

Anthropology and Security Studies

Fina Antón Hurtado & Giovanni Ercolani

Foreword by Luis Álvarez Munárriz



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Colección: Cultura y Sociedad

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Anthropology and Security Studies

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Contents

FOREWORD: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SECURITY	5
Luis Álvarez Munárriz	
PRÓLOGO: ENFOQUE ANTROPOLÓGICO DE LA SEGURIDAD	15
Luis Álvarez Munárriz	
INTRODUCTION: ANTHROPOLOGY AND SECURITY STUDIES	25
Fina Antón Hurtado and Giovanni Ercolani	
1. CONSIDERATIONS ON ANTHROPOLOGY AND CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES IN A GLOBALIZED CONTEXT: THE NATO CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE AS AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL SPACE	55
Giovanni Ercolani	
2. VISUAL ETHNOGRAPHIES, CONFLICT AND SECURITY	119
Chris Farrands	
3. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACEKEEPING: ONE DOMAIN WHERE POLITICAL REALISM AND CRITICAL SECURITY THEORY WILL MEET	153
Harvey Langholtz	
4. “THE REVOLUTION CONTINUES WORLDWIDE!” EMANCIPATORY POLITICS IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL INSECURITY	169
Danielle Moretti-Langholtz	

**5. ANTHROPOLOGICAL METHODS IN COUNTER-TRAFFICKING
ACTIVITIES: ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND VICTIM-
ORIENTED APPROACH**

185

Desirée Pangerc

**6. ANTHROPOLOGY AND CONFLICTS. TODAY'S WARS AND
PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: WHY AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE IS NEEDED**

199

Marco Ramazzotti

**CONCLUSIONS. A NEW GRAMMAR FOR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN A NEW WORLD ORDER**

227

Maurizio Boni

THE CONTRIBUTORS

255

Foreword: Anthropological Approach to Security¹

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Security is a universal aspiration of human beings that is present in all times and in all cultures. This exhaustive contention can be understood and accepted if we reflect upon the meaning and the role it plays in life of any person. In essence, every human being wants to live in peace, in a sociologically and ecologically friendly environment, and avoid all the threats and risks that endanger him or her at any cost. Security is a state of wellbeing that enables one to exercise one's freedom to develop the project of life that every human being seeks to put in practice.

In our society, being defined as the risk society, security is regarded as the most precious goods. However, a considerable part of the population lives in greater insecurity due to the fear of losing the high degree of economic and social development, that is to say, the fear of having to change one's lifestyle. The fall of New York's Twin Towers on 9/ 11 is an example which can help us to understand the degree of importance which people place upon security. Why did this terrorist attack take place? Could it have been avoided? What went wrong? These questions are important to people and we must address them because no one could have imagined that such a disaster could occur in the most powerful and secure country on the planet. And it also helps us understand that there are many disciplines and theories about the nature and scope of security. It should not surprise us since it is an aspiration that affects all of the areas of human life. But this multidisciplinary treatment has transformed the concept of security into a

¹ Prof. Fina Antón Hurtado and Dr. Giovanni Ercolani would like to thank Ms. Marina Miron (MA War & Contemporary Conflict) for the translation of this Foreword.

polysemous and ambiguous term. This is precisely the reason why we need to establish what is meant by security.

Thus, security is understood as the feeling that people have when they are able to live in peace and harmony with other members of the social group, to which they belong, and enjoy the goods offered by the inhabited territory. It is a state of wellbeing that advances the achievement of the life project every human being wants to execute in order to give a true meaning to her or his life. In a negative sense it can be described as the absence or exclusion of any contingency, threat or danger that could destroy that sense of calmness and tranquillity. To do this end it is necessary to avoid all those factors that may generate uncertainty, uneasiness, fear or pain in people's daily life.

Anthropology is a knowledge that must inevitably address this topic insofar as it examines those issues related to people's concerns and interests. Its contribution is important since it provides a vision of the human being that constitutes a solid basis for constructing a comprehensive security model. A robust and productive model consists of four key variables. Let us examine each one of them separately.

1. Individual dimension: human security

Being a reference point for people human security is designed to prevent both violent and nonviolent threats, which they may suffer. From this perspective, the basic and fundamental objective of security is to ensure a life worthy of people. Thus, it can be described as protection of individuals from risks to their physical or psychological safety as well as the dignity and quality of life which all persons have the right lead. In fact, any person by the mere fact of being a person is an absolute value in itself. From this follows that individuals are those who should primarily be protected. If we ask ourselves what kind of properties are those that make us men and *enable us to match* with one another, the answer is clear: we are all individuals

and should be treated as such. The category of persons is a sphere in which the universal and the personal are merged together. Once born, a person finds herself in a social environment the culture of which shapes her ways of being, thinking and acting. But it is not the society that makes her become a person but rather the characteristic and the specific feeling of every human being. All human beings have fundamental rights being linked to their existence which cannot be relinquished and which no one can deprive them of. Therefore, we can assert, in accordance with this principle, that there is a number of rights that is positioned above the interests of the state. Subsequently, the state should adopt effective measures of protection in order to warrant those.

There are many aspects involved in human security. We have already established that it encompasses of large number of domains such as peace, healthy and satisfactory diet, health and education, housing, retirement protection, freedom to choose one's society model, respect for human rights, environmental protection, control of the biotechnological risk, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc. In any case, it should be emphasized that, in my view, there are three basic and fundamental domains. We must concentrate all our efforts upon those domains for addressing the root causes of insecurity.

First and foremost, it must be emphatically stated that lives of people are sacred. It is not necessary to appeal to religious principles in order to grasp that the purpose of life is life itself. By taking a person's life (*that is killing a person*) one takes away the most precious thing she has, i.e. everything. Hence, the state must provide for effective protection measures against individual actions that may threaten or take the life of any person inhabiting its territory. Similarly, the state should avoid unjust and sometimes illegal actions, which its security forces might commit in a foreign territory resulting in deaths of many people, at all costs. The right to personal integrity is closely related to this "primary" value. This right deals with acts of violence or crime committed by individuals who might endanger not only life but also, and above all, bodily integrity of a person.

In this domain we must not only reject but also ensure the elimination of both production and use of antipersonnel landmines, which struggles against human trafficking, organ trading, kidnapping, slave or forced labour, etc. We must be aware that violation of this right leaves people with an indelible imprint, which inevitably generates hatred and violence. And thirdly, in developed societies the right to satisfy one's basic needs is associated with the right to work which its possessor can satisfy.

Economic globalization is producing the opposite effect of what it was supposed to achieve, namely, to free both developed (pockets of poverty) and underdeveloped countries from hunger and misery. In the latter case poverty has been increasing by leaps and bounds, being further aggravated by post-colonial conflicts and internal wars which for a number of people resulted in a wish to escape from inhuman conditions because they did not find their way out of this situation in their own country. This leads to formation of areas of insecurity that will ultimately endanger security of both the underdeveloped countries and the most developed ones.

The major part of security studies neglect this dimension focusing instead on national and international security. Military forces serve as a guarantor of the territorial integrity and political sovereignty against external aggression. The measures for preventing internal as well as external conflicts take precedence. However, human security implies more than just mere absence of those conflicts. We have to be aware that security of human lives is much more fundamental. It is so essential that failure to ensure this type of security will actually endanger any other kind of security. Not having a guarantee for her survival for whatever reason and knowing she will die sooner or later a person has no difficulty to kill while dying. By avoiding war and famine, which threaten to cause death to people's lives or even cause it in many cases, is a contribution to increase of our security.

2. Social dimension: public security

Tensions, struggles and use of force constitute an element being constantly present throughout the history of mankind, both between individuals and between nations. And similarly present is the effort of the members of any social group to avoid what Hobbes termed as *the war of all*

against all. Since the emergence of the modern state one appeals to its power to guarantee security of its citizens. It is taken for granted, however, that it is the only entity with the power to legally employ the monopoly on violence. Analysis of failed states demonstrates the correctness of this decision. Nowadays, it is considered that security must be present in the basic structure of any society. We agree that public institutions, always operating within the framework of the rule of law, have sufficient capacity to ensure the exercise of these rights and to efficiently respond when those are violated. History shows that in order to avoid social instability people provided themselves with different laws and traditions, but the most effective one of them has always been the one that comes with the rules established by a democratically legitimized state.

In such transfer we lose a part of our freedom, that is to say, security in exchange for freedom. This complies with the following principle: the greater the degree of security, the lesser the degree of freedom. History shows us that security has been used with great frequency for avoiding or delaying cultural changes and for strengthening *de facto* powers. The main challenge lies in adequate adjustment of the delicate connection that must be established in this binomial in order not to put an end to the rule of law which has to protect all of us. To this end we need to establish public security policies based upon effective and also democratically consensual legal framework. Both the powers and the security forces of the state must fully adjust themselves to the aforementioned legal framework. This will allow avoiding any misuse or illegal use of power that citizen grant to the state. Respect for it will prevent violation of the rights of people by its agents; these could be torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or

situations of unlawful use of nonlethal force. And more, citizens should be more concerned with their demand of the legal fulfillment of the already established security measures, than requesting an increase of number of security measures.

We live in a society that is highly preoccupied with the issue of security. Anthropology has been observing that people are becoming more vigilant, wary and cautious both in public and private spheres. There is a number of thinkers who talk about obsession and henceforth the myth of security. It is described not as fear but as anxiety referring to an unidentifiable threat that can arise from any part of the world. All of us need to be aware of the fact that absolute security is impossible and that the way to reach a fair degree of security can be achieved by maintenance of traditional customs seeking to preserve confidence in people. But it is precisely the dysfunction that exists between what we think and what we practice in social life preventing us from reaching that ideal. Therefore, we must convince ourselves that it is precisely that mistrust which generates the tension that can gradually undermine the security we all desire.

3. Symbolic dimension: cultural security

It is true that we are entering a hyper-connected, multipolar and post-Western world.

But it is equally true that is organized and governed by the standards that created the knowledge arisen in this area of civilization. Through the so-called mass culture it has imposed upon the rest of the societies its ways of thinking and living: Western man determines *the Man*. The rejection of this foisting allows us to understand that we are in a situation of cultural war. The sense of cultural roots and defence of cultural identity have pushed the boundaries of what was considered to be personal to become a problem of national and international security. For example, Samuel Huntington *clashed* the Western civilization with others: “Islamic civilization”, “Hindu civilization”, “Buddhist civilization” etc. One can

disagree with both the ideas and the proposals suggested by this political scientist, but by no means can we deny the existence of the tension, which endangers citizens' security, between people belonging different cultures. The feeling of belonging is a vital need of people. It is much more complex than the dichotomy presented by the aforementioned author; it is expressed in a way of cultural or ethnic identity, and is considered to be a value all of us have to respect.

Presence of tensions or cultural clashes generates pressing social problems, which threaten harmony among the members of our increasingly multicultural societies, on a national level. They affect specific political issues such as immigration legislation, rules of conduct of everyday life, by-laws of an orthodoxy and legitimization of violence and/ or insurrection. Also, on the international level the defense of cultural identity, which is considered to be under attack, is put forward by the populists, especially, and taken as a fighting weapon of their politics in the domestic realms as well as the exterior. We are also aware of the difficulties that the military has had both in peace building missions and in wars, in order to resolve conflicts confronting a cultural shock (clash) they have had to overcome when interacting with people from different cultures.

People are not miniature reproductions of their own society. The experience of their relationship with members of their social group generates a self-conception that is resolved in a consistent symbolization of what one thinks one is and should do. Sociocultural factors are a *condicio sine qua non*, i.e. an essential condition, for their development. A living culture is the one whose members decide to take charge of the social process to mould their own future, namely, to generate a sense. They can achieve it when they respect other communities and, within the global context, which overwhelms us, negotiate with the rest for being able to freely build their own history. It is the one that, without rejecting its own cultural identity, decides to appropriate its fate and to seek the meaning as a community within the wide range of possibilities offered by human nature.

In this new globalized context the challenge facing us is to recognize the intrinsic value of the contributions of the immense wealth of cultures that have shaped the cultural heritage of Humanity. Culture is a dialogue, an exchange of ideas and experiences, appreciation of other values and traditions, and this is why it withers and dies in isolation. This involves respect for the system of beliefs, values and norms that shape the culture of people. In any case this does not imply acceptance of moral relativism. Cultural pluralism can be identified neither with subjectivism nor with

relativism. There are universal principles that all cultures should respect. This, however, does not involve forcing them upon other societies but rather convincing their members of their validity. This is the only realistic way to avoid a clash of civilizations and to progress towards peace and security of nations.

4. Territorial dimension: geopolitical security

Western culture supports the idea and the conviction that we are moving towards the ability to finally build a global society. In this future scenario nation-states will have to disappear for various reasons. One of the main reasons offered here is the obvious fact that alone they cannot deal with security threats that might emerge from anywhere on the globe. The instrumental power of nation-states is really insufficient to resolve problems arising from globalization. Yet, the harsh reality is that states do not cede their power, and we are walking towards an increasingly nationalized society. We also consider the creation of international institutions, which would be able to harmonize states' interests and further stop states' abuses of power utilizing force on the margin of the laws established and accepted by most nations and even beyond, to be a utopia. The current world system is not democratic, and the dynamics of extremist rhetoric cannot control violations of the rules. Those currently existing depend directly upon the interests of dominant states led by the power of the United States. A period of uncertainty that commenced after the decline, or in a way disappearance,

of the American empire must be unavoidably overcome. In this situation a new and subtle form of imperialism is emerging: an economic and political block aiming to shape the future of the planet. It consists of the most developed countries of the world excluding China. The West does not resign itself to losing the power it has once had over other countries. Many people regard this effort of the geopolitical union as a way to maintain American power and at the same time to stop the rise of China.

It is plausible enough to think that one could never accomplish creating this large network of countries being united and facing China. Rather, one can anticipate a future defined by strong states and world powers that can be converted into *the core* to which anthropologists refer as civilization units. Yet, it is more probable to anticipate a future consisting of strong and mighty states that connect themselves to other states with similar interests and cultural traditions. Until now we can affirm that new arising state entities can survive only through their compliance in form of patronage to a strong and powerful state, be it a neighbouring one or a remote one. It is an indication to suppose that there a new empire that will dominate the planet will not come into sight and, therefore, it will not turn itself into a superpower to dominate the planet. The strongest candidate to assume this role could be China, however, in fact, it does not show any overt signs of its willingness to do so. But analyzing its immense economic and military power as well as its presence in every part of the world immediately leads to the question: what will be China's role as a superpower that possesses interests in all parts of the planet?

In this situation of uncertainty what is needed mostly is the recognition that we are moving towards a polycentric world. Certainly, we can praise the idea of an empire that would guarantee the safety of the planet. But such future defined by imperialism remains unrealistic. What we have to do is to convince ourselves that it is crucial to reach agreements between states according to the principles of equality, justice and solidarity. Perhaps this is a utopia since none complies with international standards interpreting them instead according to their own interests. But what must be avoided by all

means is the “polarization” between the two superpowers. For a long time they have been fighting the battle of the so-called cyber war, i.e. the use of digital technologies to find out and, thus, to enable them to attack and destroy each other’s vital centres and those of their allies respectively. Both powers are preoccupied with cyber-security. Thus far this only war is being waged in cyberspace, and its real impact is very limited and, in addition, known and agreed upon by them. But, in any case, we cannot rule out the danger a military confrontation if that, what is presently confined to the virtual sphere only, becomes reality. And we must acknowledge it in order to be able to avoid it for otherwise the risk of nuclear threat, which we have already considered as past, would re-emerge. This threat is much more dangerous than the non-identifiable threat that is posed by the international terrorism. Let us be aware that nuclear threat will be present as long as nuclear weapons continue existing.

Prólogo: enfoque antropológico de la seguridad

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La seguridad es una aspiración universal de los seres humanos que está presente en todas las épocas y en todas las culturas. Esta taxativa afirmación se puede entender y aceptar si reflexionamos sobre el significado y la función que desempeña en la vida de cualquier persona. En efecto, todo ser humano desea vivir en paz en un medio socio-ecológico agradable y evitar a toda costa las amenazas y los riesgos que la ponen en peligro. La seguridad es un estado de bienestar que garantiza el ejercicio de la libertad para poder desarrollar el proyecto de vida que todo ser humano aspira a realizar.

En nuestra sociedad, definida como la sociedad del riesgo, se valora la seguridad como el bien máspreciado. Sin embargo una parte considerable de la población vive en la mayor inseguridad porque teme perder el alto grado de desarrollo económico y social alcanzado, es decir, a tener que cambiar su estilo de vida. El desastre de las torres gemelas de New York el 11 de septiembre es un ejemplo que nos puede servir para entender la importancia que la gente otorga a la seguridad. ¿Por qué se cometió este atentado terrorista? ¿Se pudo evitar? ¿Qué falló? Son preguntas relevantes que se hace la gente y que debemos abordar porque nadie pudo imaginar que en el país más poderoso y seguro del planeta pudiera ocurrir semejante catástrofe. Y también nos ayuda a entender que existan muchas disciplinas y muchas teorías sobre la naturaleza y el alcance de la seguridad. No debería extrañarnos puesto que se trata de una aspiración que afecta a todos los ámbitos de la vida humana. Pero este tratamiento multidisciplinar ha convertido el concepto de seguridad en un término polisémico y ambiguo. De ahí la conveniencia de fijar qué entendemos por seguridad.

La seguridad se entiende aquí como el sentimiento que tienen las personas de poder vivir en paz y armonía con los miembros del grupo

social al que pertenecen y poder disfrutar de los bienes que le ofrece el territorio que habitan. Es un estado de bienestar que favorece la consecución del proyecto vital que todo ser humano aspira a realizar para poder dar un genuino sentido a su vida. Negativamente se puede describir como la ausencia o exclusión de cualquier contingencia, amenaza o riesgo que pueda destruir esa sensación de calma y tranquilidad. Para ello hay que evitar todos aquellos factores que puedan generar incertidumbre, intranquilidad, miedo o dolor en la vida cotidiana de la gente.

La Antropología es un saber que necesariamente debe abordar este tema en la medida que estudia aquellas cuestiones que preocupan e interesan a la gente. Su contribución es relevante puesto que proporciona una visión del ser humano que constituye una sólida base para construir un modelo integral de la seguridad. Un modelo robusto y fértil que consta de cuatro variables esenciales. Veamos cada una de ellas por separado.

1. Dimensión individual: seguridad humana

Tiene como punto de referencia a las personas y está encaminada a evitar las amenazas tanto violentas como no violentas que puedan sufrir. Desde esta perspectiva el objetivo básico y fundamental de la seguridad es garantizar la vida digna de las personas. Se puede describir como la protección de los individuos de los riesgos contra su seguridad física o psicológica así como a la dignidad y calidad de vida a la que toda persona tiene derecho. En efecto, toda persona por el mero hecho de ser persona constituye un valor absoluto. Son, por tanto, los individuos los que primariamente deben ser protegidos. Si nos preguntamos cuáles son aquellas propiedades de clase que nos hacen ser hombres y coincidir con los demás, la respuesta es clara: todos somos personas y como tales debemos ser tratados. La categoría de persona es el ámbito en el que se disuelve lo universal y lo particular. Se nace y se es persona dentro de un medio social cuya cultura conforma sus modos de ser, pensar y actuar. Pero no es la sociedad la que la convierte en persona sino que es un rasgo propio y un sentimiento específico de cada ser humano. Todo ser humano tiene

derechos fundamentales que están ligados a su existencia que en manera alguna puede ceder y de los cuales nadie le puede desposeer. De acuerdo con este principio podemos afirmar que existen una serie de derechos que están por encima de los intereses del Estado. Éste debe adoptar medidas de protección eficaces para garantizarlos.

Son muchos los aspectos que implica la seguridad humana. Hemos aprendido que engloba una gran cantidad de dominios como pueden ser la paz, una alimentación sana y suficiente, la salud y la educación, vivienda digna, protección en la vejez, libertad de escoger el modelo de sociedad, el respeto por los derechos humanos, la protección del medio ambiente, control del riesgo biotecnológico, la no proliferación de armas nucleares, etc. De todas maneras conviene subrayar que, a mi modo de ver, existen tres que son básicos y fundamentales. En ellos debemos concentrar todos nuestros esfuerzos para atacar las causas profundas de la inseguridad.

En primer lugar hay que afirmar taxativamente que la vida de las personas es sagrada. No es necesario apelar a principios religiosos para entender que el fin de la vida es la vida misma. Si a una persona le quitan la vida le quitan lo más preciado que tiene, es decir, todo. El Estado debe garantizar medidas de protección eficaces frente a las acciones de particulares que puedan amenazar o quitar la vida de las personas que habitan en su territorio. También evitar a toda costa el uso indebido y a veces ilegal que las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado hacen en territorio ajeno causando la muerte de muchas personas. Con este valor “principal” se halla íntimamente relacionado el derecho de la integridad personal. Este derecho tiene que ver con los hechos de violencia o delincuencia cometidos por particulares que puedan poner en peligro no solo la vida sino sobre todo la integridad corporal. En este ámbito debemos rechazar y asegurar que se elimine la producción y uso de minas terrestres antipersona, que se combata la trata de personas, el comercio de órganos, el secuestro, el trabajo esclavo o forzado, etc. Debemos ser conscientes que la vulneración de este derecho produce en las personas una huella indeleble que acaba generando odio y violencia. Y en tercer lugar el derecho a la satisfacción de las necesidades básicas que en las sociedades desarrolladas se identifica con el

derecho al trabajo que quien lo posee las puede satisfacer. La globalización económica está produciendo el efecto contrario al que se pretendía alcanzar: liberar a los países tanto desarrollados (bolsas de pobreza) como subdesarrollados de la miseria y el hambre. En éstos últimos está aumentando la pobreza a pasos agigantados, se agrava con los conflictos poscoloniales y guerras internas, y como consecuencia de ello la cantidad de gente que quiere escapar de condiciones inhumanas porque no encuentran una salida a esa situación en su propio país. Se están creando zonas de inseguridad que terminarán por poner en peligro la seguridad tanto de los propios países como la de los más desarrollados.

La mayor parte de los estudios de seguridad descuidan esta dimensión para centrarse en la seguridad nacional o internacional. El poderío militar como garante de la integridad territorial y la soberanía política contra las agresiones externas. Priman las medidas para evitar conflictos tanto internos como externos. Pero la seguridad humana implica mucho más que la ausencia de los mismos. Debemos concienciarnos que la seguridad de las vidas humanas es mucho más fundamental. Tan esencial que si no se garantiza este tipo de seguridad realmente se pone en peligro cualquier otro tipo de seguridad. Una persona que, por diversas causas, no tiene garantizada su supervivencia y sabe que tarde o temprano va a morir, no tiene ninguna dificultad en morir matando. Evitar la guerra y el hambre que ponen en peligro o causan la muerte de las personas, es contribuir a que nuestra seguridad sea mayor.

2. Dimensión social: seguridad ciudadana

Las tensiones, las luchas y el uso de la fuerza ha sido una constante en la historia de la humanidad, tanto entre personas como entre pueblos. Y también el esfuerzo de los miembros de cualquier grupo social para evitar lo que Hobbes denominó la lucha de todos contra todos. Desde la aparición del Estado moderno se apela a su poder para garantizar la seguridad de los ciudadanos. Se da por sentado que es el único que tiene la fuerza para utilizar legalmente el monopolio de la violencia. El análisis de los Estados

fallidos demuestra lo acertado de esta decisión. Hoy se considera que la seguridad debe estar presente en la estructura básica de cualquier sociedad. Aceptamos que las instituciones públicas tengan la capacidad suficiente, siempre en el marco del Estado de Derecho, para garantizar el ejercicio de estos derechos y para responder con eficacia cuando estos sean vulnerados. La historia nos muestra que para evitar la inestabilidad social la gente se ha dotado de diversas tradiciones y leyes, pero que la más eficaz es la que proviene de las normas fijadas por un Estado democráticamente legitimado.

En esta cesión perdemos parte de nuestra libertad. Seguridad a cambio de libertad. Se cumple el siguiente principio: A mayor grado de seguridad menor grado de libertad. La historia nos muestra que la seguridad se ha utilizado con mucha frecuencia para evitar o retrasar los cambios culturales y fortalecer los poderes fácticos. El reto consiste en ajustar adecuadamente la delicada conexión que debe establecerse en este binomio para no acabar con el Estado de Derecho que a todos nos debe amparar. Para conseguirlo se deben establecer políticas de seguridad ciudadana basadas en un marco jurídico adecuado y además democráticamente consensuado. A él se deben ajustar plenamente los poderes y las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado. Ello permitirá evitar el uso abusivo o ilícito del poder que los ciudadanos otorgan al Estado. Su respeto podrá evitar que sus agentes vulneren los derechos de las personas como pueden ser las torturas, tratos crueles, inhumanos o degradantes o situaciones de uso ilegítimo de la fuerza no letal. Y más que un aumento de las medidas de seguridad debe ser preocupación de los ciudadanos exigir que se cumplan las legalmente establecidas.

Vivimos en una sociedad altamente preocupada por la cuestión de la seguridad. La Antropología constata que las personas se están volviendo más vigilantes, desconfiadas y cautelosas tanto a nivel público como privado. Son muchos los pensadores que hablan de obsesión y por ello del mito de la seguridad. Se califica no de miedo sino de angustia que remite a una amenaza no identificable que puede surgir desde cualquier parte del planeta. Todos debemos concienciarnos de que la seguridad total es imposible y que el camino para conseguir grados justos de seguridad pasa

por el mantenimiento de las costumbres tradicionales que aspiraban a mantener la confianza en las personas. Pero es la disfunción que existe entre lo que pensamos y lo que practicamos en la vida social lo que impide alcanzar ese ideal. Por ello debemos convencernos que es precisamente la desconfianza lo que genera la tensión que puede ir minando poco a poco la seguridad que todos anhelamos.

3. Dimensión simbólica: seguridad cultural

Es cierto que estamos entrando en un mundo hiperconectado, multipolar y post-occidental. Pero también es cierto que está configurado y se rige por los cánones que creó el saber surgido en esta área de civilización. A través de la denominada cultura de masas ha impuesto al resto de las sociedades sus modos de pensar y vivir: identifica hombre occidental con el Hombre. El rechazo de esta imposición nos permite entender que estemos en una situación de guerra cultural. El sentimiento de arraigo cultural y la defensa de la propia identidad cultural han traspasado los límites de lo que se consideraba íntimo para convertirse en un problema de seguridad nacional e internacional. Por ejemplo: Samuel Huntington enfrenta la civilización occidental con las otras: “civilización islámica”, “civilización hindú”, “civilización budista”, etc. Se puede estar en desacuerdo tanto con las ideas como con las propuestas de este politólogo, pero en manera alguna se puede negar la existencia de una tensión entre pueblos con culturas diferentes que pone en peligro la seguridad de los ciudadanos. El sentimiento de pertenencia es una necesidad vital de las personas, es mucho más compleja que la dicotomía que presenta este autor, se expresa en forma de identidad cultural o étnica y se considera un valor que todos tienen que respetar.

La presencia de tensiones o enfrentamientos culturales genera, a nivel nacional, problemas sociales urgentes que ponen en peligro la armonía entre los miembros de nuestras sociedades cada vez más multiculturales. Afectan a temas políticos concretos como la legislación sobre emigración, normas de conducta para la vida diaria, la constitución de una ortodoxia, la legitimización de la violencia y/ o de la insurrección. A nivel internacional también se esgrime, especialmente por los populistas, la defensa de la identidad cultural que se considera atacada y la toman como arma de lucha en su política tanto interior como exterior. También se conocen las dificultades que han tenido los militares, tanto en misiones de paz como de guerra, para resolver los conflictos ante el choque cultural que tienen que superar cuando contactan con pueblos de culturas diferentes.

Las personas no son reproducciones en miniatura de su propia sociedad. La experiencia de su relación con los miembros de su grupo social genera una auto-concepción que se resuelve en una simbolización consistente de lo que uno piensa que es y debe hacer. Los factores socioculturales son condición *sine qua non* para su desarrollo. Una cultura viva es aquella cuyos miembros deciden tomar las riendas del proceso social para configurar su propio futuro, es decir, generar sentido. Lo pueden alcanzar cuando respetan a otras comunidades y, dentro del contexto global que nos embarga, negocia con el resto para poder construir en libertad su propia historia. Es aquella que, sin renunciar a su propia identidad cultural, decide apropiarse de su destino y buscar el sentido como comunidad dentro del amplio arco de posibilidades que ofrece la naturaleza humana.

En este nuevo contexto globalizado el reto que tenemos por delante es reconocer el valor intrínseco de las contribuciones de la inmensa riqueza de culturas que han ido configurando el patrimonio cultural de la Humanidad. La cultura es diálogo, intercambio de ideas y experiencias, apreciación de otros valores y tradiciones y, en consecuencia, se agota y muere en el aislamiento. Ello supone el respeto por el sistema de creencias, valores y normas que conforman la cultura de los pueblos. De todas maneras ello no supone la aceptación del relativismo moral. Pluralismo cultural no se

identifica con subjetivismo o relativismo. Hay principios universales que todas las culturas deben respetar. Pero ello no implica que haya que imponerlos a otras sociedades sino convencer a sus miembros de su validez. Es el único camino realista para evitar el choque de civilizaciones y poder caminar hacia la paz y la seguridad de las naciones.

4. Dimensión territorial: seguridad geopolítica

En la cultura occidental persiste la idea y la convicción de que estamos caminando y finalmente seremos capaces de construir una sociedad global. En este escenario de futuro los Estados-nación tendrían que desaparecer por muchas razones. Una de las principales razones que se esgrimen es el hecho evidente de que por sí solos no pueden hacer frente a las amenazas contra la seguridad que pueden provenir de cualquier parte del globo. El poder instrumental de los Estados-nación resulta realmente insuficiente para solucionar los problemas que plantea la globalización. Pero la cruda realidad es que los Estados no ceden poder y que estamos caminando hacia una sociedad cada vez más estatalizada. Constatamos también que es una utopía la creación de unas instituciones internacionales que serían capaces de armonizar los intereses de los Estados y además frenar los abusos del poder de los Estados que utilizan la fuerza al margen y fuera de las leyes establecidas y aceptadas por la mayoría de las naciones. El actual sistema mundial no es democrático y la violación de las normas no puede controlar la dinámica de los discursos extremistas. Las que actualmente existen dependen directamente de los intereses de los Estados poderosos y comandados por el poder de Estados Unidos. Tras el declive, en manera alguna desaparición, del imperio americano se abre un periodo de incertidumbre que es absolutamente necesario superar. En esta situación está emergiendo una nueva y sutil forma de imperialismo: un bloque económico y político que pretende diseñar el futuro del planeta. Está constituido por los países más desarrollados de la tierra con la exclusión de China. Occidente no se resigna a perder el poder que antaño tuvo sobre el resto de los países. Son muchos los que interpretan este intento de unión

geopolítica como una forma de mantener el poder americano y al mismo tiempo de frenar el ascenso de China.

Es bastante plausible pensar que nunca se conseguirá esta gran red de países unidos y enfrentados a China. Más bien se puede anticipar un futuro con Estados fuertes o potencias mundiales que se pueden convertir en el núcleo de lo que los antropólogos denominamos unidades de civilización. Parece más verosímil anticipar un futuro con Estados fuerte y poderosos a los que se conectan otros Estados con intereses y tradiciones culturales semejantes. Hasta ahora constatamos que las nuevas entidades estatales surgidas solo pueden sobrevivir por medio de la sumisión clientelista a un Estado fuerte y poderoso, vecino o lejano. Es un indicio para suponer que no aparecerá un nuevo imperio que domine el planeta y que, por tanto, no se va a convertir en un superpoder que lo domine. El más firme candidato para asumir este papel podría ser China que de hecho no da signos manifiestos de querer asumirlo. Pero al analizar su inmenso poder económico y militar así como su presencia en todos los rincones del mundo inmediatamente surge la pregunta: ¿cuál va a ser el papel de China como una superpotencia que tiene intereses en todas las partes del planeta?

En esta situación de incertidumbre es cuando más se necesita el reconocimiento de que estamos caminando a un mundo policéntrico. Se puede ensalzar la idea de un imperio que garantizaría la seguridad del planeta. Pero ese futuro imperial no es realista. Lo que tenemos es que convencernos de la necesidad de llegar a acuerdos entre Estados según los principios de la igualdad, la justicia y la solidaridad. Quizás esto sea una utopía porque ninguno respeta las normas internacionales sino que las interpretan según sus propios intereses. Pero lo que a toda costa debemos evitar es la “polarización” entre las dos grandes superpotencias. Hace tiempo que están librando la batalla de la denominada ciberguerra: el uso de las tecnologías digitales para conocer y así poder atacar y destruir los centros vitales del otro y de sus de los aliados. Ambas potencias están obsesionadas por la ciberseguridad. De momento esta guerra solamente se está librando en el ciberespacio y su impacto real es muy limitado y además conocido y consensuado entre ellos. Pero no podemos en manera alguna

descartar el peligro de un enfrentamiento militar si lo que por el momento es solamente virtual se convierte en real. Y debemos saberlo para poder evitarlo porque de lo contrario volvería a aparecer el riesgo de la amenaza nuclear que ya dábamos por terminada. Es una amenaza mucho más peligrosa que la no identificable que supone el terrorismo internacional. Démonos cuenta de que mientras existan armas atómicas la amenaza nuclear persiste.

‘Know thyself’

Introduction: Anthropology and Security Studies

Fina Antón Hurtado and Giovanni Ercolani²

1. The production of knowledge and Security Studies

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and a set of equally important other changes in the global system around 1989-92, which included the acceleration of change in China and in the Middle East as well as in East-West relations, there has been a transformation of the concept of security away from a relatively fixed ‘traditional’ image. But, much more than changes in a concept alone, there have been transformations in social practice and in the political and discursive practices which produce and sustain ideas of security. These shifts have ranged from the everyday detail of quotidian life to the grand narratives of conflict, ‘war on terror’, fear and anxiety. They touch the management of international institutions and civil society as well as states and governments. They reach well beyond the traditional boundaries of academic political science and academic international relations, although they have engaged with both. What this unpredictable –and unpredicted– event revealed to us is that all those previous authenticated reports, which were sold as knowledge during the cold war, were not innocent narratives or words without responsibilities, but most of the time, all the discourses, concepts, and ideologies based on that narrative, were structures for themselves. This begs questions about the relationships between what is understood as knowledge and received wisdom, what everyday behaviour and everyday practices imply, and the

² The authors would like to thank Prof. Christopher Farrands for his constructive comments and his editing contribution.

narratives, discourses, language and ideologies of security. In this volume, the authors collectively argue that this is a field to which anthropology can contribute powerfully. We do not doubt the relevance of politics or international relations or critical security studies; but we do deny them a monopoly. This introduction sets out the basic argument for anthropology of security which each chapter elaborates in its own way.

However, the collection of the body of evidence and argument which emerged in this re-evaluation of security revealed something more than the simple pretended scientificity of the various International Relations and Security theories. These, on the official accepted perceptions, found their validity, and scientific legitimacy, and then, as a result of this authentication protocol, their undisputed right to describe the insecure reality. The accumulated evidences displayed the vital connection between the theories and the very structures that produced these theses. Then this body of evidence was used to question the scientific validity of the theories, and the truth and the underlying intentions of the very structure that produced them. Established theories and structures which had come to have a unique status as powerful discourses and explanations came to be challenged by these new critical and multidisciplinary approaches which started producing different and contrasting discourses on the same realities. In this new globalized world, despite the fact that various voices can be heard, and ideally everyone is interconnected, still the realm of the certification of what constitute knowledge is a real battlefield, as the Foucauldian critique of relations of power-knowledge have suggested.

Thus while some theory-structures found themselves apparently obsolete or inadequate for the new political-economic-social global landscape, and some had to leave the stage and vanish, other structures fought back fiercely in order to survive and to retain their part of power (political, economical, social and symbolical), which the new realities, and with them new perceptions and methodologies were putting at risk. However, this process of re-adaptation, which started just after the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, is still incomplete today, and sees confronting structures of knowledge producing opposite or antagonistic security theories which vie to have their voices heard. As an example, if we had to retrace all the narratives which under the label of 'security' described

particular historical social events like the Bosnian War, the Kosovo conflict, and the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11th, and which accompanied, and justified, particular western policy and/or military operations like the Kosovo intervention, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the recent war in Libya against the inhuman authoritarian regime of Gaddafi, then we will notice a dramatic gap between the *a priori* narrative texts which justified the intervention, and the *a posteriori* realities present in the territories of the 'other' which were transformed in the theatre of military-humanitarian operations. Whenever these *a priori* narratives had the function to describe bloody events and mobilize an international political support for some specific humanitarian and military operations, in the end they participated in the production of a set of specific ethnocentric values which reinforced the official narrating structures of knowledge. If those dramatic events were translated through interpretive understanding, the translation stands as an exercise of power which produces a dominant language and a new world of identities of exclusion and inclusion.

The problem here is ambivalent in the sense that not only the produced translations and narratives which depicted the actors and the events (the others) were far from the truth, but the main point is that the broadcasted dramatic discourses had to convince a specific target, the 'we-audience', and then for this reason, in order to persuade, they had to be constructed on a set of comprehensible stereotypes framed in a specific social and cultural value, language system: thus Umberto Eco is right to say that it is always the reader who writes the book.

However, once the 'we' international military humanitarian mission puts its foot on the 'others' theatre of operation, and the 'we' soldiers experienced the dangerous distance between the reality in which they had to operate, and the one narrated in their mission manual, it was demonstrated that a 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose'. Each perspective derives from a position in time and space, specifically in social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of colonial history, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, and of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future' (Cox 1981:126).

As an example of how particular narratives with political repercussion were orchestrated, consider the exhaustive study conducted by Lene Hansen titled 'Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War' (2007). Using discourse analysis, Hansen examines the Western construction of the Balkans during the Bosnian war. Reading this historical genealogy, which reminds the reader of the work of Edward Said on 'Orientalism', we discover how the official British and American policies based their perceptions and construction of the 'others' Balkans on two non-scientific texts, 'Robert D. Kaplan's 'Balkan Ghosts' (1993) and Rebecca West's 'Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia' (1941). The problem here is that these representations, which were assumed as 'knowledge', formed the basis for the design of specific state policies, with the result of indirectly worsening already dramatic events, with deadly repercussions on the lives of the local people involved in the conflict. This is not just the impact of unintended consequences; it is also the consequence of unreflexive or, more bluntly, ignorant assumptions at work across the post-colonial divide between dominant and peripheral actors.

During the period of the Cold War, the study of security was done under a particular hegemonic military-strategic perspective to which a specific political vision was attached, not least because the direct military threat had an identifiable face and a specific political antagonist ideology, now, after 1991, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reconstruction of European and global international relations, this Manichean construction of the world simply lost all applicability. As a consequence, we started witnessing the proclaimed exhaustion of the great ideologies, the inauguration of the new world order, the emergence of narratives which predicted the end of history in the name of a utopian global liberal world, and the apocalyptic vision of a clash of civilizations.

And of course all these discourses were politically, scientifically, and academically certified as knowledge, and in their intention they pretended to redraw new lines of demarcation. The 'we' and 'other' categories begged to be re-allocated, but fierce debates surrounded how (and whether) those lines might be re-established.

However, despite the 'scientific' prophecies with cartographic ambitions, a more critical and sceptical analysis of the reality was

simultaneously revealing that what was emerging from the ashes of the Cold War was a completely different picture from the one which symbolises the end of the Second World War when an order was established on a world divided as chessboard with only two players.

2. New Times, New Empires, and New Security Maps

‘Panta rhei’ (everything flows) reminds the philosopher Heraclitus. However, in spite of the H. G. Wells’ novel, a real time machine has not yet been invented, and the nostalgic human action of putting back the arms of the history clock is an activity which apparently has not only inspired the scripts of several entertaining movies. Time was not frozen at the point just before the Cold War ended, and even though some security theorists might have felt more comfortable sticking to their old assumptions, global politics had changed too much and too fast. As a consequence of the impossibility of returning to that distant ideal, the disciplined pre and Cold-War time, and theorists too had to adapt to the fact that we were dealing with new times, and new societies, which in turn had major repercussions on perceptions of national and international security.

The first evidence of the features of the new times was represented by the fact that the deductive idea which sustained the strategic security concept, that the principal source of insecurity was tied to a possible interstate war between the two Super Powers, had completely lost its credibility. However, the most shocking proof was represented by the palpable truth that the main holder of power was no longer solely identified with the State, and that power in its practice was not only operating inside the borders of one state state-managed empire. If we observe photographs of the Yalta Conference (February 4–11, 1945), we can clearly point out the images of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and General Secretary Joseph Stalin, and affirm that they were representing the power of United States, of the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. In this case, when we talk of State power, this has to be understood inside the legal frame which defines a sovereign state as a political and legal system with a centralized government, a supreme independent authority over a geographic area and its populations. It is a

power that also controls the use of armed forces, to which it has a full monopoly. Today, this is no longer the case even though major states retain enormous power. If we had to look now, for example, at a set of more recent pictures of a major global conference, it would be more complicated. This is the case with the picture which catches the permanent members of the United Nation Security Council, with the one of the participant to the Group of Eight (G8) forum, and finally with the official photograph of the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20). Like a rapid sequence of a movie, we will see and understand that not only the appearance of the politicians and the essence and quality of power behind them has changed, but even how the geographical location of power has shifted away from the centres of power of the geopolitical chessboard of the Cold War period. Thus the G-20 economies collectively account for more than 80 percent of the gross world product, 80 percent of world trade (including EU intra-trade), and two-thirds of the world population. New leaders not present at such a summit include the leaders of Al Qaeda and the CEOs of major banks and corporations. We can say that at least on sole occasions the old centres of power of the world are the new peripheries and the old peripheries are the new centres of power; or, as Zygmunt Bauman writes: ‘on such a planet, the past separation between the “inside” and the “outside”, or for this matter between the “centre” and the “periphery” is no longer tenable’ (Bauman, 2006: 125).

At the same time, we can add that if during the colonial period the main actors of the colonizing process were the various Empires, with the post-colonial period we see and perceive the end of the traditional imperial power. Considering now the new neoliberal political economical global context (launched after the implosion of the Soviet Union by the Western Powers), we can affirm that a neo-colonial period has been inaugurated by new neoliberal imperial powers. If the face of the old Empires has changed, the intention, the aim to ‘imperare’ (to command and to rule) of the new empires has not. But there are not simply new state actors; new institutions, and classes of actors complicate and transform the nature of power relations.

This calls into question the mainstream, and still sometimes popular, International Relations theory of Realism, which recognizes the sovereign

state as the major actor in the international system. This theory overlaps the concept of security with that of state power, and which identifies external war as the primary source of insecurity for the state, and thus maintains as a protocol of action solutions through military means. Of course, some states are sovereign in the old sense, and a few are hyper-sovereign. But a good proportion of the 196 states in the global system have only bare vestiges of sovereignty, and many key actors in the new order are not states at all. We can come to the logical conclusion that an analysis of this sort is not valid any more in the globalized system. The reasons are various, and first of all we have to look at the concept of power and how it has changed of essence in the last years.

During the Cold War, power was generally understood as domination in a 'one-dimensional view' (A has power over B to the extend that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do; Lukes, 2005: 16), and was quantified according to the number of nuclear weapons, the conventional arsenal, and the number of soldiers possessed by each of the opposing block. However this vision does not reflect the new capacities and potentialities of power in the new historical context. While the state in the pre-globalized world was still in a position to provide and promise security through military power (following the Realist formula) for its own territory, populations, and structures, today, the 'liquid' (using an expression dear to Zygmunt Bauman) threats posed by non-state actors and non-state powers to the social, economic, political, environmental, and military sectors of a state, encounter the border of a country as completely vulnerable and penetrable. As Ulrich Beck puts it, 'the nation-state has ceased to be the source of a frame of reference that encompasses all other frames of reference and enables political answer to be found. Moreover, the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 teach us that power does not translate into security' (Beck, 2006: xii). The same argument can be applied to migration, to criminal organizations' transnational activities, to the market in organs, and even to legal and illegal financial activities to which the borders of a state are largely permeable. Thus the complex realities of the post cold war period, with the restructuring of the international system and with the arrival on the stage of new great powers (more than states but less than 'superpowers') impose a new vision of the national and international

security agenda, generating what Roland Dannreuther has called ‘critical security threats’ (2008: 210). These critical security threats, which are based on five sectors of security (military, political, economical, societal, and environmental) as Barry Buzan (1991) has shown, demonstrate the kind of menaces states face. They summarize the various aspects of the vulnerabilities of the contemporary state which are not only limited to the military field or to military solutions.

As an example, the North Atlantic Allied Organization (NATO) recently affirmed that: ‘the security of the Alliance will be challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as well as non-military, that will be often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, both of which could develop rapidly. Ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, disputes over vital resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states will lead to local and regional instability’ and the ‘Alliance security interests could be affected by other extant or emerging risks including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people (particularly as a consequence of armed conflict) or disputes over often dwindling vital resources’³.

³ The recent NATO AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation on 21st century threats says: ‘0101. Large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is unlikely in the near future but the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term remains. Meanwhile the security of the Alliance will be challenged by a wide variety of risks, military as well as non-military, that will be often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, both of which could develop rapidly. Ethnic, political and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, disputes over vital resources, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states will lead to local and regional instability. The resulting tensions could create a wide spectrum of consequences, ranging from the need to provide humanitarian assistance to armed conflict. They could also affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO members and could affect the security of other states. 0102. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies would generate a response under Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, Alliance security interests could be affected by other extant or emerging risks

At the same time these threats can help us to identify, where it is possible, the sector in which multinational and non-state structures operate (not to mention the international criminal organization) with their own powers which can have military, or political, economical, societal, and environmental peculiarities. These structures at the same time have the capacity to launch and exercise their power behind and across the geographical borders of a state. However it is especially precisely one of those sectors identified by Barry Buzan, the societal one, which played an important role in the erosion of the power and legitimacy of the state in the post cold war period, and then as a consequence represents to us the second reason which confirm the inability of the state to secure its own power. If 'societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom' (Buzan, 1991: 19), what started to be experienced after the end of bipolar confrontation was a resurgence of ethnic nationalism and religious-based violence, as well as political manoeuvring in a number of countries which used ethnic and religious difference as a pretext for provoking insecurity and violence..

Whereas ethnic and identity-based discourses were already in play at the end of the Second World War as independence movements which advocated national self-determination and recognition for former colonies,

including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organized crime, uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people (particularly as a consequence of armed conflict) or disputes over often dwindling vital resources. The various forums in the Alliance give member states platforms to discuss mutual security issues under article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the opportunity to coordinate their responses to risks of this kind. 0103. The evolving strategic environment. Alliance doctrine must take into account the changing context in which armed forces are used. The strategic environment will become increasingly dynamic and complex. There will be a variety of factors that directly influence or cause change, as well as discernable patterns in that change. There will also be a handful of key strategic drivers of change: globalization of society, political geometry, demographic and environmental change and the impact of technology'. The NATO AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation is available at: [https:// www.gov.uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment data/ file/ 142538/ 20130306_ajp3_4_9_jdp3_90_cimic.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/142538/20130306_ajp3_4_9_jdp3_90_cimic.pdf).

it was ignored or subordinated to ideological considerations during the cold war because it was assumed that ideological affiliation was enough to provide identity and a cosmology of reference.

Then most of the countries and nations which saw their aggregating political identities disintegrate with the fall of the Berlin Wall, they entered in a historical period of redefinition of their own identities in order to reaffirm their sense of belonging to a meaningful universe. This is because those human groups, whose identities were attached to a particular ideology, saw their symbolic universe collapse, and with it their capacity to find those reference points which helped them to understand the world and give them a meaning to their existence. As Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann wrote: 'the symbolic universe provides a comprehensive integration of all discrete institutional process. The entire society now makes sense. Particular institutions and roles are legitimated by reference to a cosmic order of power and justice, and political roles are legitimated as representations of these cosmic principles (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 121).

It was in this period that various ethnic groups, that no longer recognized their physical, religious, and cultural position inside the political and geographical borders of their own states, and which felt increasingly menaced, entered a process of redefinition of the divide-line between the 'we' and the 'other'. It was through this activity that these groups recuperated, and most of the time, reinvented their history, as an ordered symbolic universe, with the purpose to recreate themselves, and the 'others', and to look at the future with an enthusiastic gaze at their heroic past. As Michael Ignatieff writes, analysing the face of the new nationalism in a context of identity under stress: 'Freud once argued that the smaller the real difference between two peoples the larger it was bound to loom in their imagination. He called this effect the narcissism of minor difference. Its corollary must be that enemies need each other to remind themselves of who they really are. A Croat, thus, is someone who is not a Serb. A Serb is someone who is not a Croat. Without hatred of the other, there would be no clearly defined national self worship and adore' (Ignatieff, 1984: 14).

However these signs of identities had their own specific distinctive cultural, spatial, and territorial dimensions, which most of the time did not

coincide with the factual homogenous presence of one specific group in a determined territory. Due to the social engineering policy which was one of the main characteristic of the former soviet communist countries' politics, population patterns most of the time did not correspond to any historical and cultural original territory (as was often also the case with the artificial colonial-created boundaries of new states in Asia and Africa). This is why the newly-released aspirations for identity and territory expressed by different ethnic groups contributed to those ethnic conflicts which broke out around the borders of Europe in the 1990s.

If western countries (and their security structures) were taken by surprise by these dramatic events, it is because they were still looking at the world, protected inside our fortress, with the naïve idea that we had 'won' the Cold War, and that the future of mankind would be to move to a prosperous market-led stability, perhaps forgetting the fact that the most developed territories of the western world had since the beginning of the twentieth century experienced two World Wars and the unforgettable, and indefensible drama of the Holocaust. However a further major source of western surprise was due to simple ignorance of what was going on behind our defended borders.

So far we can summarise the main critical points which emerged from an analysis of the events related to the relation between the end of the Cold War, and the production of knowledge referred to the concept of security, and which are of interest for this introduction. What emerges from this human laboratory is:

- a problem of philosophy of science in which ontological and epistemological questions have to be re-presented in order to falsify the methodology of research;
- the fact that the concept of security is not any more tied to a military interpretation and a military solution;
- the fact that the state doesn't retain the same quality and amount of power as before, and what power it does have has been transformed;
- the fact that power conceived as domination (political, economical, social, etc) is held in the hands of non-state actors and other agencies, of varying degrees of legitimacy and capability;

- that the concept of security is linked to symbolic representations of individual and collective identities;
- that no analysis can ignore the strong link between power and knowledge which informs any of the contentious discourses of security and insecurity.

These claims form the starting point for an analysis, but are not sufficient on their own to ground a stronger approach to re-thinking security. We now turn to the elaboration of a more specific approach, which will lead to an anthropological approach.

3. ‘Security is profoundly political’

The problem outlined here is not only related to the definition of the referent object of security, the individuation of the threat, the identification of enemy, and how to respond to this menace, but it is something more broad, deep, and complex. ‘Security is profoundly political’ (Dalby, 1997: 22), and as Bradley S. Klein (1997: 362) says ‘security studies was entirely a product of the post-World War II environment, when liberal societies undertook projects of both decolonizing and maintaining global order under Western protection and coordination. In Gramscian terms, security became a crucial element in the construction of hegemony – a hegemony that operated not simply between states but below them as a mechanism for binding the civil societies of the West and its aspiring allies. Its self-representation, in Hobbesian terms of an anarchic security dilemma, masked the deeper global politics of state building, elite recruitment, modernization, military-police training, and societal incorporation. Security, in other words, was never simply about preparing against military threat “out there”. It was always intended as a way of defending common ways of life. It was an inherently cultural practice that was always about more than just the deployment of weapons system’.

However, even if we do not agree with the above sentence, and we want to continuously interpret the concept of security through the military paradigm, we might look at the following two inspiring quotations, which are familiar to any strategic studies student, and then confront them, with the use of some questions, to question the possibility of putting into practice a realist-military vision of security. These specific quotations are chosen because they are often considered as the pillars of strategic visions of security analysis and policies. The first quotation from Sun Tzu's 'The Art of War' claims: 'It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle'. The second quotation is from Thucydides, who wrote that people go to war for 'fear, profit, and honour'.

Now the first empirical question that we want to pose based on the Sun Tzu quotation is the following: despite the intelligence activities, the academic research, and all the body of knowledge produced during the Cold War on our Soviet Communist foe, did we really know our enemy? If so, why were we not able to predict the fall of the Berlin Wall? And the same question can be applied to more recent dramatic events which erupted in former communist lands, including former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. Moreover, taking Thucydides' quotation, we can ask the second empirical question: when the Bosnian War erupted, why were we not able to detect how the 'others' were living their fears, honour, and self interest, and where these motivations located? In answering these two epistemological questions, which challenge the procedure of the acquisition of knowledge, a genealogical vision has to be adopted. Even if former Yugoslavia refused to take part in the communist Warsaw Pact, and instead took a neutral stance in the Cold War, still on the NATO map, and in practical terms, it was considered a communist enemy. In Italy, during the Cold War, the so called 'North-East Military Region', the Italian, and NATO, border to Yugoslavia, housed the preponderance of military units, and continuous military exercises were conducted along the borders, where a potential Soviet Communist attack was staged.

However our cartographic-cultural-social knowledge of the 'other' never surpassed that inimical frontier. In military-political-security terms it was considered enough to protect our borders through an 'Iron Wall', as for example the one provided by the tactical deployment of the tanks of the Italian 132nd Armoured Division 'Ariete'. Thus the military securitizing action arrived just where the NATO geographical territory ended. After that line, it was 'terra incognita'. However, the same military-securitizing action was conducted inside the NATO territories even without tanks. In the Italian military environment, as an example, gathering information activities were conducted even inside the military structures, and were aimed to unmask possible internal sympathizers or those affiliated to the communist cause. Once these people were spotted, they were immediately classified as potential spies, enemies, unreliable people, or even members of a 'fifth column'. Nevertheless, the same protocol of action has been used until more recent time regarding the production of knowledge regarding those 'out there' in Third World territories that at the end of the Cold War have become theatres of operations of First World military-humanitarian interventions.

And now another question which challenges the ethnocentric position of the strategic vision of security studies, and demonstrates the fallacy in the production of knowledge, and in the construction of the 'other' enemy 'out there': did we seriously think that these 'others' who did not pertain to our defined cultural, social, ethnic, economic, and geographical sphere of interpretation, to our symbolic universe, were aliens not really members of the shared primate family of the 'hominidae'? Science fiction portrays social 'others' as aliens or zombies, and sometimes provides a provocative analogy with cold war or post old war alterification, but this is surely a satire and not a basis for policy? Thus this strategic vision of security studies was completely wrong, demonstrating an extraordinarily arrogant vision of the world. Indeed these 'others' were apparently translated as mere 'bodies' which belong to a human category that Giorgio Agamben (1995) calls 'homo sacer' (bare life). Therefore, following this reasoning, we should assume that this 'homo sacer' doesn't live like 'us', he (or better 'it') has no fears, honour, or legitimate interests. Maybe we think that he/ it lives

‘out there’ on the ‘homo sacer’ planet, and sometime he/ it appears to threaten our security.

This indubitably dangerous paradigm of interpretation makes us forget that up to today we have only one planet ‘Earth’ to live in, and that our existence is, and will continue to be, inside a framework defined by the ‘anthropos’ (human being), the ‘ethos’ (the disposition, character, or fundamental values peculiar to a specific person, people, culture, or movement), the ‘oikos’ (the space, the territory, house, etc), and the ‘chronos’ (time). It is a dimension which basically demonstrated how the construction of the human being ‘other’ as a simple body is a result of the complex of power-knowledge relations.

4. Challenging the hegemonic construction of the ‘other’ and of the ‘out there’ enemies’ territories

However, even using the cultural materialism of Marvin Harris (2011), which depicts human social life as a response to the practical problems of earthly existence, and if we compare his approach to the justification of the recent ethnic, intrastate conflicts, nevertheless we can see how the ‘behavioral superstructure’, and the ‘mental superstructure’ played the most important motivational cause in those wars. According to Marvin Harris, all the components of a sociocultural system can be organized into:

- Infrastructure (Mode of Production, and Mode of Reproduction);
- Structure (the sociocultural systems which is divided in: the Political Economy and the Domestic Economy)
- Superstructure (Behavioral Superstructure, and Mental Superstructure).

For Harris, the mode of production and reproduction (infrastructure) will probabilistically determine the political and domestic structure (structure), which in turn will probabilistically determine the behavioral and mental superstructure (superstructure).

But while the infrastructure is considered to be of primary importance, the structure and superstructures are not mere reflections of infrastructural processes, but are in interaction with the infrastructure.

Consequently, even a materialist approach to culture, such as the one developed by Harris, points to those components of a sociocultural system which should be identified, analysed, and studied in order to produce an exhaustive study of the 'other' and of ourselves. However, the strategic approach to security negates this image of 'homo sacer' as one where people live in a sociocultural system characterized by an infrastructure, structure, and superstructure like ours. But in our complex interconnected and interdependent world, the structure which is in a hegemonic position of power-knowledge has the ability to separate societies according to the Levi-Strauss division of 'hot' and 'cold' societies. Then the 'we' society (Western, First World) is the 'hot' one which has its emphasis on progress and then as a rational logic has a materialist vision of the socialcultural system. On the opposite 'out there' side, we find the 'other' 'cold' societies which are 'outside of history', and where the irrational behavioural and mental structures (allegedly) retain a predominant position in their culture. And this activity of separating, classifying, and mapping our and 'other' societies goes further, because the 'homo sacers' of the 'out there' societies become subjects of an operation of the depersonalization of their own identity. This is the process that Frantz Fanon calls 'de-cerebralization', through which the 'others' 'they have been made to see themselves as other, alienated from their own culture, language, land' (Young, 2003: 146). As a result, the decerebralized 'homo sacer' lives in his own environment as if this were a 'terra incognita' to himself too.

In addition, another constant element in this sociocultural system is the topic of power. However, most of the time and due to the strategic security vision which does not pay too much attention to the structure, this element is not given much importance. Nevertheless, 'the description of the deeds of power in non-western cultures not only help us to think the political process in a different referential system which is different from ours, but it helps us to reflect, using a comparative approach, on the coherence of our own conceptions' (Abélès, 2008: 144).

There is another element too which in a way challenges the cartographic representation of the strategic security map in the land of 'us' and the 'terra incognita' 'out there'. Indeed 'what defines the contemporary world is the circulation, more than the structures and the stables

organizations (...) From an anthropological point of view, we can define globalization as an acceleration of the flux of capitals, of human beings, products, images, and ideas. This intensification of interaction and interconnection produces relations which transcend the traditional geographical and political borders' (Abélès, 2008: 40). So, due to the fact of this 'circulation', we should concentrate our attention on what circulates, what becomes liquid (and not concentrate our vision inside the geographical border of a security national concept), because fear, according to Zygmunt Bauman, is liquid too: 'On a globalized planet, populated by the forcibly "opened" societies, security cannot be gained, let alone reliably assured, in one country or in a selected group of countries: not by their own means, and not independently of the state of affairs in the rest of the world' (Bauman, 2006: 97).

If 'social anthropology, conceptually, is primarily about social relationships; only derivatively, and not necessarily, about places (Hannerz, 2010: 67) then 'the overall agenda of anthropology involves the mapping of a continuously changing human diversity' (Hannerz, 2010: 60). Therefore we have to concentrate our efforts on the faceless 'homo sacer', on his migration, his efforts to survive and live (his fear, honour, and interest), his need to belong and to have a recognized identity. And only after that, as a result of our analysis, will we be able to move away from the various ethnocentric concepts of security (which recognize us as the only legitimate locus of fear, honour, and interest) and see security as a human value from which to restart a wider human discourse. For this reason the local work of anthropology 'becomes about large issues, set in (relatively) small place, rather than detailed description of a small place for its own sake. (...) (Where) by place, we mean not only geographical locale, but also other types of "place" – within political, economic, religious, or other social system' (Hannerz, 2010: vii). And most of the time all these places can be simultaneously both outside, and inside the 'we' geographical border.

In making this argument, one needs also to recognise an important linguistic point. Because if security is generally treated as a derivative concept, which in itself and out of context is meaningless, and then to allow it to have any meaning, security appears to presuppose something to be secured; but in reality, this is not the case. Security not only has a precise

meaning due to its Latin language origin (*securitas*: without anxiety) but it has spatial and temporal dimension which make it an anthropological space of investigation.

However, once security is transformed in a concept, it becomes a grid of interpretation, which then implies a structure. Therefore, as every structure, it has its centre which operates as a kind of panopticon in the Foucauldian sense, from which it gazes and controls, through out its own paradigm, the territory, and the space of its concept. The concept itself has its own peculiar and defined language, which is controlled too. However, the main characteristic of a security concept is that it is tied to a particular political discourse, a territory, a space, a time, a 'we/ other' dividing line, and a specific situation. All of these elements, nor even one of them, can not be excluded from any security analysis.

Most of the topics discussed hitherto were already part of the arguments of a book which, in a way, inaugurated the 'critical security studies' approach: edited by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, 'Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases' (1997) represents one of the first intellectual efforts and tentative to rethink and reconceptualise the concept of 'security' after the implosion of the Soviet Union. However, its particularity is that, despite the various original and stimulating approaches developed in this book, it is the fact that it collected papers of writers who were not belonging only to the First World, but also to that periphery most of the time considered as the 'out there'. Local 'Third World' authors then translated their insecurities in our language in order to make us understand the relativism of our own vision. What emerge from the reading of this book, the evolution of the various security politics adopted by various countries or military alliances, the fact that the face of power, and the essence of threats and vulnerabilities, have changed is that 'to reinvent the study of security we have to reinvent ourselves' (Booth, 1997: 88). The book suggests that 'a critical approach to security studies may adopt the position of a stranger, but not that of an outsider' (Williams and Krause, 1997: xiii). However both efforts, the one to reinvent ourselves, and the other to assume the position of a stranger, in order to approach the field of security studies, are already available in the methodologies of the discipline of Anthropology.

5. Anthropology, Security, and neo-colonialism

It is wide recognized that there was an important link between the development of anthropology and the colonial period. In that time, most of the anthropological knowledge was used to provide specific information to those imperial power who needed to know the 'other' in order to govern and to 'Imperare' (to produce the supreme law) over him. However it is in the post-colonial moment, that the discipline of Anthropology started to develop its own independent intellectual direction of research, analysis, and cultural intention, focusing on the societies that were former colonies or on the ones that had never entered in contact with any western cultural form of life, and on the so called 'savage mind'. Now, with the emergence of the globalized world and of new forms of powers, anthropology and security studies find themselves in a particular position to cooperate and study how new powers and forms of neo-colonialism are conceptualizing, and mapping new discourse of security were new form of 'out there' 'terrae incognitae' are identified, and where new de-cerebralized 'homines sacri' are confined.

Indeed, starting from these premises, security is an anthropological space in its broad meaning, because it is a cultural concept (as a text and as a space-territory), and it is in this environment that the anthropologist of security should place himself in order not only to translate a reality, but to transpose it. It is not only the participant observation, and the thick description of the ethnographer in this space which will make the difference, but his 'emic'⁵ approach, his knowledge of the local social, cultural, linguistic, and metaphorical aspects of the local reality. At the same

⁵ 'The emic approach investigates how local people think. How they perceive and categorize the world, their rules for behavior, what has meaning for them, and how they imagine and explain things. The etic (scientist-oriented) approach shifts the focus from local observations, categories, explanations, and interpretations to those of the anthropologist. The etic approach realizes that members of a culture often are too involved in what they are doing to interpret their cultures impartially. When using the etic approach, the ethnographer emphasizes what he or she considers important'. Conrad Kottak, *Mirror for Humanity*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006, 47.

time the Anthropologist of Security will be an area specialist, with a global vision typical of International Relations scholars.

However, we have to return for a moment to the spatial and temporal dimension of security, because if every security concept, as a coherent cultural system, is a grid of interpretation, which maps a territory, then the anthropologist of security must have the ability to take a position both inside that territory of the grid of interpretation, and into that 'out there' territory/ space, that gap of frictions, which is the result of the encounter of different political concepts of security. Because 'a good interpretation of anything – a poem, a person, a history, a ritual, an institution – takes us into the heart of that of which it is the interpretation' (Geertz, 1973: 18).

Once the anthropologist of security establishes herself inside the territory of the grid of interpretation, she will be able to look and analyse how a security structure works, and how an unpredictable event (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall) will reveal interesting aspects of the same structure. If a security structure can resemble a vertebrate, solid structure, the way it will react, and respond to an unpredictable security event, will unmask the very composition of the same structure, its intentionality, and reveal the single molecular elements which compose its structure, or even the single molecules' intentionality. The same can be said about the anthropologist of security positioned in the 'friction gap', because from this territory/ space, and thanks to her capacity to see the reality through the eyes of the local actors, she will be able to read the micro events in a macro context, and observe the local conflicting implementation of antagonistic security discourses.

We had to specify that these 'friction gaps' which are not always present 'out there', outside the region delimited by a national security concept, but, due to the human circulation mentioned before, and to the way western and first world societies are becoming more complex, the same 'friction gaps' can be found inside the same society which produced and politically supported, in an historical moment, the national security vision. Then, the anthropologist of security from his liquid standpoints, inside and outside the spatial-temporal dimension of a determinate concept of security, will be in the position to ask if we (the complex society) really know ourselves, before trying to know our other, who may or may not be an

‘enemy’, and even before to ask what reality is and what real knowledge is. And again from this liminal physical and intellectual position, the anthropologist of security will be able to identify those elements of fear, honour, and self interest, to deconstruct the way they interact, and then to point to those actors who play in and out the spaces of the security concept, motivated by these three factors.

However, there is another dimension that the anthropologist of security should take into consideration. We already know that ‘security is profoundly political’, so any good political anthropological analysis should look at the political and/ or power structure in order to deconstruct its apparently solid form and to isolate its single components. ‘Analysis, then, is sorting out the structures of signification’ (Geertz, 1973: 9), and in this process of deconstruction where the structures of signification of leadership, hierarchy, clientelism, and political violence are spotted and sorted out, there is one which plays an especially important role for the social anthropologist. This is the element of ‘memory’ which is attached to the roles of culture, myth, and symbols. Orwell in his ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ (1990 [1949]) invented the structure of the Ministry of Truth. The Ministry of Truth’s function was to make sure that language, art, books, and the mass media echoed the approved narrative offered by the State. This involved the invention of language (Newspeak) and a rewriting of history to serve some present need. Among the various slogans of INGSOC political ideology there was one in particular which serves to our reasoning and it is the following: : “Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past”. At the same time the political action of the INGSOC was accompanied by continuous political rituals and celebrations.

Every form of power has its rituals, celebrations, myths, symbols, and memory.

Then, if security, in its national dimension, is an ambiguous symbol, the symbol itself suggests protection through power (Wolfers, 1991: 149). As a result of this relation, we can construct another dimension in which the security concept constructs its own space of signification where its narrative, through a symbolic and ritualistic activity, is experienced by the ‘homo ritualis’ (Lisón Tolosana, 2012) and linked to power. This is because, if the meaning of security is etymologically tied to an emotional condition

(freedom from anxiety), then the rituals which are constructed around it they must have the form, shape, and consistency of healing ceremonies where power fights against fear to re-establish '*securitas*'. As a consequence, security as a symbol then becomes a key element in the dimension of political religion, where for political religion we understand a way to interpret life, and history, a way to conceive politics beyond power calculations and interests, up to comprise in it the definition of the meaning and the ultimate aim of human existence (Gentile, 2007: 214). Therefore the anthropologist of security has to take an observant participation position in these rituals of political religion (interpreted as a cultural system), and 'analyses' (following the vision of Geertz) how fear is represented, perceived, and which are the healing messages.

To sum up, all the above visions can be deployed to revalidate the three levels of investigation depicted by Claude Lévi-Strauss: ethnography, ethnology, and anthropology. And if in recent years we have seen the emergence of an ethnography of conflict whose aim is to study the 'other' in order to win battles, and war, the purpose of an anthropology of security is to study a common human value in order to help both ourselves and the other to be free from anxiety. This is all the more significant because if 'liquid modern life is lived on a battlefield', we have to accept the fact that 'all liquid modern victories are (...) temporary. The security they offer won't outlast the current balance of power, which is expected to be as short-lived as all balances: just as momentary snapshots of things on the move are known to be' (Bauman: 2006: 49). The message here is that security is not just a strategy, but a need that results in a feeling from which people give meaning to each one of the actions that takes place both in the private and in the public fields, both individually and collectively. Then, despite the fact that security structures want to legitimate their position on the bases that their activities reduce risks, what it is certain is that at the end what people feel and experience is a disturbing sentiment generated by their own perception of insecurity. As Deleuze and Parnet (1997: 71) wrote 'powers most need to distress us than to repress us'. So, like in the field of Anthropology of Emotions, what it is seen as necessary here is to study anthropologically security as a sentiment which is culturally built in the close relationship between the individual and his community. Because we

can not speak of institutional security without analyzing the social perception of it (or the no perception), the sensation of vulnerability, insecurity and distrust that crystallizes in the feeling of fear. And this is a work which can only be done through our informants in our fieldwork.

6. Structure of the collection

The edited collection brings together those papers which were presented in the panel on 'Anthropology and Security Studies', as part of the conference 'Anthropology in the World' organized by the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, at the British Museum (London, UK, 8th to 10th June 2012). The main aim of this panel was to explore ways to link the 'tools' provided by the discipline of anthropology to the ones of the field of security studies.

We live in a world in which 'complex insecurity' is the expression that, better than any others, can describe the contemporary explosive combination of fear-risk-threat-vulnerability-anxiety in which world society is living. In this context the motivation of the panel was to construct a new framework in which both academic topics will complement each other, and together will present a new way to contribute to the understanding of security in a critical sense in the complex societies of the globalised world.

The idea was to use the concept of the Critical Security Theory developed by Ken Booth in his book 'Critical Security Studies and World Politics' (2005) and attach it to the epistemology provided by anthropological researches, with the aim to contribute to the idea of an emancipatory politics. We believe that bringing together Anthropology and Security Studies (more specifically the denominated 'critical security studies') can contribute to a better understanding of the world and the human condition, because 'we can decide to study (security) in ways that replicate a world politics that does not work for countless millions of our fellow human beings; or we can decide to study in ways that seek to help to lift the strains of life-determining insecurity from the bodies and minds of people in real villages and cities, regions and states' (Booth, 2005:276).

All the papers presented here provide a vision (bottom-up, top-down, local-global, micro-macro, power-knowledge, International Relations, and

victims) which help to emancipate the security studies analyst from security concepts which produce interpretative automatism. For this reason the posture adopted by the authors in their papers is the one that in general sees security in world politics as 'an instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human' (Booth, 2005: 23).

In *Considerations on Anthropology and Critical Security Studies in a Globalized Context: The NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine as an Anthropological Space*, Giovanni Ercolani aims to integrate, in a critical framework the contribution of anthropologic methodologies with the approaches developed by the environment of Critical Security Studies. His study wants to underline the necessity of a dynamic focus on the way conflicts, humanitarian interventions, and complex emergencies have been analysed, and conducted by NATO. If the external military interventions found their moral justifications in the idea of the construction of a 'positive peace' in the territories disrupted by violent events, then the research want to ask the following question: now that the conflict has ended are we in a positive peace environment or a negative one? If the 'bad' authority has been destroyed or replaced, what about the various local structures of power/ violence? Are we still in front of a reproduction of a structural violence (and then a pre-intervention status quo situation) which provoked the conflict or the affected society now is free to reorganise itself? Then, according to the author, we need not only to focus on the territory of the crisis (anthropological contribution) but we have to enlarge our focus and consider that the local conflict (new war) has a map, a ramification outside its own territory. It is only by combining the Anthropological lens with the Security Studies global vision that we can arrive to a more sophisticated, emancipatory analysis, and cosmopolitan outlook of the 'multiple stress zones' and their 'crisis management' in a globalized context. Ercolani adopts a position in which the NATO security concept is considered as a cultural text, and the Civil-Military Co-operation Doctrine as an anthropological space.

Can photography provide any basis for knowledge claims? This is a question that Chris Farrands asks in his paper on 'Visual Ethnographies,

Conflict and Security'. Farrands writes that interpretations of security and securitisation have tended to draw heavily on written sources, including literature, travel writing, biography and poetry as well as official discourses of varied kinds. According to him, these methods involve versions of textual or discourse analysis and/ or narratology. This paper asks how we might extend, but also challenge, these more conventional ideas about security drawing on methods from visual ethnography. It asks whether and how the approach might need to adapt in dealing with visual sources, and questions whether photography in particular provides any kind of reliable source base, especially in the age of digital technologies and Photoshop manipulation. The paper recognises the valuable work of Pink and others in building the approach, and also draws extensively on Paul Ricoeur's core approach to textual analysis (and the author's previous work on Ricoeur), while proposing ways of addressing the more sceptical claim that photography is an unreliable source for the re-reading of security and violence. Cautiously approached, it argues, a visual ethnography approach to security can be a fruitful way of illuminating security dilemmas and the experience of insecurity.

In 'The Psychology of Peacekeeping: One Domain Where Political Realism and Critical Security Theory Will Meet', Harvey Langholtz looks at the United Nations as an anthropological space. Langholtz argues that when individuals from the western and non-western nations, the nations of the global north and the global south, the developed and developing nations meet at the United Nations or on UN peacekeeping missions, different psychological perspectives are brought to the table. Many from the developed western nations and the nations of the global north will bring with them an implicit or explicit adherence to the tenets of Political Realism, while others may be more open to the tenets of Critical Security Theory. This paper examines at a practical level how these different perspectives come together either at the political level or on a peacekeeping mission, and what happens when they do.

Occupy Wall Street is the anthropological space analyzed by Danielle Moretti-Langholtz in her paper "'The Revolution Continues Worldwide!'" Emancipatory Politics in an Age of Global Insecurity'. According to the author Occupy Wall Street (OWS) claims to be a leaderless resistance

movement that has spawned numerous demonstrations across the United States, Canada, and now the world. Yet the individuals behind OWS are skilled at using the Internet and social media to organize coordinated community action in an attempt to effect societal change. By tapping into widespread discontent associated with economic and world politics aspects of the OWS movement have been both embraced and rejected by political leaders and the press. Citing "security" as in issue, coordinated and violent crackdowns against OWS camps in cities throughout the United States, during the late fall of 2011, suggest the degree to which the movement is viewed as a national threat. This paper explores the genesis of the movement through the lens of Critical Security Studies as well as examines the use of anthropological research methods—particularly those of Rapid Ethnographic Assessment—to study this dynamic social movement and what is portends for emancipatory politics.

Specifically focused on 'Anthropology and Conflicts', Marco Ramazzotti wants to intervene in the debate on:

- 1) The modern analysis of war by anthropologists (Anthropology of conflicts and wars);
- 2) The legitimacy of the use of anthropology in the conduct of wars (use of social and economic anthropology in analysing a war situation).

Ramazzotti writes that war and social attitudes to war have changed. While the distinction between just and unjust wars has been always present in Western cultures, but limited to a State's evaluation of wars, nowadays peoples' reactions to wars are not limited to moral judgments but involve their acceptance of and participation in wars. Therefore people can accept and refuse wars, and soldiers can accept and refuse wars. We cannot forget that a number of American servicemen refused involvement in the Vietnam War. At the same time the author wants to remember the European fighters who joined their countries' Resistances against the Fascist and Nazi oppression. According Marco Ramazzotti, the anthropologists who refuse all wars do not recognize the difference between just and unjust wars. It is a reality that war has changed. We live in a period of asymmetrical warfare. However the author asks: do we analyze these asymmetrical wars with the same instruments as the symmetrical wars of the past? According Marco Ramazzotti, the difference in culture between the conventional armies and

the unconventional ones require the understanding of different cultures and different war cultures: we need anthropology.

Strongly based on the author's fieldwork experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'Anthropological Methods in Counter-Trafficking Activities: Analysis of Criminal Networks and Victim-Oriented Approach' Desirée Pangerc, looks at human trafficking as a global criminal phenomenon and the necessity to combat it as a fundamental issue in the International Community agenda. The author ask: why aren't all the implemented counter-trafficking activities sufficient to stop it? And in this paper she describes the anthropological methods employed to analyze this human rights violation and to fight it.

From the network analysis of the criminal groups involved in this illegal market to the differentiation of smuggled and trafficked persons fluxes, the paper shows the importance of qualitative approach in counter-trafficking activities and the strong limits of quantitative analysis. The research also focuses on the delicate question of the victim status from the psychological aspects to the legal ones, relying on evidence from the victims and the social operators. In conclusion, Desirée Pangerc demonstrates how important crime perception is in the Eastern Europe civil society and how it is fundamental in prevention activities, investigations and victim rehabilitation programs.

The conclusion was provided by Maurizio Boni who, although not present at the Conference Panel, kindly accepted to participate in this intellectual effort. Due to the fact that at the end of the day 'security' is a practical matter, Boni was the right person (for his military and academic experiences) to produce the concluding chapter. In 'A new grammar for international relations in a new world order', the author writes that security is a multifaceted concept loaded with assumptions, structures, solutions and functional ideas which varies according to different realities. The debate on security should therefore be tailored to specific geopolitical and social contexts. Conventional/ traditional forms of societal organization express 'orthodox' approaches to security, while 'fluid' and evolutionary trends require more comprehensive and elaborated policies. Each social actor dealing with security issues is acting alongside a spectrum of possibilities in which the military dimension of security and the tenets of

the critical security studies offer their respective potentials according to the position that geopolitical and social factors determine in a given phase of history. Therefore, broadening the security agenda shouldn't be considered as an isolated aim per se, since it must be confronted with each specific situation. Taking into consideration the main themes presented by the contributors to this book in their respective works, the paper elaborates some specific topics related to the debate on security, and offers two scenarios that present the prospective, for each author, to apply her/ his specific skills in understanding evolutionary trends which may challenge conventional way of thinking.

In presenting this book to a larger, multidisciplinary audience, the authors hope to have actively contributed to this recent debate where Anthropology and Security Studies can productively cooperate together, and provide new perspectives and analysis, in order to produce a valid knowledge free from power influences, political orientations, and cultural stereotypes. If there is a way to approach 'security' analysis, this should take in consideration that the success of the human species would be allocated in the acquisition of the culture that facilitates our creative transformation of unstable environments, often adverse and sometimes hostile. We have always sought to secure the insecure, the humans manage very badly uncertainty and chaos, but the uniqueness of the moment is that insecurity has become planetary, both from the socio-physical (ecological risk, nuclear risk, genetic risk, etc.), and from the cultural point of view (consumerism and unsustainable lifestyle). In this context we must raise awareness that we all depend on each other and, therefore, recognize that the complexity of the problems facing humanity can only be solved in a global context. Security is a common human value, and the safety of people passes through the cooperation of all the inhabitants of planet Earth.

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1

Considerations on Anthropology and Critical Security Studies in a Globalized Context: The NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine as an Anthropological Space

Giovanni Ercolani

“It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts”.

Sherlock Holmes

“The world’s inhabitants have at last become truly contemporaneous, and yet the world’s diversity is recomposed every moment; this is the paradox of our day. We must speak, therefore, of worlds in the plural, understanding that each of them communicates with the others, that each world possesses at least images of the others – images that may well be deformed, mangled, retouched, in some cases redeveloped by those who look to find in them, first and foremost, features and themes that speak to them of themselves, even if this means inventing them. Still, the referential character of these images cannot be doubted: no one can any longer doubt that the others exist. Even those who affirm with increasing vigour their own irreducible, untouchable identity draw their force and conviction from their perception of themselves as being the opposite of the image of the other, an other whom they mythify so as to be rid of this unbearable reality”⁶.

⁶ Marc Auge’, *An Anthropology for Contemporary Worlds*, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 89.

1. Introduction: Listening to Images of Security, and Places of Virtual Peace

“Ladies and gentlemen your attention please, we are flying over the city of Sarajevo, the Golden Valley of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do not look out the window. There is nothing to see other than misery and poverty. In any case the pilot has increased our speed and we will move away as far as possible”

Fikret (the main character of the movie is on the roof of a building, looking at the airplane passing overhead and talking to his girlfriend): “It (the airplane) shines while we are in the dark. That’s because it carries happy people. That’s why it shines so much”.



I wanted to start this research quoting the beginning of the Bosnian movie “Ljeto u zlatnoj dolini” (Summer in the Golden Valley)⁷ because I do

⁷ “Ljeto u zlatnoj dolini” (Summer in the Golden Valley) is a 2003 Bosnian film by Srđan Vuletić, produced by Ademir Kenović. The movie is about a 16 year old boy who has to repay his dead father's debt. In order to collect money, his friend and he get involved in Sarajevo's underground crime. The plot: at the traditional Muslim funeral service for his father Fikret Varupa, sixteen year old boy from Sarajevo, learns that his father owes money to Hamid, a man he does not even know. The debt is considerable and Hamid does not want it to go to the grave with the body, so the debt automatically passes from the father to the son. Since in Bosnia this way of collecting debts, at a funeral, is considered to be utterly humiliating, it is never, ever applied. Fikret and his entire family become subjects of ridicule. Fikret, who is practically still a child, is decisive to “redeem his father's soul”. Wishing to repay

think that Fikret's existential and "rhetorical territory"⁸, once deconstructed as a text and reassembled as a multidimensional map, enclose a series of constant elements (symbolism, emotions, structure, and functions) which frame the identification and collection of data for this research.

Even if I am talking about a fictional story we know that "social science is about telling stories. Some stories can be matched with evidence better than others. There cannot be a perfect fit because the story would be as slow to tell as life itself. It would be a mirror on life rather than an abstraction that pulls out certain aspects of life that help us guide our actions"⁹.

The problem is that a lot of time there is a cacophonous, incongruent relation between the "narrative" we listen to and the images of the story itself that we watch, especially, as in the case of this movie, between the image of a post-war "secure-peaceful" Sarajevo and what we listen to from our local fictional "informants".

Whatever the images we watch, to be receptive and to listen become a primary source to confute what we have seen because the fictional reality of

his father's debt and to secure the forgiveness, Fikret wanders into the real world of Sarajevo, the world that is ruled by post-war chaos, misery and poverty and becomes an ideal target for two corrupted policemen who wish to "help" him: they plant the kidnapped girl on him.

⁸ "The rhetorical territory (here "rhetorical" is intended in the classical sense, as defined by such rhetorical acts as plea, eulogy, praise, censure, recommendation, warning, and so on). The character is at home when it at ease in the rhetoric of the people with whom he shares life. The sign of being at home, at ease, is the ability to make oneself understood without too much difficulty, and to follow the reasoning of others without any need of long explanation. The rhetorical country of a character ends where his interlocutors no longer understand the reasons he gives for his deeds and actions, the criticisms he makes or the enthusiasms he displays. A disturbance of rhetorical communication marks the crossing of a frontier, which should of course be envisaged as border zone, a marchland, rather than a clearly drawn line." In Marc Auge', *Non Luoghi*, Milano: Eleuthera, 2009, p. 97.

⁹ Mary Kaldor, *Human Security – Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p.11

Fikret's anthropological space¹⁰ is a three-dimensional one, made of space, time, and emotions (security).

1.1. Place

In listening to Fikret and in understanding his territory, which becomes for us an anthropological place, it will help to read, decode the social relations (structured, molecular, formal and informal) and the common forms of belonging to him and of his environment, and to understand how his society perceive "totalities" which do not belong directly to their environment.

Even if the airplane, which in the movie is flying over Sarajevo, does not belong to the specific State of Bosnia Herzegovina, by the simple fact that is entering in an existential space (Fikret's Sarajevo) it has an important position in the symbolic environment of Fikret's anthropological place.

This anthropological place, despite its specific identitarian-relational-historical traits is not a closed-isolated one, it is a "situation" too, and the airplane too speaks because this can symbolize the "globalized world", the international-developed community, which for the simple fact of flying over Sarajevo, is contributing to creating a relation, even symbolically (and full of meanings) between the global environment and the local territory of Fikret.

Once deconstructed both discourses (the one of the shiny plane and Fikret's), we face some particular elements which are part of opposite perceptions of the same "situation". However, most of the time, it is the powerful perception which is not only translated in political sermons and aptitudes vis a vis the beliefs and construction of the "other", but produces a hegemonic paradigm of interpretation.

Let us start this deconstructing exercise with the shiny airplane's discourse: "We are flying over the city of Sarajevo. Do not look out of the window. There is nothing to see other than misery and poverty. In any case

¹⁰ "An anthropological place is a place intensely symbolized, lived by individuals in which they found their special, temporal, individual and collective benchmarks. For the anthropologist, at the same time, it is a space in which he can read, and decode the social relations and the common forms of belonging." Marc Auge, *Straniero di me stesso*, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2011p. 158.

the pilot has increased our speed and we will move away as far as possible”.

- “We are flying over the city of Sarajevo”: in this case the movie-reality is referred to a post-conflict Sarajevo (Bosnia). We are in the year 2003 (the year of the movie production) after exactly seven years following the end of the Siege of Sarajevo¹¹. A city that just recently, on April 6, 2012, with a line of 11,541 red chairs, one for each victim of the Siege of Sarajevo, remembered when war broke out 20 years ago and the West dithered in the face of the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II. Can we really and sincerely call it a perception of peace even what we are told that “this is peace”?
- “Do not look out of the window”: this was the general attitude adopted by various and neighbouring countries in the 1992 as the armed conflict erupted in former Yugoslavia. Quoting another movie, Sarajevo was declared by the United Nations to be only “the 14th most dangerous place on earth”¹².
- “There is nothing to see other than misery and poverty. In any case, the pilot has increased our speed and we will move away as far as possible”: Despite the fact that the Bosnian war ended officially on December 14, 1995, and with it peace, still the current situation is of poverty and political uncertainty. The 2012 anniversary of the Sarajevo Siege, found the Balkan country still deeply divided, power shared between Serbs, Croats and Muslims in a single state ruled by ethnic quotas and united by the weakest of central governments.

¹¹ The Sarajevo Siege lasted from Apr 5, 1992 to Feb 29, 1996. The Bosnian war was brought to an end after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Paris on 14 December 1995.

¹² A startling examination of the Bosnian war of the mid-1990s and the role of journalists in covering it, “Welcome to Sarajevo” is a British war film from 1997. It is directed by Michael Winterbottom. The screenplay is by Frank Cottrell Boyce and it was based on real-life journalist Michael Nicholson's book *Natasha's Story*.

On the other hand, in his “anthropological territory”, Fikret’s discourse is emblematic, too: “The airplane shines while we are in the dark. That’s because it carries happy people. That’s why it shines so much”, and a little further on in the movie he will say “in this misery I am the most miserable”.

The main character of the movie in a way expresses his entrapped life in an emotional situation, in a specific geographical area, and at a particular time, in which it is impossible to realize himself and then to be.

In my research, the framing and the deconstruction of the above discourses are important tools because Fikret’s “anthropological space” is made of humiliation, ridicule, post-war chaos, poverty, misery, and corruption, and even by the symbolism embodied by the flying airplane.

All these attributes have a considerable part in the construction of an identity: how we construct the “we” and the “other”. Their importance is even more impelling when we are dealing with security issues because the existential world of Fikret speaks of security and insecurity, too. And if the main purpose of this research is to help us to learn how to think about security and what to think about security and why, what has inspired my work has been my critical thinking to consider the lack of interest demonstrated by various Security and International Relations Theories in “seeing” in the right direction of the local “anthropological spaces” they were supposed to understand, translate and analyze, and towards the local human dimension of the human beings who were living in that anthropological space. These academic theories and the way of seeing both of which had an important influence in how we constructed our paradigm of reference regarding the protocol of interpretation of “how-what-why” security.

1.2. Time

Fikret’s world itself is temporarily situated in an historical time which stretches from the implosion of the Soviet Union (1989) and, for the purpose of this research, the year 2010 (the year of the adoption of the NATO New Strategic Concept, Lisbon, 19 December 2010).

Then Fikret’s time (2003) has a position in a time space between the year 1989 and 2010, and this time is not independent or waterproof. His

time was dramatically influenced by the 1989 events and it will be influenced by the 2010 events, too.

Now, let us leave Fikret for a while in his “post-war chaos” Sarajevo, and let us concentrate on this arc of time -- 1989-2010.

It is important to focus on a particular historical event like the implosion of the Soviet Union and its two main actors of the Cold War because what happened there had repercussions on future events.

This example is emblematic because if one of the actors vanished (the USSR with its Warsaw Pact structure). The other one, NATO, continues to survive and with it its intellectual-scientific paradigm.

When the Berlin Wall came down and no Soviet tanks were there ready to invade Europe, I can say that the NATO defence paradigm upon which all our knowledge (supposed science) of the enemy-Soviet Union was constructed and hegemonically divulged and inculcated with the purpose of constructing on us a We-NATO-identity in actual fact demonstrated to be not only a structured unscientific protocol-paradigm-grid of learning, analysis and interpretation but also one of world politics.

How did the NATO paradigm explain the Soviet Union’s implosion? And if it had tried, something that did not happen at all, how was this paradigm constructed and based on which it was certificated as “science”?

Interestingly enough, in 2005, Prof. Edward A. Kolodziej in his “Security and International Relations”¹³ study, provided a quite exhaustive answer: no one of the contending International Relations (IR) theories, such as realism, neo-realism, liberal institutionalism, classical economic liberalism, and Marxism, were able alone to understand, and explain the facts that brought a “contra-revolution” and the implosion of the Soviet Union.

Then, not only were the above listed IR theories too much concentrated on the State’s policy as the only “actor”, and too static in adapting itself to the “new times” (and the passing of generations with their own expectations) as well as to the new global environment, but the NATO paradigm was also completely fossilized on a military defence grammar

¹³ Edward A. Kolodziej, *Security and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

which monopolized the interpretation of the security concept in imposing a simple equation without considering the value of the “X variable” (the human factor): security = military problem and military solution. Thus, there was a paradigm and a practice which prevented listening to and understanding the human dimension of the Soviet state, society and culture(s).

If this was one of the major faults of these theoretical approaches, at least it demonstrated that a “theory is always for someone and for some purpose. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation, or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crisis, of past experience, and of hopes and expectations for the future”¹⁴.

Then, what was missing was the real contact and dialogue with the local realities, the understanding of local events that only an anthropological presence (fieldwork and participant observation) was able to provide.

Experts on security studies were at that time far too busy in assembling theories then to listen to the “rhetorical territory” in which the local soviet lived, and unconsciously they demonstrated that it is the “rhetorical territory” which should become the field of research and analysis of data for security studies.

However, security studies completely ignored the rich and varied results coming from anthropological practices, and, unfortunately, the same mistake is going to be repeated these days with the danger of producing the same paradigm and protocol of interpretation of security events as the one hegemonically assembled during the Cold War.

To be sure, the only survivor of the Cold War has been NATO and for this reason the case study in this paper will be dedicated to NATO and its involvement in “Crisis Management”¹⁵. However, while NATO talks about

¹⁴ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium*, 10 (2), 1981, p. 126-155.

¹⁵ <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>

its own vision of security, it does not provide any idea of what peace should be.

1.3. Emotions: Security and Peace

Emotions represent the third element of Fikret's anthropological space and to understand their importance in full, we should move from the idea of security to the one of peace and focus on those places which have been the theatre of international military humanitarian operations. If we look at their actual living and emotional conditions, despite the fact the area has been officially labelled as being in "peace", can we really say that what the local people is experiencing is really peace, or it is something else?

Because once a conflict is over and peace is reached, then the humanitarian mission too comes to an end. But, unfortunately, security has not been implemented, and the real security mission has not been accomplished. Undoubtedly, there is a link between the peace attained and the security approach used to attain it. "If peace is both possibility and danger, this underlines that what is desirable is not just peace per se but the right kind of peace. The distinction between different kinds of peace has been emphasized by Johan Galtung, for whom 'positive peace' would include love, freedom from exploitation and repression, and the existence of a culture of peace. Galtung distinguishes 'structural violence' (arising from social structures) from 'direct violence' (harm that is specifically intended). 'Structural violence', for Galtung, includes exploit and marginalization – anything that limits human well-being; it contains the seeds for direct violence"¹⁶.

The results of post-conflict situations after post-humanitarian interventions in various parts of the world have demonstrated that, despite the fact a peace has been reached, this has not been "positive peace" at all. In this regard, the words of the Italian Army General Fabio Mini, former Commander of KFOR, are rightly incisive: "The peace that is achieved after the war is the peace of who won and not the abstract concept of pax

¹⁶ David Keen, *Complex Emergencies*, Cambridge: Polity, 2009, pp. 171-172.

universalis”. There is still a war going on after the war has been declared over and the “virtual peace” achieved.¹⁷

Then, it is in this gap of space and time, between the anthropological territory of “virtual peace” and the one of “positive peace”, that the work of the anthropologist becomes of primary importance in order to challenge the constructed virtual reality of “peace” because it is in this new anthropological territory of “virtual peace” that war is still present as a “war after the war” regardless of the label “peace”. Therefore, what I call a “virtual peace space” becomes the rhetorical and anthropological territory where the idea of peace and security is reformulated and put into practice. Owing to the fact that it is in this space-situation that humanitarian interventions are taking place, then the above approach and analysis become even more significant and urgent for their practical repercussion on an instable-complex-dangerous area.

2. Theoretical Framework: Discourse Analysis, and Mapping Approach

The main aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility of constructing a common framework of reference built on the contributions from the experiences of anthropological studies on the one hand, and from critical security studies on the other, and to construct a paradigm which will help me to select, identify, collect and classify data for the specific case study of my research.

“There is one world, but many realities”, and since “each of us sees different things, and what we see is determined by a complicated mix of social and contextual influences and/ or presuppositions”¹⁸, then I have decided to take a constructivist approach because constructivist “recognizes

¹⁷ Fabio Mini, *La Guerra dopo la Guerra – Soldati, burocrati e mercenari nell’epoca della pace virtuale*, Torino: Einaudi, 2003, pp. 142-143.

¹⁸ Jonathon W. Mosses & Torbjorn L. Knutsen, *Ways of Knowing – Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 10.

the important role of the observer and society in constructing patterns that we study as social scientists”¹⁹.

Owing to the fact that the majority of conflicts that have erupted, experiencing an international humanitarian intervention, have been classified as “identity conflict” since the implosion of the Soviet Union, I want to highlight the importance of focusing on the human being because, as Max Weber noted, “We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance”²⁰.

Consequently, “because social contexts are filled with meaning, constructivists find utility in a much broader set of epistemological tools, including empathy, authority, myths and so on. (...) If something appears meaningful or real to a social agent, then it may affect his behaviour and have real consequences for the society around him”²¹.

This is the reason we have to learn to listen to our local informants and their stories because “truth lies in the eyes of the observer, and in the constellation of power and force that supports that truth. (...) For the constructivist, that battle is not so much about truth as it is about the power, interests and identities of those involved”²².

Then:

¹⁹ “Constructivists recognize that we do not just ‘experience’ the world objectively or directly: our experiences are channeled through the human mind – in often elusive ways. It is in this short channel between the eye and the brain – between sense and perception and the experience of the mind – that we find many challenges to naturalism. When our scientific investigation is aimed at perceptions of the world rather than the world ‘as it is’, we open the possibility to multiple worlds (or, more accurately, multiple perceptions). Consequently, constructivists recognize that people may look at the same thing and perceive it differently. Individual characteristics (such as age, gender or race) or social characteristics (such as era, culture and language) can facilitate or obscure a given perception of the world”, *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

- because of all the symbolism carried by the various “social representations”²³ which are performed inside the anthropological space, we are interested in analyses;
- the fact that I define “security” as a cultural, idiosyncratic concept based on the combination of two elements: cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy ²⁴;
- the importance of language which “itself conditions, limits, and predetermines what we see. Thus, all reality is constructed through language so that nothing is simply ‘there’ in an unproblematic way – everything is a linguistic/ textual construct. Language does not

²³ “To represent means at one and the same time both to make absent things, present and to present things in such a way as to satisfy the conditions for argumentative coherence, rationality and the normative integrity of the group. That this is communicative and diffusive is all the more important, since there are no other means except discourse and the meanings it carries through which individuals and groups are able to orient and adapt themselves to it. Consequently, the status of the phenomena of social representation is that of the symbolic: establishing a bond, making an image, evoking, saying and causing to be said, sharing a meaning in some transmissible propositions, and in the best of the cases summarizing in a cliché’ which becomes an emblem.” Serge Moscovici, *Social Representations – Explorations in Social Psychology*, Cambridge: Polity, 2000, p. 157.

²⁴ “Security as an idiosyncratic concept is the result of the combination of two elements -cultural idiosyncrasy and individual idiosyncrasy - in which anxiety acts as a catalyst. For cultural idiosyncrasy, I consider what is peculiar of a culture that can spark particular anxiety-fear emotions in individuals in its geopolitical context. Then being a cultural phenomenon, it carries with it its own particular cultural relativism. Whereas for individual idiosyncrasy, I consider the particular nature of the political leader, or agency, to which is recognised an authority and then can perform the speech-narrative act. The combination of culture, symbolism, myth, policy, and interests, together with the political activity and nature-character of the leader-agency and the emotional element, bring as a result a cultural concept of security which is conscious of its cultural relativism.” Giovanni Ercolani, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicization of NATO’s Critical Security Discourse”, *The Journal of Security Strategies*, Year 7, Issue: 14, December 2011, pp. 72-73.

record reality; it shapes and creates it so that the whole of our universe is textual”²⁵;

- and the importance that culture has in the construction of the “will” (interpellation) in a social-state-formation, and this “will” is perceived as a state capability in war;

I have decided to construct my theoretical framework on three methodologies: discourse analysis, mapping approach, and Life-Modes.

First, discourse analysis will help me to deconstruct the genealogy of the protocol of interpretation, and use, of the term “security”.

Then, once having established the etymological connection between security and “freedom from anxiety”, at the same time considering the centrality of emotions, I will “map” them and, using a life-modes approach, I will show how in a conflict situation culture plays a significant role for a community.

2.1. Discourse Analysis and “Security Studies”: From Orthodoxy to Liquidity Vision

“‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying action outside the normal bounds of political procedure)”²⁶.

²⁵ Peter Barry, *Beginning theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, Manchester: Manchester University press, 2002, p. 35.

²⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23-24.

Then, it is crystal clear how the process of securitization becomes a political process in which discourse analysis and narrative have their primary importance.

“The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying such words, something is done or performed (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)”²⁷. But whereas “by saying such words, something is done or performed”, in this specific case of “securitization”, when we use the very word “security”, something more is done: an emotional element has been added to the narrative.

However, the word which is central to our study is security²⁸ (freedom from danger, fear, anxiety, destitution, and so on), which in its etymological meaning bears strong emotions. ‘Security’ is derived from the Latin “securitas” and in its turn from ‘sine’ (= without) + ‘cura’ (= anxiety, worry)²⁹.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between anxiety and fear. While anxiety is a generalized mood condition that occurs without an identifiable triggering stimulus and is the result of threats that are perceived to be uncontrollable or unavoidable, on the other hand, fear occurs in the presence of an observed threat and is related to the specific behaviour of escape and avoidance. However, “the anxiety built to full fear”³⁰.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 26.

²⁸ The Penguin English Dictionary, London: Penguin Books, 2004 2nd Edition.

²⁹ “First of all we note that the term ‘securitas’, like all feminine nouns in ‘tas’, belongs to the category of abstract nouns, such as ‘libertas’, ‘humanitas’, ‘civitas’, and so on. It is, therefore, a purely theoretical concept, which did not correspond to any real objectivity in the eyes of most ordinary citizens or Roman soldiers. Even if we stop to consider the etymological root of the noun or adjective, we see that it is derived from ‘sine’ (= without) + ‘cura’ (= anxiety, worry). The ‘secura’ person was thus at the origin of the “sine cure” individual, that is without anxieties, without worries, and then free from thoughts or anxieties. The safety condition, therefore, is conceived as the absence of something: it is a condition that could be called ‘of default’.” Davide Campacci, *Il concetto di sicurezza nel mondo romano: spunti di riflessione*, paper not published, 2009, p. 1.

³⁰ Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, London: Bloomsbury, 1996, p. 6.

Regarding this relation between the etymological meaning of security, its use in parallel with a military meaning and practice as well as its political power, I have created two contending visions: one defined as the Orthodox Security Studies (OSS) vision and the other as the Critical Security Studies (CSS) vision.

According to the OSS vision: “Security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military forces”³¹, and without doubt this Cold War vision was supported by a political apparatus interested to link the meaning-use of security to the construction of a particular enemy’s identity. Then, it was, as still it is, a pedagogic and learning process in which stereotyping the “enemy” enforces the construction of our own identity: considering the other our enemy, we were forced to define us as the opposite of the supposed enemy. In this orthodox, rigid opinion of security, our identity was constructed on this side of the wall while, on the other side, another opposed identity was constructed.

At the political and military level, this particular use of security was embodied by Articles 5 (and 6) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which still frames security and insecurity inside the idea of an armed attack against the territory and on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the agreement signing Parties.³²

Therefore, while it was impossible to check the intention of the “other” enemy (Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact) thoroughly, the containment and deterrence policies prevented the two sides from coming into a direct armed confrontation with catastrophic results.

What becomes important at this point is the fact that we have to reconsider the etymological meaning of “security” (Latin “securitas”: freedom from anxiety) because it is in this that we can find the seeds of a paradigm shift, and the move from a concept to a human value.

By confronting the above incontestable meaning with the imposed “imaging” and paradigm of security (security = military forces) with recent historical events, we welcome the emergence of CSS which contributed to

³¹ Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35(2), 1991, pp. 211-39.

³² The North Atlantic Treaty is available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>.

re-interpret and reframe security providing the inspiration for a new paradigm, and theory. In scientific terms, the rich contributions brought by the auto-defined schools of Copenhagen, Paris, Aberystwyth, and other CSS authors whom did not want to see themselves entrapped inside a static dogma, were revolutionary.

But why is their approach revolutionary? Because Critical Security Studies vision represents a moment of opening the frame in which the story of security and its practice have been told, thus allowing us to glimpse at security issues at more multidimensional levels, and drawing them on the board, which other sciences up to that moment were not part of the official grammar.

Indeed, Ken Booth, writing on CSS talks about “emancipation” says: “Emancipation is the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions. It is a discourse of human self creation and the politics of trying to bring it about”³³.

The above process is supported by the works of Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, who reformulated a new framework for security analysis.

Buzan developed the “sectorial dimension of security”³⁴ in which the military security is only one of five sectors joined by the environmental, economic, societal and political security. Then, in 1998, with the publication of “Security: A new framework for analysis”³⁵, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde developed an approach to the process of securitization in which security is treated as a speech-act, as a linguistic performance which re-constitutes the world it represents. Therefore, “security” discourse can represent a learning process and can participate in the construction of that

³³ Ken Booth, Ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 181.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

³⁵ Barry Buzan, B., Waewer O., and De Wilde J., *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

symbolic system, identified by Ernest Cassirer in which mankind (animal symbolicum) lives its reality³⁶.

Precisely because of its political power, it is in this symbolic system where contending powerful voices depict their own scenarios: while Waltz in his “Theory of International Politics”³⁷ talks about “anarchy” in which it is understood as the lack of a superior authority in the international system (an authority with enforcing power), and then anarchy itself is the location of fear, on the contrary, Cynthia Weber focuses her research on the link between fear and International Relations Theory. According to Weber, “anarchy does not create the fear that Waltz theorizes in Theory of International Politics. Rather, fear creates the effects that Waltz attributes to anarchy – prioritizing survival, self-help over cooperation, and either conflict or competitive balancing. (...) The fear is the fear of fear itself. (...) Fear, then, is the final supplement of Waltz’s theory”³⁸.

However, as the end of the Cold War provoked the slow disappearance of net, clear, identifiable, identi-cal³⁹ characters based on official “security” discourses, we have passed “from the ‘solid’ to the ‘fluid’ phase of modernity”⁴⁰.

Then, in a new reality where the new conflicting situation has been defined as liquid, NATO, obsessed in staying alive after the vanishing of its

³⁶ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974 (1944), p. 32.

³⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

³⁸ Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory – A Critical Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2005, P. 32.

³⁹ Identity” in English has its origin in the Latin *idem*: same.

⁴⁰ “‘Fluids’ are so called because they cannot keep their shape for long, and unless they are poured into a tight container they keep changing shape under the influence of even the slightest of forces. In a fluid setting, there is no knowing whether to expect a flood or a drought - it is better to be ready for both eventualities. Frames, when (if) they are available, should not be expected to last for long. They will not be able to withstand all the leaking, seeping, trickling, spilling – sooner rather than later they will drench, soften, contort and decompose.” In Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity*, Cambridge: Polity, 2004, p. 51.

“vertebral-solid” mortal enemy (the primary function of a structure is to reproduce itself), started to re-invent itself.

Therefore, NATO too had to abandon its security equation (security = military solution) linguistically because the conflicts which come to the stage after the implosion of the Soviet Union were completely new according its paradigm, and were defined as:

- “new wars” vs. “old wars”⁴¹;
- “War amongst people”⁴² ;
- “Large group identity-conflict”⁴³;

⁴¹ For old wars we understand the war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum violence; this old wars are becoming an anachronism. According to Mary Kaldor with the concept of “new wars” we are in front of a new type of organized violence which could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights. For Kaldor new wars actors are both global, and local, public and private. These new wars are fought for particularistic political goals (Kaldor talks of Identity Politics: movements which mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power) using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the rules of modern warfare. Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

⁴² “War amongst people it is the reality in which the people in the street and houses and fields – all the people, anywhere – are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilian, in defence of civilians. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much an opposing forces.” In contrast to what Gen. Rupert Smith defines as “interstate industrial war”, the new paradigm of war amongst people is based on the concept of a continuous criss-crossing between confrontation and conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Rather than war and peace, there is not predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point: conflicts are resolved, but not necessarily confrontations.” Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force – The art of War in the Modern War*, London: Allen Lane, 2005.

⁴³ “Large group identity-conflict”, in which a threat against a large group identity brings a psychological regression which can spark an identity conflict. Here “the concept of large-group identity describes how thousands or millions of individuals, most of whom will never meet in their life-times, are bound by an intense sense of sameness by belonging to the same ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group.” “When large groups are threatened by conflict, members of the group cling

- “Hybrid conflicts”⁴⁴;
- “Fourth Generations wars”⁴⁵.

evermore stubbornly to these circumstances in an effort to maintain and regulate their sense of self and their sense of belonging to a large-group. At such times, large-groups process become dominant and large-group identity issue and rituals are more susceptible to political propaganda and manipulation. Political, economic, legal, military, and historical factors usually figure prominently in any attempt to manage and solve large-group conflicts, but it is also necessary to consider the profound effect of human psychology, especially specific large-group processes that evolve under stress or after massive trauma and are manipulated by leaders.”. Vamik Volkan, *Blind Trust – Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror*, Charlottesville, Virginia: Pitchstone Publishing, 2004.

⁴⁴ “Although conventional in form, the decisive battles in today's hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the international community population. Irregular, asymmetric battles fought within these populations ultimately determine success or failure. Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related ‘population battlegrounds.’ (...) Thus, hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously--and more decisively--attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them (stability operations). Hybrid conflicts therefore are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community. In hybrid war, achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse conventional and asymmetric battlegrounds. At all levels in a hybrid war's country of conflict, security establishments, government offices and operations, military sites and forces, essential services, and the economy will likely be either destroyed, damaged, or otherwise disrupted. To secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore security, essential services, local government, self-defense forces and essential elements of the economy. Historically, hybrid wars have been won or lost within these areas. They are battlegrounds for legitimacy and support in the eyes of the people.” John J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars”, *Military Review*, March-April, 2008.

⁴⁵ “These wars have four distinct characteristics: (1) the loss of the state's monopoly of war and on the first loyalty of its citizen; (2) the rise of non-state entities that

Despite their various labels, new-wars, war amongst people, large group identity-conflict, hybrid conflict, and fourth generations wars, all of them retain this ambivalence of “wars- war” in which we have been forced to look at them, and where the primacy is still given to the word “war” and the human being.

CSS and the recent contributions from Contemporary Conflict Resolution studies suggest to us that none of all recent conflicts ended with a peace agreement. What CSS also does is to insist on the critical epistemology, the critical research practice, which, as Booth argues, offers an emancipatory approach into this difficult material.

Then, we have to start to examine these conflicts and “virtual peace places” through the lens of peace (positive peace), and not only with the purpose to win war (“bellum-war”, and/ or “wars-war”): a new position from which look at the conflict and win the security because “critical explorations of the realities of security have to start in our heads before they can take place in the outside world”⁴⁶.

2.2. Mapping approach and the “Virtual Peace Space”

Once defined, the relation between the meaning of security and its emotional characteristics, together with the changing nature of the most recent conflicts (which have identified the centrality of the human being, his identity, alongside his culture as the main motivations behind the reason of

command people’s primary loyalty and that have the ability to wage war. These entities may be gangs, clans, religious groups, races and ethnic groups, tribes, business enterprises, ideological actors and terrorist organizations – the variety is almost limitless; (3) a return to a world of cultures, not, merely of states, in conflict; and (4) the manifestation of both developments – the decline of the state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties.” Andy Knight, Civil-military cooperation and human security, in Christopher Ankersen, Ed., *Civil Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations – Emerging theory and practice*, London: Routledge, 2008.

⁴⁶ Ken Booth, Ed., *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p. 3.

the combats), I now need to illustrate these social representations' emotional discourses on a map.

This is justified by the fact that "one of the characteristics of the 'new wars' is that pre-conflict and post-conflict phases increasingly resemble each other. Agreements stabilize the violence but tend not to provide solutions. Moreover, the 'new wars' have a tendency to spread through criminal networks, refugees, and the virus of exclusivist ideologies. The risk is that the just war and the humanitarian peace positions could end up prolonging these wars, perhaps indefinitely"⁴⁷.

Linking the pre-conflict phase to the post-conflict situation takes us back to the discourse initiated before on the concept of peace and virtual peace because, as David Keen says: "the kind of peace that prevails will be linked to the kind of violence that preceded it. (...) Therefore, there should be other routes to peace that might work better than the 'security approach', particularly in the medium and the long term. One is the attempt to question the definition of the enemy that has been sanctioned and propagated by officialdom (in whatever form) and perhaps also by rebels and terrorists. That questioning will need to include an attempt to deconstruct the process by which a particular enemy came to be defined as the enemy. (...) A second approach is to try to map the various functions of violence for the various parties who have contributed to violence (...), and then to use this analysis as a way to trying to reduce violent behaviour"⁴⁸.

I have already demonstrated the importance of discourse analysis in defining the term security and how it is used by the state or agencies in order to produce the image of the "enemy". Now is the moment to move to the second pillar of my methodology: the mapping approach.

However, I believe that there are some problems with this approach due to the fact that it should provide a valid, dynamic and open representation of the rhetorical space-anthropological place where the actors-informants interact. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. My

⁴⁷ Mary Kaldor, *Human Security – Reflections on Globalization and Intervention*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 71.

⁴⁸ David Keen, *Complex Emergencies*, Cambridge: Polity, 2009, pp. 172-173.

interest is, undoubtedly, to provide a way to map what I call the “virtual peace space”:

- an open and dynamic “rhetorical space-anthropological-existential place”, filled with symbolism, cultural elements and emotions, which has been the “territory-environment” of pre-conflict phases, and subsequently of an armed conflict, and
- post-conflict situations in a “virtual peace” dimension where there is still a “war after the war”.

For this reason, even if the mapping approach and conflict mapping are regarded as the classical *modus operandi*, I consider them unable to reproduce the “qualitative” reality which they suppose to represent and thus the base for a structured analysis, which I want to set in motion here with the idea of “virtual peace space”.

Indeed, “the mapping approach has been subject to a very particular (and very narrow) interpretation in the form of analysis and interventions based around the idea of ‘rebel greed’. According to this limited perspective, the most useful interventions are those that constrain the money that rebels can make, thereby removing the cause of civil war and of its perpetuation”⁴⁹.

Despite the fact that “conflict mapping is a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict”⁵⁰, in my opinion, however, there are still some

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 173.

⁵⁰ “Conflict mapping is a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict. It gives both to the intervenor and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolution of the conflict. (...) Having mapped the structure of the conflict, the next step is to use the information in the map to identify the scope for the conflict resolution, preferably with the help of the parties or embedded third parties. Such an analysis would identify: changes in the context which could alter the conflict situation, including the interests and capacities of third parties to influence it; changes within and between the conflict parties, including internal leadership struggles, varying prospects for military success, the readiness of general populations to express support for settlement; possible ways of redefining goals and finding alternative means of resolving differences, including suggested steps towards settlement and eventual

problems with both approaches because I think they participate to “diagnosticate” a “conflict” as a “disease”, following an ethnocentric biomedic protocol of data-identification and interpretation. In this mapping approach, based on a western Newtonian-Cartesian scientific paradigm, the dynamic relation between time and material-subject is not considered. Even a reductionist scission between the mind and the body has been operated on, not to mention the distance which has been constructed between the intervenor-doctor and the supposed patient⁵¹. Therefore, if “medicalization occurs when human problems or experiences become defined as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses, diseases, or syndromes”⁵², these mapping approaches, or “medicalization-mapping approaches” contribute to the construction of a new institutionalized concept of security: from the orthodox-militarized concept of security to a “medicalized” one. For this reason, these official maps depict a “symbolic space”, which I call a “geopolitical-narrative framework”⁵³: the space where the process of Securitization becomes a “more extreme version of politicization”⁵⁴, and now as a result of a “securitization-medicalization” process.

transformation; likely constrains on these; and how these might be overcome. (...) A conflict map is an initial snapshot. Analyst may then want to keep updating it by regular ‘conflict tracking’”. In Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, pp. 74-75.

⁵¹ Juan Ignacio Rico Becerra, *El inmigrante “enfermo” – apuntes y reflexiones desde un trabajo antropológico*, Murcia: Ediciones Isabor, 2009, pp. 68-83.

⁵² Peter Conrad and Kristin K. Barker, “The Social Construction of Illness: Key Insights and Policy Implications”, *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 2010, 51: S67. p. S74.

⁵³ “A ‘geopolitical-narrative-framework’ is a physical and intellectual-symbolic space (as a hermeneutical circle where the three elements of the Aristotle’s Rhetoric are present: Ethos, Pathos and Logos), in which emotions and perceptions are elaborated through an hegemonic narrative (narrative is a re-representation of real or invented events, then a paradigm), in order to produce a particular image and meaning (and protocol of interpretation) to be attached to the word security”. In Giovanni Ercolani, “Keeping Security and Peace: Behind the Strategicalization of NATO’s Critical Security Discourse”, *The Journal of Security Strategies*, Year 7, Issue: 14, December 2011, p. 54.

⁵⁴ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23-24.

However, medical anthropology challenges the excessive biologist's view of western medicine (the dimension of disease), and focuses more on the cultural dimension (illness) and the social dimension (sickness). This is because it is within this dimension illness-sickness where the continuum health/ illness of the "patient" is determined.⁵⁵

As a result, the mapping approach (understood as a conflict mapping – conflict tracking) will not be able to map the "virtual peace space" in which the local populations live because the time of this map has expired after the end of the war/ conflict and the declaration of "peace". However, the problem is not only of the time, but of the very relation which the official mapping approaches (as a bio-medical protocol) establish with the local population.

"Peace" is not a medicament which, once prescribed (by the intervenor-doctor) and swallowed (by the warring "patients"), transforms the whole "post-conflict" situation, and the human relations which exist into the "virtual peace place".

The problem resides in the bio-medic division between body and mind, and the distance between the doctor and the patient. Here, in this dimension, the patient loses his human dimension and the medical doctor looks only at the body-disease. It is the disease that must be combated, what the patient says and feels is of no importance: once a disease is diagnosed, the bio-medical protocol takes possession of the situation.

Thus, even the continuum health/ illness, the cultural/ social dimension in which the "patient" lives, becomes a "contagious" non-existing place.

Again, it is medical anthropology which provides us a clue to exit from this bio-medical hermeneutical cycle: the process "salud/ enfermedad/ atencion (s/ e/ a)" ⁵⁶ (health/ illness/ treatment-attention), focuses on the continuum health/ illness, then, becoming a basic dimension of culture, gives importance to what the "patient" says and feels. It is in the treatment-attention phase of the "s/ e/ a" process, where the relation between the doctor and the patient is restored, and where empirical

⁵⁵ Juan Ignacio Rico Becerra, *El inmigrante "enfermo" – apuntes y reflexiones desde un trabajo antropológico*, Murcia: Ediciones Isabor, 2009, pp. 84-85.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 83-84.

evidence plays a major role. In treating and attending to the patient as a human being, with his own identity, culture, emotion, and in listening to him, permits us to exit from the bio-medical protocol.

Then, considering the local population as human beings, in listening to their voices which verbalize their emotions, in understanding them and their cultural-social environment, and not pretending that they and their “existential place” are contagious, these represent the first steps for a reinterpretation of the “mapping approach”.

Dominique Moisi, a leading authority on international affairs, in his 2009 book “The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World”, reports his experiences of travelling and interviewing people around the world, and explains that in order to understand our changing world, we need to confront emotion.

“Emotions matter. They impact the attitudes of the peoples, the relationship between cultures, and the behavior of nations. Neither political leaders nor students of history nor ordinary concerned citizens can afford to ignore them”⁵⁷. For this reason Dominique Moisi suggests that “such a mapping involves bringing together elements as diverse as surveys of public opinion (how people feel about themselves, their present, and their future) the statements of political leaders, and cultural production such as movies, plays, and books”⁵⁸. Taking into consideration the globalization⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Dominique Moisi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*, New York: Anchor Books, 2010, p. 29.

⁵⁸ Dominique Moisi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*, New York: Anchor Books, 2010, p. 16.

⁵⁹ “Today (...), quests for identity by peoples uncertain of whom they are, their place in the world, and their prospects for a meaningful future have replaced ideology as the motor of history, with the consequence that emotions matter more than ever where media are playing the role of a sounding board and a magnifying glass. (...) In an age of globalization, emotions have become indispensable to grasp the complexity of the world we live in. (...) Unlike the Cold War system, globalization is not static but a dynamic ongoing process, involving the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed, in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations, and countries to reach around

process and the various sentiments which have been aroused by the impact-relation between the local and the global, the author focuses geopolitically on three emotions of culture: fear, hope, and humiliation. Following the mapping approach developed by Prof. Dominique Moisi, it is very interesting how different the culture of emotions takes place in various geopolitical areas of this planet.

While the culture of hope is an Asian hope⁶⁰, and the culture of ‘bad humiliation’ is most present in large parts of the Arab-Islamic world⁶¹, the culture of fear is “the dominant emotion of the West is, above all, a reaction to the events and feelings taking place elsewhere. For the first time in more than two centuries, the West is no longer setting the tune. This perception of our vulnerability and of our relative loss of centrality is at the very center of our identity crisis”⁶².

the world farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before. This same process is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind by the new system. (...) The primary reason that today’s world is the ideal fertile ground for the blossoming or even the explosion of emotions is that globalization causes insecurity and raises the question of identity. In the Cold War period there was never any reason to ask, “Who are we?” The answer was plainly visible on every map that depicted the two adversarial systems dividing the globe between them. But in an ever-changing world without borders, the question is intensely relevant. Identity is strongly linked with confidence, and in turn confidence, or the lack thereof, is expressed in emotions – in particular, those of fear, hope, and humiliation. Economically, globalization can be defined simply as the integration of economic activities across borders through markets. The driving forces of globalization, masterfully analyzed by Martin Wolf, are technological and policy changes that reduce the cost of transport and communication and encourage greater reliance on market forces. But this free flow of goods in economic terms also implies in political terms the free flow of emotions, including both positive emotions (ambition, curiosity, yearning for self-expression) and evil ones, including the angry passions that lead to hatred between nations, religions, and ethnic group.” Dominique Moisi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion – How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World*, New York: Anchor Books, 2010, pp. 4-13.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 30-55.

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 56-89.

⁶² “This crisis might be described in the following terms: ‘What’s happening to us? We used to be in charge of the rest of the world. Even if, in the twentieth century,

3. Case study: NATO's geopolitics of fear and CIMIC operations


It is in my case study that my theoretical framework finds its justification. This is because NATO has produced not only its own discourse on what constitutes its concept of security, but it has also produced a map, too. It has even produced a "bio-medical" tool. These have been done in the following phases:

1. The discursive part was provided by the "NATO emerging security challenges" as reported in the speech of the NATO Secretary General Rasmussen on emerging risks (London, October 1, 2009). "The challenges we are looking at today cut across the divide between the public and the private sectors"⁶³ the NATO Secretary General said.
2. On the other hand, what I consider here as the "NATO's Fear Map" was visually provided by Lieutenant General Jim Soligan, USAF (Deputy Chief of Staff, of the NATO Allied Command Transformation) on April 17, 2009, at "The Second International

we led ourselves to self destruction [World War I] or to suicide/ murder [World War II and the Holocaust] at least we did it to ourselves. Those were our own follies. Now it seems we are to be victimized by forces beyond our control. Asia is about to overtake us economically. Fundamentalists in the Islamic world are intent on destroying us. Immigrants from the southern nations are about to overwhelm us. Is there any way we can regain control of our own destiny?" Ibid, pp. 90-91.

⁶³ "Furthermore, his speech embraced the following pretexts for NATO interventions. This future 'casus belli', in his own words, includes: 'piracy; cyber security/ defence; climate change; extreme weather events – catastrophic storms and flooding; the rise of sea levels; population movement ...populations will move in large numbers...always where someone else lives, and sometimes across borders; water shortages; droughts; a reduction in food production; the retreating of the Arctic ice for resources that had, until now, been covered under ice; global warming; CO2 emissions; reinforcing factories or energy stations or transmission lines or ports that might be at risk of storms or flooding; energy, where diversity of supply is a security issue; natural and humanitarian disasters; big storms, or floods, or sudden movements of populations, and fuel efficiency, thus reducing our overall dependence on foreign sources of fuel.'" At: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57785.htm

Symposium on Strategic and Security Studies”, organized in Istanbul by the University of Beykent.⁶⁴ In his presentation, the NATO General showed a map of potential areas of intervention for NATO, and defined potential regions of crisis as “Multiple Stress Zones”, adding that “Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple Environmental Stress”.



If we overlap General Soligan’s presentation with the speech of the NATO Secretary General, we will see that not only are the main points regarding the possible security challenges the same but also, at geopolitical level, the threats (the sources of fear) – Multiple Stress Zones - are all outside the territories of NATO countries.

3. The last historical moment in the construction of this narrative, which defines NATO’s fears, is represented by the recent NATO Strategic Concept⁶⁵ approved in Lisbon on November 10th, 2010 (NNSC 2010). Accordingly, the defence and security of the Members

⁶⁴ Jim Soligan, “The Transformation of Defence: NATO Perspectives”, in Sait Yilmaz. Ed., *The National Defense in the 21st Century*, Istanbul: Beykent University, 2009, ISBN: 978-975-6319-06-2;

⁶⁵ At: http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation “will be based on an Active Engagement, Modern Defence”⁶⁶.

To sum up, the three pillars on which the security (freedom from anxiety) of the NATO Alliance will be based are: Collective Defence, Crisis Management, and Cooperative Security. This is because on the “NATO’s Fear Mapping approach” there is an emotional direct relationship between the security-securitization of the NATO-States territories and the securitization of “Multiple Stress Zones” which were regarded (if not ignored at all) until recently as the “periphery of non-importance”.

Then, for NATO, the “bio-medical” tool “for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”, becomes the “Crisis management”⁶⁷ operations.

⁶⁶ “(a) Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole. (b) Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security. (c) Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.” NATO 2010 New Strategic Concept, at: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>

⁶⁷ “Security through Crisis Management”, at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.

3.1. Civil-Military Cooperation Operations and NATO

“Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is a military label used to describe those occasions that see elements of armed forces engaging, and even collaborating, with civilian entities (such as local authorities or other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, or international/ intergovernmental organizations). This collaboration usually takes place during some crisis situation, whether it be after natural disaster, war, or, increasingly, during complex peace support or stability operations. It can take the form of abstract contingency planning or the high level coordination of resources and objectives, but can also manifest itself as aid delivery or reconstruction activity by military forces”⁶⁸.

NATO has been involved in CIMIC operations since its deployment in Kosovo (1999, KFOR mission). However, perceiving and reducing the purpose of CIMIC as “winning the hearts and minds of the local populations” is too simplistic. It is not a coincidence that the Italian Army Gen. Fabio Mini, former KFOR Commander, who had first hand experiences during the mission, talks about the concept of “virtual peace” and the idea of “the war after the war”. For this reason, and based on his experience, my interest in this research is not related to the political and strategic involvement of NATO military forces in any conventional declared conflict, but the very moment at which NATO, called by the international community to operate, is deployed and tactically enters into and operates, in a “CIMIC Operation” context, in a “Virtual Peace Space”.

The idea that a NATO’s comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management, in order to contribute to the stabilization and reconstruction of areas where a conflict has come to an end, is expressed by the following articles from the NNSC 2010:

“24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation

⁶⁸ Christopher Ankersen, “Interrogating civil-military cooperation”, in Christopher Ankersen, Ed., *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations – Emerging Theories and Practice*, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 1.

and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors”.

And:

“21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort”.

In this particular regard, it is worth noticing that the NATO’s theory of “Security through Crisis Management” is organized inside the “liquid” concept of “Comprehensive approach”.

Although the Comprehensive Approach is not yet well defined, since actors and nations have different opinions about what it is, it has, however, become the biggest issue in NATO today. From the standpoint of the NATO military, through lessons learned, it is now generally agreed that military operations executed in host countries cannot reach the state of that operation by military means alone. Although the military can contribute in final other fields, their first objective will always be to bring a higher level of security in that area of operation.

According to the NATO official web page: “The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary,” says NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. “NATO needs to work more closely with our civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level – especially the European Union and the United Nations”. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy. NATO is improving its own crisis-management instruments and it has reached out to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities. In particular, NATO is building closer partnerships with civilian actors that have experience and

skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, judiciary and police”⁶⁹.

Therefore, if the Comprehensive Approach is a “liquid” concept, this is not the case for the NATO Civil-Military Co-operation operation which is very well regulated by the following NATO documents: the “MC 411/ 1” on the NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (18 January, 2002), and the “AJP-9” on NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June, 2003).

According to the MC 411-1⁷⁰ NATO document: CIMIC is “the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental

⁶⁹ “A ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to crisis management. NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon to enhance NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to improve NATO’s ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction. “The comprehensive approach not only makes sense – it is necessary,” says NATO Secretary General Rasmussen. “NATO needs to work more closely with our civilian partners on the ground, and at a political level – especially the European Union and the United Nations.” The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy. NATO is improving its own crisis-management instruments and it has reached out to strengthen its ability to work with partner countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local authorities. In particular, NATO is building closer partnerships with civilian actors that have experience and skills in areas such as institution building, development, governance, judiciary and police. In March 2012, NATO agreed on an Updated List of Tasks to update its Comprehensive Approach Action Plan. These tasks are being implemented by a dedicated civilian-military task force that involves all relevant NATO bodies and commands.” At: [http:// www.nato.int/ cps/ en/ natolive/ topics_51633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm).

⁷⁰ At: [http:// www.nato.int/ ims/ docu/ mc411-1-e.htm](http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/mc411-1-e.htm).

organisations and agencies”. And “the immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him to fulfil his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of Alliance objectives in operations”.

Moreover, in meeting the above purpose the CIMIC staff will, according to the AJP-9⁷¹ NATO document:

- “a. Liaise with civil actors at the appropriate level.
- b. Engage in joint planning, at the strategic as well as the operational level, with appropriate civilian bodies before and during an operation.
- c. Carry out continuous assessments of the local civil environment, including local needs in order to identify the extent to any vacuum and how that vacuum might be filled.
- d. Oversee the conduct of civil-related activities by military forces, including the provision of requisite functional specialists.
- e. Work towards a timely and smooth transition of civil responsibilities to the proper authorities.
- f. Work with others staff branches on all the aspects of operations.
- g. Advise the Commander on all the above”.

The above activities should contribute towards the following three core functions of the CIMIC activity: civil-military liaison, support the civil environment, and support the Force.

Because of my interest in the tactical level, it is necessary to know that the principles governing the NATO Civil-Military relationship are: cultural awareness, common goals, shared responsibility, consent, transparency, and communication. Indeed, I can say that the two pillars on which the human relationship with the “locals” is based (cultural awareness, and communication) is highlighted by the fact that “the military must acquire a sound understanding of local culture, customs and law”, and that “effective

⁷¹ At: <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf>.

communication with civilian authorities, agencies, organizations and populations is vital to maintaining consent and co-operation” (AJP 9, 2-2 – 2-4).

These principles are very important the moment the CIMIC staff prepares the CIMIC input to the main operational plan. “They will also ensure that factors relating to the (local) civil dimension are incorporated into all aspects of planning. Inputs will be based, where possible, on reconnaissance, and detailed assessment. In the latter will include:

- (1) Political and cultural history.
- (2) The state of national and local government.
- (3) Civil administration and services.
- (4) The needs of the civilian population.
- (5) Population movement.
- (6) The presence, mandates, capabilities and intentions of IOs and NGOs.
- (7) Civil infrastructure.
- (8) Economy and Commerce.
- (9) The mind-set and perceptions of the civilian population” (AJP 9, 3-2).

The above approach can be synthesized by what Clifford Geertz calls a “thick description”⁷², which inspired David Kilcullen to develop his “conflict ethnography” methodology.

According to Kilcullen, who served as Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq, it is necessary to understand “the war holistically, in its own terms and through the eyes of its actual participants, in their words and in their language. Field methods applied include participant observation, face to face interviews, open-ended interaction with key informants, proficiency in local languages, long term presence on the spot, integration of written sources with personal

⁷² Clifford Geertz, “Thick description: Toward and Interpretative Theory of Culture”, in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York: Basic Books, 1973.

testimony, and developing well-founded relationship of trust with key informants – along with the fundamental ethical responsibility to protect those informants and advocate for their safety and well-being. The aim is to see beyond surface differences between societies and environments, beyond a ‘military orientalism’ that see warfare through exotic ‘eastern’ cultural stereotypes, to the deeper social and cultural drivers of conflict, drivers that local participants would understand on their own terms”⁷³.

However, I consider that there is an ontological problem with the above approach for the fact that, despite its “scientificism”, “conflict ethnography” has been developed inside a bio-medial ethnocentric mentality in which the rebel-terrorist-fighters are seen as a “disease”, then reproducing the same “medicalization protocol” where the intervenor-doctor examines the

⁷³ “‘Conflict ethnography’ methodology can be summarized as follows: Conduct the research, as far possible, using sources in the local language; Get as close as possible (in time and space) to the actual events, ideally by being present when they unfold but, at the very least, by seeking firsthand descriptions from eyewitnesses; Use documentary sources (including operational and intelligence reports, captured documents, quantitative data, maps and surveys, media content analysis, and the work of other researchers) to create a primary analysis of the environment; Use this primary analysis to identify a more limited number of “communities” (local areas, population groups, villages, or functional categories) for further detailed personal analysis at the case-study level; Conduct firsthand, on-the-spot field studies (applying an extended residential field work approach wherever possible) of these secondary communities; Work from unstructured, face to face, open-ended interviews (rather than impersonal questionnaires and surveys) during field work, but integrate this subjective qualitative perspective with quantitative data from the primary analysis; Revisit, in an iterative fashion, the results of earlier field work and analysis using follow-up interviews and contextual studies; Understand and accept the presence of personal and research bias, but act to compensate for it by using the greatest possible variety of human and documentary sources and by explicitly identifying and examining the sources of bias; Treat analogies (with other conflicts, societies, or regions) with extreme scepticism: seek to understand the conflict in its own terms rather than by analogy with some other war; Accept the fundamental ethical responsibility to protect the identity, and work to further the well-being, of any key sources and informants, seek their informed consent to research and publication, and advocate for policies that enhance their welfare.” David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla – Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp.304-305.

“body” of the patient, does not listen to him, focusing his attention only on the “disease” which must be confronted.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that what I have called a “medicalization-mapping approach” is depicted by Kilcullen when he proposes the “medical” map of the “Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome”⁷⁴.

Consequently, according to the above “representation”, the infection is spread by the diseased body of a terrorist-fighter-rebel, and so on.

At this point, I should recall my previous comment when I discussing the medical anthropology approach, which identifies in the “health/ illness/ treatment-attention” process a protocol which:

- Focuses on the continuum health/ illness, and becomes a basic dimension of culture, and, as a result, gives importance to what the “patient” says and feel.
- Where the “treatment-attention” phase contributes to restoring the relation between the doctor and the patient, and where empirical evidence plays a major role.

As a result, in treating (“to treat” in the human sense) and attending to the patient as a human being, with his own identity, culture, emotion, and in listening to him, permits us to exit from the bio-medical protocol.

Then, the problem of the “conflict ethnography” encapsulated in an “Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome” is that it is not interested in listening to the image of the “sick” person which has been produced.

On the contrary, this is what an “Italian approach” does to CIMIC developed by Col. Fabiano Zinzone, Commander of the Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Livenza, Italy) which I think puts into practice a

⁷⁴ “Based on field observation in several theatres of the ‘War on Terrorism’ since 2001, I theorize that the accidental guerrilla emerges from a cyclical process that take place in four stage: infection, contagion, intervention, and rejection. (...) Infection: Al Qaeda (AQ) establishes a presence in a remote, ungoverned or conflict-affected area; Contagion: AQ uses the safe haven to spread violence and takfiri ideology to the others regions; Intervention: outside forces intervene to deal with the AQ threat and disrupt the safe haven; Rejection: local population reacts negatively, rejecting outside intervention and allying with AQ”. Ibid, pp.34-38.

“health/ illness/ treatment-attention” process inside a “stabilization operation” which takes place in what I consider a “virtual peace space”.

3.1.1. The Ulysses’ paradigm for CIMIC

According to the Italian Army Col. Fabiano Zinzone, we need a paradigm shift in the operational-tactical approach to CIMIC operations. Based on a cultural approach which has its roots in the Greek mythology, Col. Zinzone reminds us that it was not Achilles who, despite his strength, and the fact that he killed Hector (who embodied the Command and Control mind of the Trojans) who won the Trojan War, but the strategic imagination of Ulysses who was able to read, listen, and understand the symbolic world of the Trojans. While the Achilles’ gaze was concentrated on the walls of the city and on the number of the soldiers (quite a Cold War approach in my opinion), the Ulysses’ gaze was trying to detect, identify, and then translate those symbols-signs which embodied the mythological-religious essence of the cultural life of the Trojans.

As I personally remarked to Col. Zinzone, Ulysses translated (as a symbolic analyst) the emblem of the city (the horse), which symbolized “peace”, in an instrument of war: on it he constructed the famous Trojan horse and staged a “peace” representation. The Trojans opened the gate of their city only because they recognized in the Horse the emblem of their city and the meaning of peace.

In a conference presented at the Multinational CIMIC Group on April 19, 2012, Col. Zinzone exposed his personal view on the above topics linking the Achille’s view to the old CIMIC paradigm, while the Ulysses’ one to what should be a new CIMIC methodology.

According to Zinzone, the Achilles’ view was based on a “shape-clear-hold-build” approach, while the contemporary Ulysses’ vision should be based on an “understand and shape – penetrate and secure” style.

In the Ulysses’ vision, what becomes very important is the “secure” point because in this version (opposed to the Achilles’) the aim of his mission is not to win a war, but to establish security for the local population.

Undoubtedly, there is a remarkable shift in interpreting the “theatre of operation”: first, “understanding, then shaping (not manipulating) the

environment, and in a second phase penetrating and securing the area”. The two opposite views (Achilles and Ulysses) can resemble two different ways of looking at the CIMIC (old and new).

According to Col. Zinzone, a new CIMIC concept is:

- Essential civil-military interface (understand and shape – penetrate and secure);
- Function in support of the overall mission (expand and develop);
- Key enabler/ force multiplier in a modern multifunctional environment (political/ military end state);
- Enabling all sources of the state/ coalition power system to work.

What CIMIC is not:

- CIMIC is not a humanitarian agency;
- CIMIC is not a duplicate of UN/ IO/ NGOs/ Civil actors;
- CIMIC is not capable of providing medium and long term sustainability.

Indeed, what can draw a line between the old and the new concept of CIMIC is the implementation of the “Ulysses’ paradigm for CIMIC” which is based on a “Listening-Influence-Interact” (LII) model.

Thanks to this new paradigm, the CIMIC operational activity becomes an operational design in a balanced comprehensive approach, becoming a small local centre where all the comprehensive approach capabilities are present.

Then, it is in restructuring the basis of the of the CIMIC operational design that we are able best to appreciate the evolution it brings bottom-up to the idea of comprehensive approach.

3.1.2. Structuring the Ulysses' paradigm: Buzan's Sectorial dimension of Security, and Life Modes

Once the CIMIC operations are put into practice using the Ulysses' paradigm, its main purpose is to create a locally-secured "Centre of Influence", endowed with centrifugal and centripetal energy in order to spread security, and attract people from "unsecured" surrounding areas.

Then, the CIMIC local base becomes a centre where the "Understand and Shape-Penetrate and Secure-Expand and Develop" project is continually sustained by the comprehensive approach capabilities and the local tactical doctrine of the "Listening-Influence-Interact" (LII) model.

If we look more carefully at the above representation of "centre of influence-penetrate-expand" and take into consideration the fact that the Ulysses' paradigm gives primary importance to the interaction with local people, with the purpose of securing the area, and then attracting people from surroundings area, I would say that we are dealing with the putting into practice of specific critical security studies and anthropological methodologies.

Thus, it is necessary to structure and enrich the Ulysses' Paradigm with the concept of "societal security", and the methodology of the anthropology of life modes for the following reasons. Not only does the centre of influence become an "emancipated" place which has been freed from the insecurity-conflict dimension, but also the local people become the main actors. Then, the centrality of the concept of "societal security" is restored, and with it the "live modes" of the community.

It is in this combination of the "Ulysses' Paradigm" with "societal security" concept, and Life Modes methodology, that we can have a definitive paradigm shift with a practical adaptation of this new combined paradigm to the nature of the new conflicts (and post-conflict situations), which are, as we have seen before, identity conflict, then, societal conflict.

The concept of Societal Security was developed by Barry Buzan in his book "State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era"⁷⁵.

In the book, societal security is one of the sectors in his five-dimensional approach to security alongside military, political, economic, and environmental concerns.

Despite the fact that Buzan developed his approach within the frame of a neo-Realist framework, in which the state remains the referent object of security, the concept of societal security has been acquiring more importance since the time of the publication of his book.

Societal security is concerned with the sustainable development of traditional patterns of language, culture, religious and national identities, and customs of states and if we compare these patterns to the ones which play an important role in the "identity politics-new war" (Mary Kaldor), "war amongst people" (Rupert Smith), "large group identity-conflict" (Vamik Volkan), "hybrid wars" (John J. McCuen), and "fourth generations wars" we can really understand that everything happens inside this frame of "societal security".

"Threats to societal security exist when a society perceives that its 'we' identity is being brought into question, whether this is objectively the case or not. Those means that can threaten societal identity range from the suppression of its expression to interference with its ability to reproduce itself across generation"⁷⁶.

However, the point that is missed is that if we do not have a society, we can not have the other sectors of security, and not even a state. This is another reason for considering this concept central to my reasoning.

What is more, a lot of time states and societies do not coincide, and the lack of cohesion between the state and its society can define the state as "weak". If we look at the characteristics of the Identity Politics in the "new wars", this tends to be fragmentative, backward-looking, and exclusive, not

⁷⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

⁷⁶ Paul Roe, "Societal Security", in Alan Collins (Ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 169.

to mention the important role played by diasporas and new imagined communities in the economy of the new wars.

If we want to come up with a practical example, just consider that the fundamental problem we had with the Bosnian war was a conceptual problem: the failure to understand why or how the war was fought and the character of the new nationalist political formations that emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia.

This conceptual problem is behind the critical idea of “virtual peace”: we were not able to understand before, during, and after the “societal security” problem. How was it possible for us then to treat and listen to the societal sector?

The Ulysses’ paradigm works at the tactical level with the “societal” sector of security where listening to it, and trying to understand the social and cultural dimension in which the “virtual peace” is lived daily. Owing to the fact the local CIMIC unit plays a linking role between the local society and the NATO Comprehensive dimension of the operation, it helps the local population to restore a legitimate government and, consequently, all the other sectors of security: military, political, economical, and environmental.

As a result, into the “Centre of Influence” societal security (and the other security sectors) is re-established and with it the “life modes” of the local society. As a result, the combined work of the CIMIC local unit and the local players contribute to providing that “capability” which permits the centre of influence to survive in a “virtual peace place”/ conflicting area.

In my opinion, it is the contribution and the very use of the concept of Life Modes that can make a qualitative difference in a “centre of influence” because once societal security is re-established, the centre has to “work” to reproduce that life which permits the society in the centre of influence to survival.

According to Thomas Højrup, professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark), “Life-Modes” is a social theory which analyses culture inside the framework of the state. In his work, the state is understood in its double sovereign efforts – toward the external and toward the interior. Here, he has elaborated on a model of society which

binds the process of interpellation to a reformed analysis of the modes of production and the life-modes which are tied to the society itself.

In his oeuvre “State, Culture and Life-Modes”, Højrup takes “war” as a particular social reality and gives it a remarkable position and function in the formation of society.

The author wants to demonstrate how the capacity to generate more defence capability (based on internal interpellation) by a state involved in a war/ struggle for recognition at international level (state system) is seen as a biological evolutionary theory in which the notion of the “survival of the superior defence” is eradicated.

For Philip Bobbitt, “war is a product as well as a shaper of culture. Animals do not make war, even if they fight. No less than the market and the law courts, with which it is inextricably intertwined, war is a creative act of civilized man with important consequences for the rest of human culture, which include the festivals of peace”⁷⁷.

For sure, war during human history has participated in the formation of the state: one domestic, while the other dependent on the international system.

On this society-state formation, Thomas Højrup talks of fusion theory when he refers to the domestic dimension and of fission theory for the international-system dimension.

It is on this particular relation which historically has been constructed between “war-culture-state formation” that Højrup wants to demonstrate that “civil society (...) cannot be understood independently of the state subject of which it is part”⁷⁸.

⁷⁷ Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles – War, Peace, and the Course of History*, New York: Anchor Boos, 2003 [2002], p xxxi.

⁷⁸ “It is only in civil society’s own understanding (...) that civil society can be considered as self determined or as an end in itself while the state is a derivative or means (...) This means that the state is not simply a social contract in which individuals ensure themselves against civil war and the violation of their right. The state is culture’s substantial foundation. Without the state subject, no individual and particular subjectivity or social relation can be conceived. (...) Culture is part of the concept of the state”. In Thomas Højrup, *State, Culture and Life Modes*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p 160.

In this “cultural-state-formation” process, a corner stone concept is represented by the concept of “recognition” which was introduced by Hegel.

This “recognition” exercise operates at two levels:

- at the domestic level in which the individual-citizen has to recognize the state and the state has to recognize the individual-citizen as terminal elements of a relationship. This mutual recognizing affair is constructed through the “interpellation process”⁷⁹ (fusion theory);
- at the international level in which mutual recognition is a permanent struggle for recognition which has become the accepted “rule of the game” among a plurality of state subjects (fission theory).

As the author says, cultural history contains both the struggle for recognition and interpellation, and this is not a novelty if we read history with the right eyes.

In this interpellation-recognition conflicting-exercise in which the “citizens-state-states” are involved a catalyst element is inserted in this laboratory: war.

This is because war activates a variety of elements which, at the international and domestic levels, plays a decisive role in this interpellation-recognition process.

“Only the recognized state subject, which possesses the defence capability in the struggle for recognition (during war) to exclude others from its domain of sovereignty, can interpellate its own citizens. (...) Sovereignty is forged in war. State subjects are not pre-existing entities, but wills which are forged and recognised as sovereign in the struggle for recognition. Cultures are forged and selected in this struggle”⁸⁰.

Thus, it is here that the theory of war developed by Carl von Clausewitz comes into play in this framework: war is struggle for life and

⁷⁹ Louis Althusser, *Ideología Y aparatos ideológicos de Estado*, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Vision, 1988, pp. 52-58.

⁸⁰ Thomas Højrup, *State, Culture and Life Modes*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 166-167.

death between wills, each of which attempts to subordinate each other. War is the effort of wills to destroy each other's plans.

According to the work of Danish philosopher and peace researcher Anders Boserup, at one point "Clausewitz' theory contains the key to a true infinity, i.e. the infinite struggle for recognition which never culminates in some all-encompassing dominant Will, and which resolves the contradictions of the Hegelian state theory. In his *Krieg, Staat und Frieden*, Boserup outlines the way in which war theory's initial sequence of specifications explains why the struggle for recognition is a truly infinite process which will continue to split up into a plurality of states, i.e. generate state system"⁸¹

It is at this point that Højrup, in order to sustain his reasoning, makes use of Clausewitz's point that the war comprises two forms of struggle: offensive (O) and defensive (D), of which the defensive struggle is stronger ($D > O$).

In this D-O (defensive-offensive) period of confrontation, the importance of pauses (of peace) is of essential significance, but the $D > O$ (supremacy of defensive on offensive) struggle is only possible if the capabilities of the defending state are just well enough to sustain the pauses periods. Having at its disposal more capabilities is equal to the benefit of "pauses time", and thus peace time.

Then $D > O$ is possible only if the defending state is really able not only to interpellate his citizens to sustain the state struggle, but even to provide material capabilities to the state itself. In military terminology, I can say that, as far as the defending state has a strong logistic structure, then it is able to live in pauses-peace time.

Consequently, we can assume that the struggle for recognition among states has its foundation on the defence capability of the states themselves.⁸²

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 169.

⁸² "The state, then, is defined in the system of states as a capability for defence. (...) As the defence capability rests upon the state's ability to generate and renew the internal social structure which provides the defence capability and the will to defence, this structure is conditioned by the concrete conditions of possibility in the state system. The social structure, therefore, are quite varied and defined concretely by the context of the state system". Ibid, p 173.

Going back to the art of war⁸³, it is natural that the offensive-attacking part will try to attack the opponent on its weak point and then reach the “centre of gravity” of the opposing structure. Thus if D>O, the then defending state, has to defend its own centre of gravity, which is not only material but also includes a hidden agenda, the tactics of the enemy are limited by material factors and thus the strategy to destroy the adversary’s centre of gravity is based on ideas which are unknown and unlimited.

The centre of gravity can then be seen in the “will” of the state.

General Sir Rupert Smith says: “The will to win is the paramount factor in any battle: without the political will and leadership to create and sustain the force and direct it to achieving its objective come what may, no military force can triumph in the face of a more determined opponent. (...) political will is an essential ingredient to success in war. The will to triumph, to carry the risks and bear the costs, to gain the reward of victory, is immense; as Napoleon had it, “The moral is to the physical as three to one.’ (...) capability=means x Way2 x 3 Will”⁸⁴.

Therefore, on this idea of the “will” as an immaterial capability, Højrup constructs his discourse in which the state’s defence capability requires three elements:

1. given goals;
2. given means;
3. the ability to activate these means purposefully in relation to the goals⁸⁵.

Consequently, using the Aristotelian problematique of polis, oikos, and etikos, Højrup constructs his domestic structure in which this state defence-will capacity is constructed in combining three levels:

1. “polis-political level”, in which it ensures the formation of the will to defend the domain of sovereignty when it is challenged;

⁸³ We do not have to forget that wars and conflicts are conducted at four levels: political, strategic, theatre and tactical.

⁸⁴ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World*, London: Penguin Books, 2005, pp. 241- 242.

⁸⁵ Thomas Højrup, *State, Culture and Life Modes*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p 176.

2. “oikos-economic structure”, which not only provide the material capability but the armed forces in charge to defend the city;
3. “etikos-ideological structure”, which activates, through the interpellation process, the means to attain the goals.

This last point is of particular importance because in this “etikos-ideological structure” there is the construction of the citizen self-consciousness (linked to the concept of live-modes). However, in this ideological process of consciousness construction, I see a strong relation with the concept of “habitus” developed by Pierre Bourdieu in which the “habitus is a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways”⁸⁶, and thus providing individuals with a sense of how to act and respond in the course of their daily lives.

“There is every reason to think that the factors which are the most influential in the formation of the habitus are transmitted without passing through language and consciousness, but through suggestions inscribed in the most apparently insignificant aspects of the things, situations and practices of everyday life”⁸⁷.

As a result, the capability of a state resides in this capacity of the political level to “interpellate-habitus” (interpellate-accustom) its subjects in order to activate them to provide the means (material and immaterial) for the sustainment of the state defence.

This is in short the state domestic production of its own defence capability.

“Defence capability is a necessity in that it constitutes the conditions of possibility for all other aspects of culture”⁸⁸.

I strongly support the above construction and thesis because there are plenty of historical events which are the results of the international system influencing/ constructing society/ states formation.

As a result, what is important is the capacity of the state to produce the political will (through the interpellation-habitus process) inside their own

⁸⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language & Symbolic Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005, p. 12.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 51.

⁸⁸ Thomas Højrup, *State, Culture and Life Modes*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p. 180.

citizens, and I argue a political will that sees security as a value and not as an open concept.

This process, which works both as a centrifugal force (struggle for recognition at international level) and as a centripetal force (domestic interpellation process), finds its explanation in the fission and fusion theories.

In fusion theory “the state emerges as an amalgamation of pre-existing concepts. This theory is an effect of the given properties which emerge when certain object-concepts are put together. In fission theory, states appear in a process of splitting on the global level”⁸⁹.

These two theories open the path to the concluding analysis in which the capacity of the state to generate a defence capability (based on internal interpellation) and its D>O struggle for recognition at an international level (ecosystem) is seen as a biological evolutionary theory in which the notion of the “survival of the superior defence” is eradicated.

Therefore, if we apply the above concepts at societal security level, it is the ability of the local society, helped by the CIMIC operation, to produce that will which is inside the “centre of influence” and thus becomes a defence capability during the “pauses time”.

When we talk about “pauses time”, I refer here to the Conflict Management Continuum because I take into consideration the continuum of time which is present in the idea of “the war after the war” in a “virtual peace space”.

Then, on my advice, it is only integrating the Ulysses’ approach with the concept of societal security together with the methodology of Life Modes in a “culture-state-formation” process, framed in a temporal dimension of Conflict Management Continuum (war after the war), that we are able to produce the following in the “centre of influence”:

- The re-establishment of a social security dimension, where the “will” of the local society, based on its state culture, produces that interpellation process which mobilizes the local people to re-establish their life modes and then their defence capabilities;

⁸⁹ Ibid, p 219

- That official recognition which operates at the local level (fusion theory) and external-international level (fission theory), and which permits the centre of influence to expand its influence at the external level (fission theory);
- The implementation of the link between the cultural (illness) and social (sickness) dimensions in the centre of influence, which permits a treatment/ attention, and which has a time duration which exceeds the establishment of a “virtual peace”.

4. The Anthropological Lens as a “cosmopolitan outlook”: The Local and the Global Context

“Today, the planet has shrunk; information and images circulate readily, and because of this the others’ mythic dimension is fading. The ‘others’ are in fact not so very different, or rather, their otherness remains, but the prestige of their erstwhile exoticism is gone. (...) We are experiencing an ‘acceleration of history’ – another expression for the ‘shrinking of the planet’ – that involves both objective interactions within the ‘world system’ and the instantaneity of information and image dissemination. Each month, every day, we experience ‘historical’ events; each day the border between history and current events becomes a bit more blurred. The parameters of time, like those of space, are changing, and this is an unprecedented revolution”⁹⁰.

According to the French anthropologist Marc Auge’, anthropology, because of its dimension in which is established a relation with the object of its observation, and in the context in which the object is observed, it becomes a privileged path for the observation of the contemporary worlds. It is the contemporary situation which forces anthropology to define itself not only as “just ethnography”: the context today is increasingly global and, although it remains necessary to study the local and regional micro-

⁹⁰ Marc Auge’, *An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds*, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 14.

contexts, anthropology acquires all its meaning only in relation to the global context in which are inserted the micro-contexts.⁹¹

Then, it is the complexity itself of the contemporary world, which forces anthropology to adopt the elements of a “prospective critique”⁹². It thus improves its way of looking, taking into consideration that, in this anthropology of contemporary worlds, as the anthropological space has changed, so the concept of time has changed, too.

Auge’, in this regard, defines the time we live in as the state of super-modernity, defined in opposition to modernity. “Super-modernity corresponds to an acceleration of history, a shrinking of space, and an individualizing of references, all of which subvert the cumulative process of modernity”⁹³.

Super-modernity is marked by three types of events:

1. An excess of event, which makes it difficult to conceive history;
2. An excess of images and spatial references, the paradoxical effect of which is to close us up into a shrinking space of the world;
3. An excessive recourse to the individual, by which I mean that because of the collapse of intermediary bodies and the confirmed impotence of the great system of interpretation, individuals are now required to conceive their relation to history and the world by themselves.⁹⁴

Thus, we are cached in a new space-image-time dimension in which I would like to place the “NATO’s fear map” to see if its geopolitical representation of its fears and anxieties are really justified when we are confronted with the “others”’ perceptions of reality like the above mentioned map of humiliation and hope.

⁹¹ Marc Auge’, *Che fine ha fatto il futuro?*, Milano: Eleuthera, 2009, p.87.

⁹² Marc Auge’, *An Anthropology for Contemporaneous Worlds*, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 53.

⁹³ *Ibid*, p. 110.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 101-102.

This way of challenging the NATO's fear map is justified by the fact that other "con-temporary" states and societies live in the same fusion and fission processes which are at the base of their "life modes".

For this purpose, I consider the "NATO's fear map" and the "NATO New Strategic Concept" as a combined image that is posing for a picture.

"Once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of 'posing', I instantaneously make another body for myself, I transform myself in advance into an image. This transformation is an active one: I feel that the Photographer creates my body or mortifies it, according to its caprice. (...) I pose, I know I am posing, I want you to know that I am posing, but this additional message must in no way alter the precious essence of my individuality (...) What I want, in short (...) is to see myself"⁹⁵.

This is why, to explain the fact that the NATO's picture is "living" in a different time and a different space dimension, I need to use an anthropological lens.

"In the physics of photography, the brighter the light, the smaller the aperture of the lens; with more light, a smaller hole is sufficient to transmit the image to the film. And the smaller the aperture, the larger is the depth of the field. That is, the photographer can include in focus the background and the foreground of the object as well the object itself. If this field could be extended infinitely, it could include even the camera. Anthropology is not imprisoned in the law of optics, nor is it exclusively visual; but a visual analogy may help us think concretely"⁹⁶.

⁹⁵ Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida*, London: Vintage Classics, 2000, pp. 10-12.

⁹⁶ "In the physics of photography, the brighter the light, the smaller the aperture of the lens; with more light, a smaller hole is sufficient to transmit the image to the film. And the smaller the aperture, the larger is the depth of the field. That is, the photographer can include in focus the background and the foreground of the object as well the object itself. If this field could be extended infinitely, it could include even the camera. Anthropology is not imprisoned in the law of optics, nor is exclusively visual; but a visual analogy may help us think concretely. Imagine a photographer who favors bright, harsh light – conditions where glare is intense. Imagine also that he seeks depth of field – to include in focus the foreground and background as well the subject itself. Anthropology seeks conditions of harsh light; this may be literally true (...) but is also true metaphorically in that anthropologists

Therefore, if I use a small lens aperture (with a long exposure), the larger the depth of the field becomes. The result is that I create an image in which, while NATO is posing (interested in being itself) in front of me, in the background (caught in the depth of the field), I have other realities and perceptions which, on the whole, contribute to providing a different picture from the one NATO had originally in mind.

As a result, I produce a picture that ontologically and epistemologically challenges the idea NATO has of what reality is and what knowledge constitutes.

Because once the picture has been developed and printed, this is what we find in the background of a posing NATO:

1. Unrestricted warfare;
2. The 2010 G20 Seoul Meeting;
3. A multiple stress-zone-Pentagon map;
4. The world's population growth rate;
5. Consumption factor;
6. A demand for food;
7. Water, food and climate changes;
8. Life expectancy rate;
9. The globalization of migration;
10. The changing character of conflict.

1. Other countries like China (with a population of 1.5 billion) have produced their own concept of war. "Unrestricted Warfare" is a book on

usually seek to their work in conditions that are in some sense harsh, so as to expose the raw and elemental, the fundamentals of human nature stripped of the fluff of civilization. Within those settings, anthropology focuses softly rather than sharply: rather the focus narrowly on the object, anthropology blurs the boundary between object and milieu so as to include not only the object but also its background, and foreground; this perception of the total milieu we call holism. Were this holistic field of vision extended far enough, it would include the perceiver as well as the object perceived, and this too is a concern of anthropology, which recognizes the subjective as well the objective aspect of knowledge." James L. Peacock, *The Anthropological Lens*, Cambridge University Press, 2001 (1986) pp. xi-xii.

military strategy written in 1999 by two colonels in the People's Liberation Army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The book, rather than focusing on direct military confrontation, examines a variety of other means which can be summarized in the Formula: Schwartzkopf + Soros + Xiaomolisi + Bin Laden.⁹⁷

2. At the G20 Seoul meeting (2010), even the map of the world financial crisis was changed. Despite the western countries depicted the financial crisis as a global one, its perception from other global actors and emerging economies was completely different. According to O'Neill (Goldman Sachs), policy makers in Asia were referring to the global credit crisis as the "North Atlantic Crisis"⁹⁸ Thus, and for the first time, the "others" defined our military alliance as a financial system.


3. When we look at the "Multiple Stress Zone" map presented by the NATO General Soligan in 2009, how can we not see that it is the exact copy of the Pentagon Map which was produced in the year 2004⁹⁹ to highlight the grand strategy for the American foreign policy? Furthermore, the Pentagon Map is much more than a simple cartographic representation of the planet. It is a division of the world's countries between the Functioning Core, characterized by economic interdependence, and the Non-Integrated Gap, characterized by unstable leadership and absence of international trade. The Core can be sub-divided into the Old Core (North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australia) and the New Core (China and India). The Non-Integrated Gap includes the Middle East, South Asia (except India), most of Africa, Southeast Asia, and northwest South America. Thus, using a realist terminology, the Functioning Core can represent the land of order while the Non-Integrated Gap the land of anarchy and disorder.

⁹⁷ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, at: [http:// cryptome.org/ cuw.htm](http://cryptome.org/cuw.htm)

⁹⁸ BBC News - Today - West 'paranoid' about world economy, Nov 11, 2010 at: [http:// news.bbc.co.uk/ today/ hi/ today/ newsid_ 9179000/ 9179739.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9179000/9179739.stm)

⁹⁹ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, Putnam Adult, 2004.

Furthermore, it can be seen as a tentative to ethnicize the world¹⁰⁰. And if what can happen in the Non-Integrated Gap can produce security concerns to the NATO countries (which are part of the Functioning Core) and justify a military intervention in their internal affairs, then “fear is something that is actually missing in a situation of international anarchy, and because it is missing, it must be invented and skilfully deployed”¹⁰¹.



4. World Population Growth Rate: “By 2003, the combined population of Europe, the United States, and Canada accounted for just 17 percent of the global population. In 2050, this figure is expected to be just 12 percent. (...) Today, roughly nine out of ten children under the age of 15 live in developing countries. (...) Indeed, over 70 percent of the world’s population growth between now and 2050 will take place in 24 countries, all of which are classified by the World Bank as low income or lower-middle income, with an average per capita income under \$ 3,855 in 2008”¹⁰². Data, which have been confirmed recently by the USA National Intelligence Council

¹⁰⁰ Marco Aime, *Eccessi di Culture*, Torino: Einaudi, 2004, pp. 73-100.

¹⁰¹ Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory – A Critical Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 23.

¹⁰² Jack A. Goldstone, “The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2010. And the recent article of Georges Minois, “Une Planète trop peuplée ?”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Juin 2011.

“Global Trends 2025 – A Transformed World”. “Population growth: Asia, Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West. Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth, but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease. The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration. The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase. The number of countries with youthful age structures in the current “arc of instability” is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent. Three of every four youth-bulge countries that remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa; nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East, scattered through southern and central Asia, and in the Pacific Islands”¹⁰³. “World population is projected to grow by about 1.2 billion between 2009 and 2025— from 6.8 billion to around 8 billion people. Although the global population increase is substantial—with concomitant effects on resources—the rate of growth will be slower than it was, down from levels that added 2.4 billion persons between 1980 and today. Demographers project that Asia and Africa will account for most of the population growth out to 2025 while less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the “West”—Europe, Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In 2025, roughly 16 percent of humanity will live in the West, down from the 18 percent in 2009 and 24 percent in 1980”¹⁰⁴.

5. Consumption factor. “The estimated one billion people who live in developed countries have a relative per capita consumption rate of 32. Most of the world’s other 5.5 billion people that constitute the developing world,

¹⁰³ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, Nov 2008, pp. vii-viii.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 19.

with relative per capita consumption rates below 32, are mostly down toward 1”¹⁰⁵.

How will it be possible to “secure our future” (the estimated one billion people who live in developed countries coincidentally is the same number of NATO people, the “our”) and then maintain a consumption factor of 32 when the “others” will want to consume like us? “The World Bank has predicted that by 2030 the number of middle-class people in the developing world will be 1.2 billion – a rise of 200 percent since 2005. This means that the developing world’s middle class alone will be larger than the total populations of Europe, Japan, and the United States combined. From now on, therefore, the main driver of global economic expansion will be the economic growth of newly-industrialized countries, such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey”¹⁰⁶.

6. “Demand for food: The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class. Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching critical proportions, particularly for agricultural purposes, and the problem will worsen because of rapid urbanization worldwide and the roughly 1.2 billion persons to be added over the next 20 years. Today, experts consider 21 countries, with a combined population of about 600 million, to be either cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025”¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁵ Jared Diamond, What’s Your Consumption Factor?, *The New York Times*, January 2, 2008, at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf

¹⁰⁶ Jack A. Goldstone, “The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/ February 2010.

¹⁰⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, Nov 2008, p. viii.

7. “Water, Food, and Climate Change: Experts currently consider 21 countries with a combined population of about 600 million to be either cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, home to about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025. Among the new entrants will be Burundi, Colombia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Pakistan, and Syria. Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching unprecedented proportions in many areas of the world (see map on page 55) and is likely to grow worse owing to rapid urbanization and population growth. Demand for water for agricultural purposes and hydroelectric power generation also will expand. Use of water for irrigation is far greater than for household consumption. In developing countries, agriculture currently consumes over 70 percent of the world’s water. The construction of hydroelectric power stations on major rivers may improve flood control, but it might also cause considerable anxiety to downstream users of the river who expect continued access to water”¹⁰⁸.

8. Life expectancy rate. Will the people living in the “multiple stress zone” (the non- integrated gap) accept their dramatic living conditions, and live less than the people living in other parts of the globe? Will they accept the status quo that has produced their misery or will they rebel? And the peace that NATO will impose on them will be a “positive peace” or a “negative peace” which will reproduce the same “structural violence” that provoked unrest and internal conflict, and not seeing instead the “civil war as a system”¹⁰⁹?

9. The globalization of migration. According to the EU analysis on “Global Trends 2030 - Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World”¹¹⁰: “The globalization of migration will continue to expand due to increased factors of mobility such as greater availability of information for discerning migrants, broader diasporas that facilitate migration and settlement, and

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 51.

¹⁰⁹ David Keen, *Complex Emergencies*, Cambridge: Polity, 2009, pp. 11-24.

¹¹⁰ ESPAS Report, *Global Trends 2030 - Citizens in an Interconnected and Polycentric World*, 27 April 2012.

changes in the drivers of migration. The most important traditional drivers of migration – the differences in economic opportunity and/ or personal security between source and destination countries – will be increasingly complemented by differences in dependency ratios that encourage changes in immigration policy in many host countries. Climate change may also have more of an influence on future migration flows. While the dominant migration destinations of the latter half of the twentieth century will continue to attract people (North America, Western Europe and the Persian Gulf), increasing numbers of migrants will move toward new destination zones in quickly developing countries”¹¹¹.

The same scenario of migration is confirmed by the US National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*¹¹²: “The net migration of people from rural to urban areas and from poorer to richer countries likely will continue apace in 2025, fuelled by a widening gap in economic and physical security between adjacent regions”.

Although the document does not mention the concept of “societal security”, it talks about Identity Demography: Where ethno-religious groups have experienced their transition to lower birth rates at varying paces, lingering ethnic youth bulges and shifts in group proportions could trigger significant political changes. Shifts in ethno-religious composition resulting from migration also could fuel political change, particularly where immigrants settle in low-fertility industrialized countries”.

10. “The Changing Character of Conflict. Conflict will continue to evolve over the next 20 years as potential combatants adapt to advances in science and technology, improving weapon capabilities, and changes in the security environment. Warfare in 2025 is likely to be characterized by the following strategic trends: the increasing importance of information, the evolution of irregular warfare capabilities, the prominence of the non-military aspects of

¹¹¹ Ibid, pp. 65-67.

¹¹² National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, Nov 2008, pp. 23-24.

warfare, and the expansion and escalation of conflicts beyond the traditional battlefield”¹¹³.

In conclusion, what emerges from this complex picture is that NATO countries cannot ignore the rest of the planet when the Alliance represents a minority compared with the global picture. If NATO does not want to be accused to have “strategicalized the global politics”¹¹⁴, and to have produced its own world vision¹¹⁵, it has to accept to review its idealistic discourse.

Then NATO’s narrative, which can be seen as the sum of the various Alleys’ national security looks, needs to move from what I consider as an example of “cosmopolitan idealism” totally in contrast with the concept of “cosmopolitan realism which adheres to the principle that political action and political science make us blind without cosmopolitan concepts and ways of seeing the world”¹¹⁶.

If NATO really wants to see itself, it has to consider the large background which appears on the picture because in this globalized and complex society we are all interconnected.

Then, NATO too has to adopt a new way to look at the world and accept a “cosmopolitan outlook (which) (...) is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but sceptical and self-critical. The world that appears within its field of vision is neither darkened by cultural pessimism nor illuminated by belief in progress. There is not attempt here to persuade us that we are on

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹⁴ “Strategicalization of global politics’ – the rendering of events as subject to human mastery at the hands of statesman and to the logic of a peculiarly contemporary, i.e. postwar strategic discourse.” And “by talking of ‘strategicalization’, we identify processes by which political domain is extended beyond realms of immediate sovereignty.” Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 27.

¹¹⁵ “What is distinctive about ‘strategicalization’ is the extent to which state behavior becomes encoded within world views and then becomes the basis of the whole bureaucratic apparatuses – of security analysis, intelligence estimates, and international surveillance.” Ibid, p.127.

¹¹⁶ Ulrich Beck, *Power in the Global Age – A New Global Political Economy*, Cambridge: Polity, 2006, pp.110-115.

our way towards a world of general human benevolence. Indeed, just the opposite is the case: disasters lurk at every turn, and yet there is also an enticing glimmer of new beginnings – usually it is impossible to tell whether or not the future holds both at once. The main feature of the cosmopolitan outlook is simply that it is different”¹¹⁷.

5. Concluding Thoughts

“To evaluate the results of operations and wars is not sufficient to consider only the end of military hostilities, but we need to examine the results of the next phase of transformation which is euphemistically called reconstruction. This phase becomes an integral part of the declared engagement for peace and should be an integral part of the war engagement that preceded it”¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 110.

¹¹⁸ “Countries rebuilt by the so-called international community, but dependent on the world charity in terms of economy and security are doubly enslaved: they are in the condition of dependency and in the impossibility to rebel against overwhelming and indefinite power. Therefore war is strictly tied to the post conflict and to the military and civil component. These two dimensions intertwine and influence each other in a continuity which should already be manifest before the war. These two components should be already in set in the pre-war phase, in the planning, and conduct of the war. The need of transformation and reconstruction, the costs, the duration, the sacrifices which will be imposed, the socio-economic model which should be implemented, and the identification of the personnel in charge of the post-conflict phase, all these are all those elements which should even indicate what to destroy and what to safeguard. Modern war is won or lost in relation to the results of what is done after the end of the conflict, and not in relation to the elimination of the opponent. It is from the post-war phase that we can understand if the war and the operations were worthy and if they were necessary for something or not. If those who made the war wanted peace, stability and welfare as an assertion of civilizations and solidarity, or if they just wanted to make a show of power, exercising authority, destroy, plunder, and gain extra expenses and leave. How did some barbarian hordes and all adventurers.” Fabio Mini, *La Guerra dopo la Guerra – Soldati, burocrati e mercenari nell’epoca della pace virtuale*, Torino: Einaudi, 2003, pp. 172-173.

According to the Italian Army Gen. Mini, what is then of big importance in these operations which take place in “virtual peace space” is the temporal aspect, that time which continues to play a role after that the conflict has ended. This is indeed the concept of the “after-afterwards” (“dopo” in Italian) which broadens the structured Ulysses’ paradigm, puts it in a state of super-modernity, and creates the link with that cosmopolitan outlook which participates in a construction of possible life-modes methodology at a global level.

Therefore, taking the idea of “after-afterwards” as a system of measurement, we can go back to the ontological and epistemological questions of (of what??) and ask again:

- What is reality?
- What is real knowledge?
- What can we do?

And after, due to the fact we are dealing with “security” issue, we can ask the following questions:

- What is being secured?
- What is being secured against? Who are the enemies?
- Who provides security?
- What methods can be undertaken to provide it?

Therefore, the reality is more complicated than the one presented on the NATO’s fear map and our methodology has presented a “picture” which can be accepted as knowledge.

After these results, there is most definitely something that we have to do. First of all, the referent object of security has to be considered.

The structured Ulysses’ paradigm puts at the centre of its activity the security of the local society. The creation of a centre of influence is a practical example of how to implement at best CIMIC cooperation activities in areas where the “enemy” is the situation created by the “virtual peace” where a war after the war is going on, and where the society is slowly trying to reconstruct its life-modes. Indeed, hard security is needed.

This is a task of the international forces which received an UN mandate to operate. However, when we arrive to answer to the question “what methods can be undertaken to provide security?”, we need another tool which automatically will provide benefit to the implementation of CIMIC operations by the structured Ulysses’ paradigm.

Thus, it is in this state of super-modernity, where time and space assume different significances and dimensions, that create the “centre of influence”, which is open and “con-temporary” to the global dimension because the “centre of influence”, even if it has place in a more wide regional area of “virtual peace”, is connected to the world, and the world is connected to it.

Therefore, it is on this global-contemporaneous world dimension that we should rethink the NATO CIMIC Doctrine, and put it on a new global framework.

Already the structured Ulysses’ paradigm works at a different level, linking the social reality to the regional context and the international dimension in a comprehensive dimension. However, this is, on my advice, not sufficient.

If the purpose of the secured centre of influence is to generate that centrifugal and centripetal energy which it permits to enlarge its sphere of influence, then the philosophical will on which the NATO CIMIC operation is based should not be an ethnocentric one, or linked to a map of fear, or a specific security discourse, but based on a more general and global concept as the one developed by Human Security.

“Our version of human security emphasizes what the UNDP calls personal security – the security of human beings in violent upheavals. Thus, we agree with the idea of Responsibility to Protect. But we also think that it is impossible to protect people from violence without taking into account all of the other dimensions of insecurity – the conditions of violence”¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁹ Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, *The Ultimate Weapon Is No Weapon – Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace*, New York: Public Affairs, 2010, pp. 7.

“A human security approach aims, above all, to prevent violence by tackling the conditions that lead to violence. (...) A human security approach looks not just at reconstruction but also at preventing new outbreaks of violence, since the conditions that led to violence – weak rule of law, unemployment, criminality, surplus weapons, loss of livelihood, or extremist ideologies – are often worse after conflict than before. (...) There is an essential role for force in human-security operations: sometimes you need to be able to protect people using what is known as hard power. But militaries must work together with civilians – police officers, health workers, development experts, and others – and their role is very different from traditional war fighting”.

Thus, according to Mary Kaldor, the six principles of human security that apply to both military and civilians working together in zones of insecurity are: the primacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, regional focus, and clear civilian command.¹²⁰

Therefore, the structured Ulysses’ paradigm should openly adopt the Human Security principles and move more closely to a Human Security operation doctrine. The Human Security principles should become the new referential framework for the structured Ulysses’ paradigm. Then, in this “virtual peace space”, peace is won or lost in relation to the results achieved and what is done after the end of the conflict, and not in relation to the elimination of the opponent as Mini reminds us.

Consequently, “although conflict is often more polarized in areas of insecurity, the real difference between areas of security and areas of insecurity is the existence of mechanism for managing conflicts peacefully. (...) When prevention fails, and violence escalates, a human security approach aims to reverse the process: to stop the violence rather than to side with one party to the violence. This is much more expensive and difficult than prevention. This is why human-security approach stresses the need to work proactively before conflict turns violent and violence turns to

¹²⁰ Ibid, pp. 7-9.

catastrophe. The tasks to be undertaken are sustainable security, sustainable livelihoods, sustainable governance, and sustainable development”¹²¹.

As a positive result, we should find a structured Ulysses’ paradigm guided by the six principles of Human Security and implemented to achieve those tasks which will permit to make a difference in that period of time, which stretches from the moment of the end of conflict, and passing by the phases of peace, virtual peace, and finally arriving at a positive peace (which as Johan Galtung reminds us would include love, freedom from exploitation and repression, and the existence of a culture of peace).

In conclusion, I would like to say that we have to reinvent ourselves and understand what our position is on this planet and what the responsibilities are that we have toward the global community. It is in re-interpreting the concept of security, how the concept is implemented and exported in different cultural environments which prove to us how our perception of the other is based on a cultural relativism, which can become a danger when we operate in the “war after war” area. What is needed is to move from a “conflict ethnography” and adopt a “life-modes anthropology”, which can represent the middle point, or the point of contact between the anthropological world of research and the ideas developed by the critical security studies environment. This is because it is in this multidisciplinary environment where it is possible to put into practice the tool of controversy developed by the School of Mines of Paris¹²². Here, controversy, as a pedagogical methodology, is defined as a “debate which takes into consideration technical or scientific knowledge that is not even insured”. Furthermore, this is by reason of the fact that the gross negligence has been not to have listened to Fikret as well as not having been able to integrate the “after-afterwards” in a unitary process of thinking and planning.

Without knowing that we have been a prisoner of a conceptual way of looking, like Achilles had been, and without realizing that the first

¹²¹ Ibid, pp. 89-106.

¹²² Izaskun Chinchilla and Fabián Muniesa, “La controversia como herramienta proyectual”, Boletín CF+S, Madrid, 2004, at: [http:// habitat.aq.upm.es/ boletin/ n32/ aichi01.html](http://habitat.aq.upm.es/boletin/n32/aichi01.html)

“controversy” starts at the very moment we look at the events, the moment we label them with terminologies, we define their meaning and their existence.

It is the anthropologist who, in contact with local post-conflict realities, looks, listens, understands, compares, writes, and proves that what has been defined as “peace”, in reality is still a “war after the war”. Thus, it is in this space that the military and the civilian have to operate to secure people and re-establish a secure life-modes, providing dignity and hope for a better future. This is not an academic exercise. It is a human responsibility because, quoting Sherlock Holmes, “it can be dangerous to theorize before one has data. Insensibly, one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts”.

2

Visual Ethnographies, Conflict and Security

Chris Farrands

In this paper¹²³, I am concerned with how interpretive approaches to photography in contemporary conflicts might offer some kind of understanding of those conflicts using an ethnographic approach. To do this, the paper will establish what is generally meant by ‘visual ethnography’, and identify how this approach might differ from, and strike a conversation with, more conventional international relations (IR) approaches. I will look at some specific images, which will be the main element of the presentation in the conference session. The paper explores whether, and how, some kind of interpretation or sense-making process might help our understanding not just of those individual images, but of the conflicts which form their context. All the time, the argument of this paper resists a seductive scepticism which denies the possibility of this kind of understanding. This scepticism is seen not as a fundamental problem, but as an essential part of the dialogue from which sense-making might emerge. The paper makes an important contribution to an understanding of security

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and securitisation through the use of an anthropological or ethnographic approach.

It is often said that postmodern society is addicted to images, and that we live in a society which understands itself through the images which it produces much more than through more traditional, print medium oriented medium of words and written text (see, for example, Epstein, 2012 and Thorpe, 2012). Images have apparently taken over contemporary culture, almost to the extent that only what can be captured in a mobile phone shot and placed on Facebook counts as real, and, perhaps even more pointedly, where 'news' only exists for editors, journalists and consumers alike if the film or images can be found to justify its inclusion in TV or online broadcast. This leaves news professionals and lobby groups struggling to find the image which can best convey what they are trying to get across, and, even in 'serious' news media, less and less space being devoted to text as opposed to images of different kinds. It also encourages the invention of images and the recycling of established 'iconic' images for purposes very different from those which originally led to their creation.

This image-focussed nature of news has an obvious effect on the presentation of stories which matter a great deal but which do not, for one reason or another, generate great film: they get neglected. Conflict in the eastern Congo (DRC) might be only one example, where it has generally been too dangerous for film crews to travel during a civil war which killed around 3 million people over a decade, and which, despite having been proclaimed resolved is still going on. Equally, stories of great complexity, which is hard to capture in film images may lose out to stories which it is possible to tell with available new film and/ or 'stock' images. But this situation also changes the priorities and processes of newsrooms; and it shapes the ways in which words are used, as it were, 'around' pictures and film sequences in news. But it also influences the way non-news stories are presented. It changes the balance between them and more solid news so that gossip, new media of all kinds, and the styles and capabilities of new media in turn affect more conventional media, not least in the way stories are edited and framed. Visual images have come to define a great deal of what we see and know, and what we do not see and do not know, about international relations. They may, perhaps, also shape consciousness –I say

‘perhaps’ because this is important, but not a discussion for this paper. These evolutions in turn have effects on what people might experience as security or insecurity, in ways which will be explored shortly. What counts as security makes sense to a community in the context of a whole raft of social assumptions, expectations and practices, however unjustified or prejudiced these may (sometimes) be. This whole context is difficult to separate from the specific political anthropology of security closely defined—including the gossip, new media exchanges, Facebook postings and blog entries, as well as much more longstanding social assumptions.

Visual ethnography has several dimensions here. One main idea is the use of visual images made by the researcher as a tool in her work. In this context, the researcher is more in control both of the context and the ways in which images are made and reproduced. In this paper I am concerned with the question of how visual images might make sense and contribute to an understanding of violence when the photography was *not* done by the researcher. There are good reasons for this which are discussed through the paper. Although some critics may see this is immediately invalidating the whole effort, by the end of this essay, I trust that the reader may be dissuaded from holding that view.

Visual ethnography or more generally uses of the visual in anthropology, are as old as those fields themselves. El Guindi (2004) provides a useful history of this endeavour explaining the interest of many of the founders of anthropology in film and still images. However, El Guindi’s own study is primarily concerned with film and video, and although some of these arguments carry into discussion of still photography many of them are only tangentially relevant here. Banks (2001) suggests a range of specific research strategies in the identification of visual data and the grounding of an analytic frame for ethnographic research to which this paper owes some acknowledgement. But it is Sarah Pink (2003, 2007, 2008) who has probably done more than anyone else in the recent academic literature to develop strategies and boundaries for the use of film, video and still images in ethnography, and her work provides a powerful impetus for further study, including this paper.

The starting point for this argument is that photography in conflict situations provides an important potential resource for the researcher, that

photographs are very often referred to by writers on conflict and violence, but that those writers may quite often be taking too much for granted. A 'visual ethnography' (as opposed to other kinds of approach in conflict studies, for example –see Hon Wong Jeong, 2008) has the potential advantage of taking the source and the creation of the image seriously, of exploring the context with attention, and of making ethical positions clear. Visual ethnography has been concerned with the everyday human experience in its detail and complexity, and in this paper I will be exploring what might be called the violence of everyday life, or at least, violence as everyday life. Inevitably, there must be some limitations to the kinds of conclusions one might draw from an exercise where the subject matter are images taken by others in a context which may not be fully understood or explained. So this paper also constructs a critique of the knowledge of visual ethnography of this form: what are the limitations and constraints on methodology, methods and ethics which can be identified with this kind of activity. The question is important not least because scholars in conflict studies are increasingly turning to image based texts alongside those rooted in words, poetry, drama, novels, travel writing and various forms of biography or autobiography (Bleiker, 2009, Moore, 2006). The question at issue then becomes 'does anthropology in the more specific form of visual ethnography offer any correctives to the assumptions that are often made in that kind of argument in conflict studies?'

Nearly all photography, and in particular all news photography, with which this paper is mainly concerned, is shot to a deadline for commercial reasons. Photographs that appear in news media of all kinds are taken with motives other than producing a beautiful picture, and aesthetics may not come into the process of creation of images at all, although at the same time aesthetics (more broadly defined) cannot be avoided in the evaluation of photographic images (a point explained later). Commercial considerations mean that many images are rejected by the photographer in favour of a set which are sent to an editor, who then chooses the image they most want to use, which may not be the photographer's preferred choice. Something similar applies to mobile phone images taken in Tahrir Square or in an Occupy demonstration: the photographer selects one or a few images to put on Facebook from a much larger sample –they are not only their own image

maker but also their own editor. One dimension of the paper is to ask what value the immediate images gathered and diffused through the new media such as Facebook and twitter have in the analysis of contemporary conflict – if any.

1. Debates on security and the invitation to ethnography

We might argue that security and insecurity have been central concepts in almost all political debate, as well as in much sociology, for centuries, and then still recognise that since roughly the end of the Cold War, the terms of that debate have significantly changed. An understanding of insecurity and securitization has evolved which is much more complex and sophisticated than that generally held by writers in academic international relations in the Cold War period, and perhaps earlier (there is a debate to be had here which I am not going to engage now). The primary reason for the debate to which this paper contributes is that there is a sense that the debate on critical security studies (see Fierke, 2007, Dannreuther, 2007) within international relations has gone about as far as it can, and that the baton can be taken up and moved forward by a dialogue between critical security studies and some form of anthropological studies (political anthropology, ethnography, analysis of the rituals and everyday practices of forms of violence and so on). Giovanni Ercolani has made a significant contribution to the debate on how political anthropology might illuminate (or in his view, perhaps, supplant?) critical security studies as a way of making sense of human experience of security and insecurity (Ercolani, 2012). This touches on the relationship between anthropology and international relations, an interesting but very large question which this paper does not try to pursue.

Barry Buzan (1991) initiated a thorough-going revision of concepts of security in international relations at the end of the Cold War, a debate which he furthered in later publications and in collaborative work with others (e.g. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). The shift of focus is one of content –from state security to human or societal security. But it is also a shift to a different set of ethical concerns. And it presents a distinctive knowledge paradigm. It integrates domestic debates about risk and security

with international politics, where traditional approaches to security studies ('military strategy') had generally kept debate about the two separated. It takes questions about identity, risk and technology much more seriously alongside traditional questions which have not disappeared, including appropriate force structures, institutional arrangements for security and the economic basis of military capability. These new security agendas have included the complex issues of food, energy, water and environmental security, all of which have both market dimensions and social psychological and political dimensions which can lead to the conclusion that they are the focus of a process of 'double securitization' (Farrands, 2010b). In this work there is a shift towards a (contended) notion of human security and a much greater priority put on the risks and dangers which has come to matter as part of the normal agenda of academic international relations.

Buzan and others (Buzan, 1991, Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, Dillon, 1996, Fierke, 2007, MacSweeney, 1999) have argued that security is constructed in specific contexts and within the boundaries of certain kinds of knowledge. Security is at the same time a matter of everyday experience and of fundamental identity. In more philosophical language, it concerns both being-in-the-world and Being. It is possible to point to security discourses and their interaction with how people understand insecurity (Dillon, 1996) but it is not possible to pin down what counts as security except in an ideal (unrealisable) sense. But it is possible to ask basic questions about security which help to take the debate forward away from the limiting framework of state security understood as a militarised hegemonic regime or as an apparatus for the imposition of the power of the state on its unconsenting (and, often, unknowing) citizens. These questions open up a critical space: security for whom? Security as the elimination of risk or as its arbitrage –if the latter in whose favour, if the former, by what means has risk been eliminated if that is possible at all? Does the assertion of security tend towards the construction of a sovereign subject identity or does it listen to the subjectivity of those it confronts (Edkins *et al.*, 1999, Jabri, 1998)? How are resources managed in insecurity discourses and how does that in turn create inequalities (the question can be reformed as 'what is the political economy of insecurity?') (Farrands, 2010b). Does the focus on the political or political economy of security undermine the possibility of a

coherent social being (MacSweeney's critique of Buzan *et al*)? The purpose of these questions is to reformulate an understanding of global social and political relations away from the tradition of state centred security studies. It vastly extends the scope of what is at issue in thinking about security, and creates an intellectual space within which non-governmental organisations, private interests, global corporations and social movements contend to securitize particular issues and to shape government policies which relate to their concerns. The concept of human security draws attention to the global interests of humankind in food, disease and climate change issues as security questions which demand quite different kinds of understanding and quite different kinds of action from the traditional agendas (Fierke, 2007, Dannreuther, 2007). 'Human security' is also supposed to put individuals and their experience in a central place in these debates, but this is not always the case. The attention to individuals interacting in small groups which has always been a focus of ethnographic study is one reason why a specifically ethnographic approach to visual images of conflict and insecurity brings something new to the debate –even more radical approaches to conflict studies tend towards institutional analysis which, undeniably important, tends to contradict the claims of those writers on critical security studies who aim to set human experience at the heart of their work (for a broader discussion of conflict studies, see Ho-Won Jeong, 2008).

Security in this more recent understanding is precarious and complex. Insecurity represents a set of risks which are much broader than specific threats. Insecurity does not only arise from the 'clear and present dangers' which form the rhetoric of much American foreign policy. Insecurity is at once systemic and immediately personal, specifically political and societal in the broadest sense. One of Buzan's main contributions to these debates was to argue that although enlarged concepts of security had a powerful force, the traditional agenda of security –state, territory, political system, social order- had not disappeared, and furthermore that, despite the evolution of international organizations and sub-state political movements. The sovereign state remained the principal means by which security issues could be arbitrated and managed. Buzan continues to hold that the state is indispensable for security even though it may have lost control over what

comes to form the substance of the security agenda ('securitization'). His critics do not disagree for the most part, but might well point out that when the agenda and the processes of security are so much more complex, the traditional concept of the state is as much changed as the issues and contexts within which insecurity is addressed. But other critics plausibly argue that the focus on institutional levels of relationships mean relatively little if the burden of insecurity is faced by individuals and small groups of people. Hobbes suggested that insecurity was a function not so much of the original sins of individuals or the structured conflicts of whole societies as a product of the fears and insecurities of individual people who had then to decide how they would respond. In a given situation, it became rational to kill others before they threatened you, not simply when they immediate threat presented itself. This led Hobbes to the famous formulation of a 'war of all against all there being no assurance to the contrary' (Hobbes, 1968, chapter xiii, pp. 183-186). This starts to point towards individual and group responses to insecurity. How do people react? An image seems to be a way of conveying the immediacy of that response, but may also identify the longer-term power of stress and loss – can we not see in the faces of those touched by conflicts how insecurity shapes their lives and limits their possibilities, how in extreme cases individuals and communities become enslaved by fears and insecurities which they find themselves unable to bear or impossible to remember without new traumas? But this question, while it is not at first sight unreasonable, assumes that there is a one-to-one correspondence between how people look or express themselves and their experience.

However any understanding of insecurity, including the ways in which photographs capture its different faces, need to recognise the importance of context and ethical concern. An image of an exhausted soldier weary of war carries a different message if we discover he has just returned from his role in a special commando killing Jews in Ukraine in 1942 or massacring Bosnian civilians in 1993. *There is no meaning without context and some prior understanding, including some understanding of the visual language at play in an image.* This can be a warning to be wary what a picture means until, at the least, we have a sense of how and when it was taken, by whom, for what purpose, and in what context. Images discussed later illustrate the

importance of both context and of reading different levels of meaning into an image, but most of all they warn against any closure which tries to *determine* the (singular) meaning of an image. Derrida, discussing the force of the photographic image, (2010) typically supports the two main arguments here, that context is everything in understanding the meaning of images, and that any attempt to close down the interpretation of meanings into a neat basket of representations and identities is bound to fall short of its goal of making sense of the subject of the picture in question. Context is vitally important, but there are, as this essay will argue later, different ‘reading’ strategies which one might bring to bear on visual images, and these strategies go beyond both the authorial intentions of the photographer and the context in which individual shots are made.

Visual ethnography has evolved as a sub-field of ethnography concerned with what John Berger explored in his influential *Ways of Seeing* (1972), the idea that what we see and how we see are so closely connected we might argue they are mutually constitutive, and socially formed, that what we see predates any verbal language we acquire. Languages we share include the visual environment we inhabit and describe, which forms what Ludwig Wittgenstein might have called a distinctive ‘form of life’. Berger’s attempt to explore visual understanding was partly directed at undermining a conventional aesthetic centred account, but he discusses photography and advertising as well as painting and the high arts, as Roland Barthes did in his important study of the visual environment which photography surrounds us, *Camera Lucida* (2000). Susan Sontag (1979, 2004), more sceptically, examines how we read photographic images and how claims are made for the capability of photography to shape sensibilities and record events with a truth that transcends the everyday sentimentality or personal meaning of the pictures people might put on the table or wall. All of these authors, who have all also been photographers –Sontag with great distinction- refer explicitly back to Benjamin’s essay on automated reproduction and kitsch, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (Benjamin, 1999). These notions of the social construction, social use and social power of visual images provide a platform for the more specific kinds of questions which a visual ethnography of violence and insecurity can pursue. In this construction process, there are a number

of different simultaneous dialogues, and the focus of any kind of analysis rests on the exploration of those dialogues and the meanings which they create, encapsulate or exclude (Moore and Farrands, 2010; Farrands, 2010a). These dialogues legitimately include one between the photographer, her subject(s) and the viewer; they also include one between the images and their context, and a distinct interrogation between viewers and their own context through which they evaluate images presented to them.

2. Photography and Knowledge

Can photography provide any basis for knowledge claims (in any subject field)? While it is easy enough to reject naively optimistic claims ('the camera never lies'), it is not so easy to identify when and where we can claim to have any understanding of social life from visual images. This is all the more an issue where many of the strategies of visual ethnography seem to rely on the camera operator being the researcher and using photographic images as a way of telling a story enriched beyond words by the images which they own and have taken themselves, and which they take responsibility for, and where they have the ability to interpret layers of meaning from the context in as much detail or in as many dimensions as they think are necessary to construct a coherent and justified account (Pinney, 2011, Banks 2001). Here I am specifically not concerned with images I have taken. I am not a war photographer, although I have taken and sometimes developed, enlarged or photoshopped pictures I have taken. I can claim some understanding of the technology, but this paper is not about images for which I have any direct responsibility. While this is not to disclaim responsibility for the use of images that will be cited in this paper in any way, it is evidently quite different.

Furthermore, to ask this question is immediately to confront one of the great contributions to debate on uses and abuses of photographic images in the available literature. Susan Sontag, in her *Concerning the Pain of Others*, has expressed a deeply grounded scepticism about what we might learn from images if we claim they tell not just 'the' truth, but any truth at all. She adds to that a measure of scepticism about the kind of empathy which a photograph might create in its viewer. Stephen Chan (2010) has augmented

this argument with an argument of his own which, powerfully written and carefully argued, underpins Sontag's case against interpretation. For this is an argument against interpretation as a whole. Even if we have some direct experience of conflict, which, thankfully, many people will not have, we should be wary of bringing that experience to bear on the experience of others in a picture. People –victims, survivors, perpetrators, or those whom Maya Zehfuss (2004) has called victim/perpetrators- have a unique experience of their own which is usurped by a claim that 'I feel your pain'. A rape victim may empathise with another; a person who has seen their child killed in Tahrir Square may (perhaps) be able to communicate more easily than others with someone who has lost a close relative or friend more recently in Syria. But most of us are not in that position, and should not pretend that we can be 'with them' or even (a favourite term of Christian helpers) 'alongside them' in any very meaningful way without great care and reflection. This argument extends to the ways in which we might view visual images. It also begs a question of how we learn to look at photographs and how we make sense of them in everyday life which the paper returns to later. Sympathy here is a natural emotion; but it is also a dangerous pointer towards a sentimentalisation which deadens a more critical and careful response.

This is partly an argument about representation –whether any kind of representation of the Other person is possible either ethically or, indeed, at all. The ontological condition of the Other is at a sharp distance from each person encountering them/. Any representation asserts my own subjectivity over theirs; any representation co-opts their subjectivity to mine and so denies it; any representation asserts a closure of their identity which, although actually impossible nonetheless makes a bid to subjugate the Other. These arguments, mostly derived directly or indirectly from Derrida, are well known (Ricoeur 1992, Jabri, 1998), but they do not negate the possibility of different kinds of relationship to that Other. The photographer might present rather than represent the subject, by allowing them agency in the taking of the photograph, but allowing them to construct the narrative the photograph suggest (at least as far as possible –there will always be a limitation to the subjects authority in the image making process). The image might also fail as a representation of the Other but suggest metaphorical

sense in which the status of an image might restore or create meaning anew (again there are potential important problems with this suggestion, which will be developed below). One further conceivable relationship is that the photographer or viewer allow the subject of an image into a dialogue with them in which the negotiation power is not all on their (photographer or viewer's) side. This assumes that some kind of subjectivity on the part of the subject is possible, but goes beyond that to construct a dialogue in which their voice carries significance. How this dialogue might become possible is a function of several conditions, not least the awareness or recognition of the viewer, which in turn evokes their image literacy, their ability to read these kinds of texts. However, this is

also an argument about witnesses and witnessing. It asks who should, who can, bear witness in a case such as the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. The response might not be that a photographer intruding on a scene can hold that role; but it might also be that bearing witness is one of the clearest roles which sensitively planned photojournalism can play.

How might one respond to the Sontag/ Chan argument? One part of an answer is to interrogate the way in which we look at visual images. And one part of a response is also to interrogate the social function of visual images including photography. And a further element of a reply is to ask how images are used, and to think how one might draw on tools of reflexivity to respond to photographic images.

It may be that the response proposed here to the Sontag/ Chan argument is relevant, and maybe even a helpful clarification; but that it is also inadequate. Sontag's own answer to the dilemmas her argument create is bloody minded: although there is no solution to the problem of the interpretation of photographic images she identifies, she asserts, there is no alternative but to keep trying to take honest photographs, and to keep trying to find interpretations with as much integrity as we can muster. This is so even though she suspects that we are bound to fail in the attempt. But the struggle is better than quiescence. The critique of conventional sentimentality in photographic interpretation is well made, and the question of interpretation is no doubt always a struggle, a conflict within a series of dialogues, as Ricoeur notes in a different context (Ricoeur, 1974, 1978). The case made here is that perhaps one can be a little less pessimistic

than Sontag if one identifies other functions and other dialogues which constitute parts of the relationship between photographer, image subject and viewer.

3. Forging truth

One of the most famous war photographs of the twentieth century, the image of a Spanish Civil War soldier falling backwards in the moment he has been hit in an attack, has been claimed to be 'faked'.¹²⁴ In other words, the picture was set up. It is as if the photographer, Robert Capa, says to the viewer 'it might have been like this, but it wasn't'. This at first sight seems immensely reprehensible, *if* the allegation is true. Many commentators reply to the accusation by saying that Capa clearly endangered himself many times to get the image he wanted, that he was a great artist, that he nearly died on the Normandy beaches in an attempt to get the shots he wanted, and that both his artistic integrity and his professional integrity should be sufficient to ward off the accusations, which were only made long after the events he portrayed. One might not doubt his integrity, yet this raises a slightly different question. The famous images of Abu Ghraib are at one and the same time 'real': shocking images and wholly faked constructions created by a team of prison officers for their own amusement, but also, so they apparently thought, so that they could become famous through the publication of these images on social media. Although this is an extreme case, it might lead one to think that all images have a certain integrity of their own, even if it is remote from the intentions of the image maker, and all photographic images have at the same time the quality of made-upness, of construction, of lack of authenticity. The Abu Ghraib pictures tell a truth of their own. Sontag (1979) suggests this ambiguity about all photographic images even before one starts to question how it is possible to respond to such images, a question she then explored in her later essay (2004).¹²⁵

¹²⁴ http://www.tc.pbs.org/wnet/americanmasters/files/2008/08/capa_essay_01.jpg

¹²⁵ The point is recognisable in images of Sontag herself; compare the following: <http://www.susansontag.com/SusanSontag/images/susanBioImage01.jpg> and <http://i2.listal.com/image/1057041/600full-susan-sontag.jpg>

One other example is the important early war photography of William Russell in the Crimea (1854-56)) and Timothy O'Sullivan in the American Civil War. O'Sullivan's image of the federal dead at Gettysburg which he called, perhaps with a particular kind of dramatisation, 'The Harvest of Death on the Field of Gettysburg'¹²⁶ is a still image of a group of federal casualties which he posed for the purpose. He asked his assistants to group the bodies in a pattern which he found pleasing but which, because it was not too close-up, would not shock reasonably robust newspaper readers (the images were all the same found shocking for the time -1863). This image was posed by regrouping the bodies, and we cannot be sure how many other of the pictures of the mid-nineteenth century were posed except to note that, given the clumsiness of the equipment and the long exposure times necessary, almost any photograph would have had a good deal more of an artificial element than the immediate images taken by photographers and casual observers or participants after the middle of the twentieth century.

This question is rendered even more pressing by the existence of Photoshop and the ease with which all images, but especially digital ones, can be adjusted or simply faked. It does not take ten minutes of training to put President Barack Obama's face on the body of Osama Bin Laden in an image which can then be put on a website to 'prove' that the president is a Muslim fanatic who has consistently lied about his background. But anyone seeing this image is likely, if they have any sense, to question the context (the only websites that would carry this image are rabidly fanatical as well as childish) and would recognise the crude manipulation being attempted. The task of the honest photographer is to get beyond this kind of argument by the demonstration of their integrity but also through their understanding of the context. It may also be possible to argue that a set of related images provides a kind of narrative in which each image adds a check on the others; but, again, it is as easy to manipulate a string of images as it is a single picture, and this argument in itself is not sound. But even the most honest intending photographer can no more shake off their assumptions

¹²⁶[http:// photohistory.jeffcurto.com/ wp-content/uploads/ 2008/ 07/ osullivan_harvestdeath.jpg](http://photohistory.jeffcurto.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/osullivan_harvestdeath.jpg)

and their own cultural context than any other story-maker can. This is, of course, as much a problem of what is meant by truth as of the possibilities of fakery. The arguably naïve desire of a photographer to ‘tell a better truth’ by re-arranging the details of a picture seem unexceptionable in the context of what painters such as Goya or Paul Nash –surely truth tellers?- have done in war images. Pictures can tell stories, and groups of pictures can narrate a sequence of events as a complex reality, which is to say that they can never be simple truths, as William E. Connolly’s argument (2005) that there are multiple truths which are compatible with each other in various ways distinct from falsehood also implies.

4. The Numbing Image of War and Conflict

There are a number of standard images of conflict, recognisable tropes, often perhaps clichés. These images are repetitions of images one can find in every conflict and every newspaper or blog. These representations give us powerful images which resonate in one way if we know something about the history of war photography and resonate in other ways to a viewer coming quite cold to the image. Specific images create a pornography of violence in which the viewer comes to consume an image for their own purpose at the expense of the individuality as well as the experience of the Other.¹²⁷ This definition is intended to put some responsibility on the viewer’s gaze for the construction of pornography as well as identifying something about the image itself and its creator’s intentions. This may involve, but does not need to involve, images which have a more evidently sexual content. Everyday journalism may look for the truth, but whether or not journalists are looking for a truth, editors and managers are looking for the image which attracts attention. Ultimately, the choice of which pictures take primary places on the front covers of newspapers and (even more)

¹²⁷ I have in mind Kevin Carter’s picture of a vulture stalking a dying child in Sudan, a great image like the Nachtwey picture cited earlier, but also a terrifying image of responsibility, a responsibility Carter himself found unbearable: https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/PAMr30WkSws/T3lNyITMml/AAAAAAAAADzE/nY_6nbVwGKg/Sudanese-Vulture.jpg

news magazines is an editorial decision about commercial interests. But other pictures may be used in initially valid ways and yet come to have a very similar function. It is not an accident that campaigners and publishers have some common interests even if their first aim is not simply to sell a product. Campaigners for non-government organizations (NGOs) find themselves under great pressure to use the most effective images to support their work. This can lead to the creation of what has been called survivor porn or campaign porn, where damaged children and survivors of rape or famine are included in advertisements. Every NGO publicist is aware of the danger of using exploitative pictures; each NGO manager will avoid the use of some pictures; but all will admit that using the most violent images generally brings in the most income from donors. This use of visual images has been the subject of many debates among NGO groups, but the fact that the general public tend to acquire a chilling numbness in response to repeated images means that a form of escalation creeps into NGO searches for attention and recognition, especially in long-drawn out humanitarian emergencies.

This numbing of perception leads to a numbing of response. The viewer becomes accustomed to the emotional responses which a series of recurring images invokes, unaware that what is problematic is not the image or images they see but the assumption that what is at play here is an emotional response at all. To engage only an emotional response to images of suffering or human catastrophe is to move towards sentimentality. As Schopenhauer (2000) suggested in his critique of Kantian ethics, and as Heidegger and Levinas, as well as Ricoeur (1992) were subsequently to develop, sentimentality is the enemy of a politics of care for the Other. This raises difficult questions because to not feel emotion on seeing these kinds of images would be inhuman. Sontag's argument (and on this point I agree with her) is that to ground an understanding solely on emotion without critical reflection is intellectually shallow, and when one brings critical reflection to bear, the 'conclusions' to draw from a particular image appear highly circumscribed.

Note that the previous paragraph does not argue against any emotional response to the images which might be faced in an exhibition, on a blog, or in the varied news media. It argues that a response which is only emotional

tends to sentimentality and so tends to destroy the faculty of critical reasoning which might be a better basis of understanding. More precisely, that is at issue here is a specific kind of judgment which is neither aesthetic nor rational/ scientific, but which is more closely aligned with the faculty of aesthetic judgment (Farrands, 2010a; see also Bleiker, 2009, and Moore, 2006). The notion of judgment here includes a significant element of emotion, partly on the grounds that to respond only with reason or scientific measurement to shocking images and violent experience is to traduce both the humanity of the subject and one's own; but the response is not reducible to emotion, and it includes an element of reflectivity which takes and critiques the emotional reaction as it measures it against both learned judgment, previous experience and reasoned evaluation. This is a version of Kant's third critique refined through Gadamer and Ricoeur. It is neither purely emotivist nor merely subjectivist. It is also consistent, one can argue, with versions of interpretivist methodological arguments in anthropology and ethnography derived from Bourdieu and Geertz (but this point is not developed here for space reasons).

One website which looks at first useful and then might on second thoughts be dangerous presents 'The 12 most iconic war photographs ever'.¹²⁸ Many of these images have indeed become very familiar. Are they 'iconic'? They are an individual collection, although maybe half of them might also be in many peoples' choices. It is not over-academic to point out that, despite common popular usage, an icon is not a 'paradigm picture' of anything, but an image which points to something else through a spiritual means when the something else is itself ineffable. But that may not be helpful here. It may also not be helpful to identify omissions from the list; these probably should include the Robert Capa images of both D-Day¹²⁹ and the falling Republican soldier, but everyone will have their own choices. The most important problem with this kind of site is that it makes well-

¹²⁸ <http://swick.co.uk/index.php/2009/06/12-of-the-most-iconic-photographs-ever-taken/>

¹²⁹ See for example: <http://www.skylighters.org/photos/who.jpg> and <http://travel67.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/capa-germanpows.jpg> -the former an individual soldier in the surf and the latter an image of German prisoners captured by US troops, both on Omaha Beach.

known images even more commonplace in such a way that they tend to lose the force of impact they can have; familiarity breeds, if not contempt, then at least a dulling of sensibility and judgment. But if images can have a numbing effect, they can also have a fresh and powerful impact, as the examples considered below do, and also as the range of material put together by the Afghan photographer Zahria of child labour suggests.¹³⁰

5. Giving an Account of Another: Ethnography of Violence

From the critique which has been developed so far, one might conclude either that photography has nothing to tell us about war and conflict, and that it contributes nothing to our understanding of insecurity, or one might say that the methodology of how we make sense of still images needs to be rebuilt. That is the task this paper initiates but cannot complete. The focus is valid if it is shifted onto the subject of the image rather than the skill of the photographer. It is valid if it takes ethical questions into account –it does not need to resolve them, but it cannot ignore them. The parameters of an ethnography of insecurity are to respect and include the insecurity of the Other person, and not merely to use the Other person as a means to an end, even if that end is in itself relevant or valuable. This basic principal, a refinement of the Kantian imperative filtered through the writing of Levinas and Ricoeur, shapes the gaze of the photographer and the approach of the viewer at the same time.

Let me now come to the point. I would argue, in the face of some possible scepticism, that visual images might present (at least) six distinctive ways of reading insecurity through their ability to engage and hold a viewer. These are:

(i) Metaphor: even if one suspects the ability of photographs to tell a literal truth of any kind, it is also possible to explore and elaborate metaphor in image making. Some of the most impressive photography fails the ‘is it true?’ test while providing metaphorical narratives which can be valid in

¹³⁰ See for example: [http:// www.zoriah.net/ blog/ 2009/ 04/ guest-photographerphotojournalist-gmb-akash-child-labor.html](http://www.zoriah.net/blog/2009/04/guest-photographerphotojournalist-gmb-akash-child-labor.html)

themselves. Although they still have to pass the test of respect for the subject of the image, they may have other functions than a direct presentation of the subject as she/ he would want.¹³¹ The ‘rule of metaphor’ which characterises an important element in Ricoeur’s (1978) approach to interpretation provides a double-edged sense of how interpretive understanding is constituted (double edged because the ‘rule’ could be a principle or a disciplinary regime, but can also be both at once). This is also an important quality, even if ambiguous, in James Nachtwey’s work discussed below.

(ii) Presenting the subject: an honest and insightful photographer has the ability to let the subject present herself. The image will be partial and no doubt there will be other stories to tell. But the image itself will present a valid story if it lets the subject tell their story, whatever that is. This is impossible if the photographer does not understand the context, the personal history, the fears and desires, of their subject. But the possibility that a photographic image can assert the subjectivity of an individual whose gaze back into the lens holds the viewer and compels their ethical and intellectual attention is always important. Jenny Matthews’s work, also discussed below in more detail, points among other things towards this kind of quality in image making. Both in metaphorical image making and in the presentation of the subject, specific languages of the image matter enormously. Confronted with a surplus of meaning, the viewer has to choose between conflicting interpretations (Ricoeur, 1974, Taylor, 1998, Derrida)

(iii) Everyday violence: ethnography aims to make sense of everyday life in the social groups in which people actually live and have their identities. Academic conflict studies and academic strategic studies slips around the experience of individuals and small groups which ethnography engages. But it is not difficult to suggest that violence is not the exception in the lives of many people, most obviously in Iraq since 2003 and Afghanistan (with small pauses) since 2001. It has become a part of the fabric of everyday life

¹³¹ For example the complex images in the two bedframe pictures:

in many conflict zones (Darfur, DRC, Pakistan, South Sudan, but also the south side of Los Angeles, as well as El Salvador and too many others to name here). Conventional liberal readings of global security take insecurity as unnatural and violence as an aberration, hoping that insecurities can be eliminated by good management and effective institutional arrangements. Visual ethnography starts with the experience of those whose life it tries to understand as it is evidenced in their behaviour, life style, attitudes, fears and relationships. In many cases these hold violence and insecurity as a central part of everyday life and not an aside. Photographic images provide one way of beginning to make sense of that experience without excuse or justification. But this kind of interpretation is never merely 'common sense' and it should always be expected to remaining complete.

(iv) Making sense of the experience of others: the visual image captures something about the experience of other people. It tells their story. It may well give clues from the background as to the context as much as from the main image. This is the function of photography which one might be most leery about, especially in the light of the Sontag/ Chan argument. As has already been discussed, Sontag also argues that the dangers and pitfalls of interpretation of empathy for another through photographs does not necessarily prevent one from trying, but it is problematic at least.

(v) Not being 'truthful' –the intensification or expressionistic function of the image: photography, no less than other arts of performance, including most evidently music, but also dance, film, theatre, painting and all the plastic arts, has an expressive dimension. It is able to intensify images and the stories they might tell as it intensifies light and contrasts of light. The problem with this kind of narratology might be whether the viewer is sophisticated enough in their visual education to make more of the image than its more basic quality –a question of visual education. But at the same time one should not patronisingly assume that only an 'expert' can make sense of the world through photos, which are after all one of the main ways in which people in all modern societies make sense of their own world.

(vi) What images might tell us which no other medium can articulate? It is possible to find ways of articulating meanings across from one medium to another, so that, for example, particular things can be said, or intimated or implied, in words *or* music; other ideas might be conveyed equally in poetry *or* in painting. But it is not a very controversial point to argue that what is most important about prose, music, poetry or painting is what is untranslatable from each, what is specific to that peculiar medium. In the same way, still images might be seen as having a specific force of communication, and ability to resonate and capture experiences and feed it back to the viewer.¹³² The unique force of photographic images, separate from other kinds of graphic work but also separate from moving film, is at issue here. This might take a number of forms, but one dimension of this which clearly matters in debates about security and insecurity is memory (Rolleston, 2004). Images in photographs have the power to shock, to distract, to shift assumptions and to challenge what viewers had thought they remembered. Steven Poliakoff suggests a chain of implications from visual images which at the same time recapture and question received memories in a television drama, *Shooting the Past* (1999) which explores the ambiguity and uniqueness of visual images as well as any academic analysis.

(vii) It is clear from this discussion and from other sources (Rolleston, 2004) that photography has the potential to play a central part in the construction and reconstruction of identities. Images of community and shared experience such as the memorialisation of the second world war as well as more recent events shape how new generations of a society make sense of their past and so understand themselves. But as Rolleston suggests in his account of changing German self-images, this is a continuously changing process of re-imagination.

¹³² Nachtwey's image of a child and a soldier in the DRC, where the soldier is looking up a street and the child hides just behind him round the corner. We do not see or know what they are looking at up the street but it is clearly a source of great insecurity: http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3585/5805037640_c3b13055a6.jpg

It might then be said that one significant danger in the ways in which photography is used is that these separate partial truth telling strategies are not recognised (Clifford, 1986), or are confused by those who do not recognise them as particular strategies, or who mistake one for another. This in turn points towards an area of discussion that this paper will not pursue, the visual illiteracy of a large proportion of viewers of complex images. I am not sure that any professional photographer is unaware of these questions, or who does not worry how a particular image will be read and interpreted, or who has not on occasion junked images they thought were powerful or even beautiful because they were fairly sure that they would be misinterpreted if they were widely available.

6. The Ethics of an Ethnography of Violence

The previous section makes a number of assertions about ethics, including the both the ethics of the relationship between a photographer and their subject(s) and the viewer and the image. It might be important to stop the flow of argument to reconsider these questions. In confronting a photographic image, we are entertaining an image of the Other. That ethically distinct other person has a subjectivity and a voice to which each person viewing the picture owes a duty of care. This is so regardless of the relative power relations between the two, but is perhaps even more powerfully compelling if there is an obvious disjuncture of power and voice, as there is in many photographic images of war and violence. The first responsibility of the viewer is not to strip the subject of an image of their humanity or their distinct identity. That remains the case, it can be forcefully argued, even if the choice is between a more 'perfect' aesthetically satisfying image or a more refined or enhanced 'truth'. And here, critical security studies and visual anthropology converge with a philosophical argument originally set out in Levinas's work and refined in Ricoeur's writing (1992).

When a viewer looks at a photograph of individual people, how might they do this? Note that this question excludes a lot of interesting and potentially important images. It does not include the landscapes and generalised social images of conflict and the insecurities and narratives

which they might point towards; although these might be illuminating, they point to other questions and other methodologies (critical geopolitics; the built environment as an arena of conflict; narratives of the spaces of violence) which might be the subject of other debates. It focuses more particularly on the kind of images which are illustrated in the analysis of the work of Nachtwey and Matthews which interrogates in the individual subject in the face of violence. This confronts the question of subjectivity and responsibility that others (notably Campbell, 2003, and Edkins, Persram and Pin-Fat, 1999) engage. Specific images capture our attention because the subject looks at us and holds our interest, but also demand our ethical gaze. They do so whether they look directly at us or whether their own gaze is more oblique.

7. Drawing on Specific Cases: Jenny Matthews and James Nachtwey.

While much of this essay focuses on methodological questions, there are plenty of examples of work which one might explore to develop and reflect on the case the paper is suggesting. Two contemporary photographers seem to capture some of the elements of the discussion outlined in this essay. No doubt there are many other potential candidates, but here the discussion explores the work of Jenny Matthews and James Nachtwey. Both are professional photojournalists; Matthews is British and Nachtwey American.

Nachtwey has long experience of photojournalism and has won many awards and much distinguished recognition for his work in conflict zones and news reporting. He has taken some of the most stunningly beautiful images I can think of, but he has also taken images which are very hard to look at at all. He challenges the vision of the viewer and draws them into the conflict he has witnessed himself. However I have some questions about some of the images he has produced –I ask the reader to believe that I also have great respect and admiration for much of his work, but here I have selected three images in particular to make the point I want to propose. They are images which are, I think, typical of a very influential genre of photojournalism. They present structures and situations; but one might recognise that they do not present subjects. They have great metaphoric

force, and they tell powerful stories. But they do not often allow subjects to present themselves, and they offer compelling images at the expense of the individuality of their subjects. We never know their names; they are generic images. They tell stories, and they inform the viewer in specific ways. They have also often been achieved at great personal risk. But their beauty is also a part of their problem, one might suspect. Two images, one of recent violence in Tripoli in Libya and one from Sudan capture this ambiguity very clearly.¹³³

Matthews adopts a different approach which presents her subjects to the viewer (Matthews, 2003). Her images involve a more critical approach to the construction of the image which is explicitly directed to three dimensions of conflict. First of all, she now rarely takes pictures of actual fighting, although she has done so in the past. Instead, she is attempting to gauge the impact of violence and to interrogate some of the assumptions a viewer might have. In the process, she is one of the most effective in her field at allowing the subject to present themselves. This is in part a reflection of professional experience, but it also reflects a feminist concern with the ways in which women are treated in much other conflict photography, and demonstrates an ethical concern with the women she portrays in the series *Women and War* in particular. In both her image of a girl in Afghanistan taken for Care International to promote women's education¹³⁴ and in *Fina*¹³⁵, these concerns are powerfully evident. In Goya's famous image of the *Shootings of the 3rd of May*, a group of Spanish nationalist resisters are shot by French troops a day after a failed uprising in 1807.¹³⁶ The resisters stand out, especially the central figure in a white shirt; the French execution squad are faceless and remorseless, with their backs to the focus of the image (the 'camera', except of course the image is a painting). We see the image

¹³³ Respectively http://www.ncsx.com/2012/020612/Hungeree/tripoli_bullet.jpg and <http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/images/Chap8.jpg>

¹³⁴

http://photophilanthropy.org/images/00000941_Matthews/2009_professional_00000941_photo09_resized.JPG

¹³⁵

http://www.ur.umich.edu/0304/Nov24_03/img/031124_cal_women_war_1.jpg

¹³⁶ <http://davidmhart.com/WarArt/Goya/3rdMay1808.JPG>

through a series of planes which the artist constructs for the viewer which includes as one level his own gaze. In the same vein, Matthews is well aware of which faces she wants to direct to the viewer, and how they might interrogate the viewer who is interrogating them. The picture of Fina, especially, looks at first sight very like survivor porn of the kind that NGOs have often been accused of exploiting. The young woman has been mutilated by gangs in Sierra Leone and looks back at the camera with a kind of anger. But this is not how Matthews took the picture. She talked at length to her subject, asked her how she wanted to be pictured and gave her the main decisions of how she would present herself. It is, of course, true that Matthews is a professional photographer who has probably made quite a lot of money out of the images she takes and sells as a freelance photographer. But her care for the subject of her work is unrelenting, and her concern to recognise the subject as an other person in her own right is an important and very distinctive element in much of her photojournalism. Many of the same qualities are identifiable in Penny Tweedie's compelling image of a woman emerging from the forest with her children carrying a rifle at the end of the civil war in Bangladesh in 1971.¹³⁷ In this image it is impossible to 'know' what the woman knows, or understand the world through her eyes, or to understand what she has experienced in any complete way; but the image gives a series of glimpses and ideas which among other things help the viewer to understand how blurred the line between peace and conflict are and how insecure the peace here might have been.

8. Conclusions

My first purpose in this paper has been to map out an argument for visual ethnography in the understanding of conflict and violence. The claim made is simply that visual ethnography is a coherent and grounded way of thinking which enables one to come to grips with problems of understanding conflict and violence. Much more cautiously, it is also an argument that a visual ethnography approach supplements both a more

¹³⁷ <http://www.panos.co.uk/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/00128509.jpg>

loosely defined political anthropology framework and a conflict/ peace studies analytic model, although since I am myself sceptical of the real meaning of the difference between these 'disciplinary boundaries', this in not a point I would press very far. The second main claim here is that this can be so, and that it is 'visual methodology' properly so called, even if researchers are not themselves the camera operator. This is important in a sense for what might be taken as 'health and safety' reasons, but those are much less important (in my view) than a second consideration. That is that news photography is a highly qualified business in itself, providing important sources of information in its pictures and images, in the stories that it tries to convey, and in the resources it creates for memory and history. But to try to interpret these sources naively or as a straightforward representation of what they purport to show is surely crass. We need reading strategies for these texts as surely as we need reading strategies for any kind of text. These strategies need to take account of the possibility of fraud, but they also need to recognise the contexts within which images are created, the editorial and selection processes which bring some to a wider reception while concealing or losing others.

We also need reading strategies which can make sense of the vast array of material coming through the new media, as well as recognition of the possibility of large-scale manipulation of images and narratives articulated through many of the new media. Thus the third main claim has been rooted in an exploration of what some of those strategies might be. It suggest that a reader must indeed beware, as Sontag and Chan have argued, of the claim that through photography we might 'get closer' to a subject, that we might be able to empathise with them and 'feel their pain'. There is a risk of demeaning oneself as well as the subject in this situation, and the danger is compounded both by the emotional depth of many good images and the commonplace language of emotional sharing and the self-help counselling book which powerful images of suffering attract. Sontag's warning is not, after all, against the danger of Facebook fakery; it is a warning against the misuse of responses which are dangerous because they reflect some of the best parts of human nature. The desire to empathise can, however, be as much an attempt to co-opt the Other to oneself as anything else, with all the ethical and methodological problems that that cooption creates. But I argue

here that while recognising these dangers, the reading of the text of photographic images can bring a fuller sense of the nature of human experience by other more reflective means. The paper suggests a number of reading strategies which remain valid in the face of both the critique of empathy and the critique of representation, which the essay spends less time discussing since it is relatively well rehearsed in other sources. These reading strategies are grounded in methodology derived from Ricoeur and Bourdieu (and to a lesser extent a version of Gadamer's hermeneutics) which is consistent with (some specific) contemporary ways of trying to make sense of violence through visual images which identifies an area in common between those three disciplinary sub-fields to which this essay relates (conflict/ peace studies in international relations, ethnography and political anthropology).

Finally (fourth), this essay tries to examine some of the ethical issues which run through the reflective methodologies which the paper considers. It does so aware of the possibility which other scholars also touch on, that easy assumptions about interpretive strategies lead to unethical as well as ungrounded arguments.

Quite a lot remains undone in this paper, including the question of the differences between 'new' and 'old' media and the impact of visual images on social networking sites on the practices of securitisation, violence and resistance. The paper has also made no attempt to develop some of the trails it has initiated beyond the brief exploration of the work of only two photographers among hundreds working in the field. This serves to illustrate the possibility of visual pathways to better understanding of security. But if the paper achieves that, it is long enough already, and no apology is necessary for what it cannot cover here.

I have no intention of claiming to have done more in this essay than open up these main questions for debate and critique, building, as was noted early in the paper, on a valuable extensive literature on visual ethnography which has not, however, explored conflict and insecurity in any detail. There is no definite 'answer' here, and I am inclined to think that there *could* not be a definitive answer to these questions. However, one might at the same time suggest that there is a compelling ethical basis for an understanding of violence which sets in question the everyday nature of

human experience of the drama of conflict and the extraordinary suffering which we find, and to which visual images are capable of bearing witness. That is, at bottom, what good photographers might claim -not that they represent others or that they interpret their experience, but that they enable the bearing of witness. They enable, no doubt in some flawed and incomplete form, the subjectivity of the subject of photography to be articulated. This is what Jenny Matthews has claimed of her own work at its best, and it is considered response to critics which carries a great deal of weight. We encounter those people when we look carefully and slowly at an image, and then, as the painter Lucien Freud insisted in his own approach to a portrait subject, we look again and then look again, as photographers themselves look again and again. This is an ethical encounter with the face of the Other even if it is not an encounter with the whole person of the other. That means that the viewer of images has a responsibility in how they look at images which may be at once necessary (essential) and impossible to fully discharge. This is a dilemma which has part of its source in the Levinassien ethics which Ricouer modifies and integrates into his account of memory and interpretation with which this author is not in disagreement.

Ethical questions therefore inform the reading strategies which this paper has suggested. But there are specific textual strategies proposed here beyond the generalised methodological and ethical analysis. More obliquely, I am also concerned at the lack of visual education among people who, it was suggested earlier, are more dependent on visual images and visual stimuli than pretty much any culture before, at least in the modern world. This lack of sophistication may be something one has to accept; but it means that a highly developed vocabulary of image, metaphor and response shared in dialogue is not available to many people. It also means that, while we are all vulnerable to unscrupulous manipulation by images and film, the majority of people on whom democratic institutions depend are less able to defend themselves against that manipulation than they generally believe. Bluntly, visual meanings and visual manipulations express, present and represent violence to viewers continuously; visual ethnographies provide the possibility of critique and the possibilities of sense-making without which, in an age of fast moving pictures and image overload, we may simply be lost. If one works in education, whatever the

boundaries of individual disciplines, is there not as much of a duty to promote cautious and complex visual literacy as there is of any other kind of textual understanding?

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Photographic sources

For copyright and convenience reasons, I have not included any images in this text, although there is a Powerpoint presentation which accompanies it. All the images referred to in this text are freely available via Google Images. All the pictures by Jenny Matthews referred to here are held in the imperial War Museum (London) archives and previously formed part of her exhibition there *Women and War*.

3

The Psychology of Peacekeeping: One Domain Where Political Realism and Critical Security Theory Will Meet

Harvey Langholtz

1. Introduction

While the field of international relations has been largely occupied and controlled by political scientists, lawyers, economists, and military leaders, in this paper we will examine international relations, war, collective security, and peacekeeping from the perspectives of anthropology and psychology. In this paper I will show that the psychology and anthropology of international relations as well as the psychology and anthropology of war have changed, and these changes need to be reflected in new theoretical explanations and hopefully the useful application of these new theories. My goal will be to explore ways to link the tools provided by anthropological studies to the ones from security studies and to construct a new framework in which anthropology and security studies will complement each other and contribute to the understanding of security. This will – we hope – be our contribution to Critical Security Studies as discussed by Booth in his 2005 book “Critical Security Studies and World Politics”.

There is an unattributable quote that diplomats know well. It is “War represents the failure of diplomacy”. (Some attribute this quote to Tony Benn of the UK and Member of Parliament, but there is no consensus in this). But I submit to you that war represents not only the failure of diplomacy, but also the failure of psychology, anthropology, sociology,

political science, economics, international relations, security studies, and all the other social sciences broadly defined. Perhaps it should be our goal as anthropologists, psychologists, and social scientists to understand what anthropology and the other social sciences can construct in terms of theories that go beyond traditional Security Studies, to Critical Security Studies. In many ways the time is quite ripe for moving beyond traditional Security Studies. The realities of the environment of international relations have evolved since the realities that led to the development of traditional Security Studies.

Traditional Security Studies developed during the 20th century – a century characterized by warfare between the major powers – either actual war during WWI and II, or threatened war during the Cold War. During World War I and II sovereign nations sent their uniformed soldiers to meet on the battlefields, or in the air or on the water. The Cold War was of course also a confrontation between sovereign nations. However, wars of the 21st Century are more likely to be undeclared wars, or civil wars, characterized by ethnic cleansing, genocide, and a blurring of any separation between the soldiers on the battlefield and the civilians who live on it. In many ways Critical Security Studies and Critical Security Theory, with its challenges to TSS is more appropriate for the realities of the 21st Century, just as TSS may have been appropriate for the realities of the 20th Century.

Let's take a step back to international relations as they existed for centuries. What is the history of Europe but the history of warfare? What is the study of security but the study of the tensions between sovereign nations and how those tensions are played out between those sovereign nations? And what are the assumptions and theories about the psychology and anthropology of international relations that have evolved over the years and continue to evolve?

2. The Evolving Assumptions about the Psychology and Anthropology of International Relations

I do not know if there is any one reference that is cited as the first publication on Security Studies. If there is such a document it was probably written in the past 100 years. But the first recorded efforts to understand how the relations between nations can lead to war were reactions to the first recorded wars. Kagan (1995) in *On The Origins of War And the Preservation of Peace* notes that

The ancient Greeks, wracked...by perpetual war, were eager to investigate its causes...Thucydides, writing...about...war, sought its causes..... He expected his history to be useful “to those who wish to have a clear understanding both of events in the past and of those in the future which will, in all human likelihood, happen again in the same or similar way”. That is why he set forth with great care the quarrels between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and the reason they broke their treaty: “so that no one may ever have to seek the causes that led to the outbreak of so great a war among the Greeks [emphasis added]”.

The careful study of the origins of war declined for many centuries to follow, perhaps because it was such a common occurrence. (Kagan, p. 5)

That war came to be tolerated as a “common occurrence” of the human condition is a statement of its widespread acceptance at a psychological level. Rapoport (1968) summarizes Clausewitz (1832) as having a “philosophy of international relations” where the

State is conceived as a living entity...(with) no authority above itself.....Since among the goals of all states is that of increasing their own power at the expense of that of other states, the interests of states, regardless of incidental and ephemeral coincidence, are always in conflict. Clashes of

interest between two states are typically resolved by the imposition of the will of one state upon that of another. Therefore war is a normal phase in the relations among states. (Rapoport in Clausewitz, 1968, p. 63)

It was perhaps William James (1910), who first questioned these assumptions and came to be called “the first peace psychologist” (Deutsch, 1995). In his 1910 classic *The Moral Equivalent of War*, James objected to the tolerance the world had for war and called for a future where “acts of war shall be formally outlawed as between civilized peoples” (James, 1995, p. 23).

This same theme of finding a way to outlaw war can be found 22 years later in the exchange of letters between Freud and Einstein, as proposed by the “League of Nations at its International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris” (Einstein & Freud, 1933, p. 1). Although there had been hopes that the League of Nations might be the institution to enforce an end to war, by 1932 this seemed to be a fading hope. In his letter of July 30, 1932, Einstein wrote to Freud, asking

This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war? It is common knowledge that, with the advance of modern science, this issue has come to mean a matter of life and death for civilization as we know it; nevertheless, for all the zeal displayed, every attempt at its solution has ended in a lamentable breakdown.

I believe, moreover, that those whose duty it is to tackle the problem professionally and practically are growing only too aware of their impotence to deal with it...As for me, the normal objective of my thought affords no insight into the dark places of human will and feeling...I can do little more than enable you to bring the light of your far-reaching knowledge of man's instinctive life to bear upon the problem. There are certain psychological obstacles whose existence a layman in the mental sciences...is incompetent to fathom: You, I am convinced,

will be able to suggest educative methods, lying more or less outside the scope of politics, which will eliminate these obstacles...

The ill-success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work, which paralyse (sic) these efforts. (Einstein & Freud, 1933, p. 3-4).

Freud responded to Einstein's questions in September of 1932 with a letter discussing several themes: psychology, sociology, law, and international diplomacy.

Conflicts...are resolved, in principle, by recourse to violence. It is the same in the animal kingdom, from which man cannot claim exclusion; nevertheless men are also prone to conflicts of opinion, touching, on occasion, the loftiest peaks of abstract thought, which seem to call for settlement by quite another method. This refinement is, however, a late development. To start with, brute force was the factor which, in small communities, decided points of ownership and the questions which man's will was to prevail...

Thus, under primitive conditions, it is superior force--brute violence, or violence backed by arms--that lords it everywhere...

There is but one sure way of ending war and that is the establishment, by common consent, of a certain control which shall have the last word in every conflict...The League of Nations...has no force at its disposal and can only get it if the members of the new body, its constituent nations, furnish it" (Einstein & Freud, 1933, p. 10-14).

3. The End of WWII, The Founding of the UN, and a New Psychological Perspective

With the subsequent failure of the League of Nations and the advent of World War II, it was recognized by all that the existing theories and models of International Relations would need to change. While it may have been the reality for centuries that disputes between sovereign nations were ultimately settled either by the use or threat of force, the world could not endure wars of such scale every generation. The United Nations was founded on the ashes of World War II and it was designed to prevent repeats of the conditions that led up to World War I and II.

The founding of the UN and the establishment of the UN Security Council of course represented a redefinition of the assumptions of the relations between nations and the development of a new approach to collective security. The acceptance of the existence of the UN Security Council of course represents an erosion of sovereignty. Article 2 of the UN Charter clearly states "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

The UN Charter continues through 19 chapters to establish a structure by which nations might address grievances and avert war. Chapter VI addresses "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes" in which

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement...or other peaceful means of their own choice.

As the UN was formed in the closing days of World War II, it was agreed that collective measures must be put in place to prevent a repeat of the sort of aggression that had precipitated the world-wide conflict. Chapter VII of the UN Charter was drafted to deal with "Actions with Respect to

Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression” and proposed how the community of nations would join against an aggressor nation through the joint application of land, sea, and air force.

Chapter VI was intended to address diplomatic solutions to potential conflicts and Chapter VII was to provide for a united military capability to confront any single aggressor nation. It seemed that the mechanisms were now in place to breathe life into James’s hope that acts of war would be “formally outlawed as between civilized peoples” and to respond to Freud’s concern that such an organization would need “force at its disposal” (Goulding, 1993).

4. Realities of the Cold War

The political realities of the immediate post-war years led to an environment where the UN was incapable of assuming its role as intended. With the growing superpower rivalry and opposing ideologies of the Cold War, instead of serving as an organization of nations that would work together to avoid or prevent war, the UN became a place where adversaries or potential adversaries would seek political advantage as part of broader strategies of conflict.

The idea of the member nations of the UN working together to bring collective security took at least partial form with the early UN peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping was never mentioned in the UN Charter. Instead, peacekeeping became a series of *ad hoc* interventions, starting with the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East in 1948, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in 1949, and the UN Emergency Force in response to the so-called Suez Crisis in 1956 (Durch, 1993).

With some notable exceptions, UN Peacekeeping continued as a series of relatively small operations throughout the Cold War and the UN was selective not to over-extend its capabilities. Despite more than 80 wars (not including many of the smaller intra-state conflicts) that were fought worldwide during the 40 years of the Cold War with a toll of 30 million deaths (James, 1990), the UN Security Council established only 13 peacekeeping and observer forces (Roberts, 1996). A handful of troop-contributing nations loaned the UN less than 10,000 people per year and the entire budget for

UN Peacekeeping in constant 1990 US dollars was generally less than \$500 million per year (Durch, 1993). UN Peacekeeping missions were small, peacekeepers were either unarmed or lightly armed, and US and USSR personnel were rarely involved (United Nations 1990, 1996).

5. The End of The Cold War, Smaller Conflicts, and a Smaller World

While the specter of conflict between the superpowers dominated geopolitical relations throughout the Cold War, smaller-scale intra-national conflicts persisted. What changed was not the frequency of these smaller conflicts, but rather the level of public awareness and the willingness of the superpowers to intervene.

Nearly 100 national and minority peoples participated in violent conflicts during the 50 years following WWII (Gurr 1993, 1994, 1995) and these included almost 50 cases of genocide and mass political murder that caused at least 9 million deaths (Harff & Gurr, 1995). While the roots of the cultural and ethnic animosities that led to these sub-national conflicts had their beginnings long before the Cold War, the close of the Cold War brought a period where the world community would become more aware of these ethno-political conflicts.

In addition to the changes in power relationships that came with the end of the Cold War, there was also a technological development that led to a widening and democratization of the global relationships. With the advent of 24-hour cable news, the “CNN effect” (Livingston & Eachus, 1995) made “people everywhere more aware of situations that seem to cry out for intervention and more familiar with the human tragedies that accompany these horrible calamities” (Blechman, 1996, p.288). Viewers of CNN saw images of starving masses in Somalia (Chopra, Eknes, & Nordbø, 1995; Crocker, 1992) and shelled cities in Yugoslavia (Gowing, 1994; Jakobsen, 1996; Livingston & Eachus, 1995; Strobel, 1996), shaping public opinion as abstract information never could (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977), and increasing pressure on world leaders and national governments to intervene.

CNN viewers worldwide were now more aware of humanitarian tragedies – be they manmade or natural – and they would pressure their

capitals to “do something” even if that “something” meant simply placing that problem at the doorstep of the UN. As a result the number of UN humanitarian and military interventions in civil wars and other internal conflicts grew from less than five per year throughout the 1980's to almost 20 per year by the early 1990's. This widening of the community of individuals who were aware of ongoing conflicts and threats to security led to a democratization of international relations, and one more change in the environment and the assumptions that had originally spawned Traditional Security Studies.

6. An Agenda for Peace

In January of 1992, with the Cold War over, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the Secretary General of the UN. Within a month, world leaders asked the new Secretary General, to draft a paper proposing his view of the emerging role the UN could play in more expanded peacekeeping that would live up to the expectation held for the UN at its founding, that of a world body capable of addressing both the causes and consequences of war.

Boutros-Ghali outlined his vision in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). In it he called for a widening of the “size, scope, and complexity of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” and a greater willingness to address the root causes of conflict: economic, social, political, ethnic, and a widening gap between the haves and the have-nots.

This would not be the psychology of mediation, but rather a psychology of active intervention. *An Agenda for Peace* called for the international community not to wait until a dispute had escalated into violence before attempting an intervention. Instead, the UN would take preventive measures early to avert war, or humanitarian and remedial steps following war to help a region return to stability. Boutros-Ghali asserted that “The Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed” (1992, p. 2). He also called for a greater readiness for the UN to impose peace on behalf of a civilian population by using force. The Secretary General called for more post-conflict *peace-building* measures to “enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace”.

To this end, these new approaches were designed to identify potential problems early and resolve conflicts before they escalated into violence. But where a conflict had degenerated into war the interventions were designed to limit the effects on the civilian population, seek a cease fire, disarm the combatants, clear mines, restore order, rebuild infrastructure, hold elections, and reinstitute the web of civil society so necessary to the building of confidence and trust. These were no longer the peacekeeping interventions of soldiers, but instead were the interventions of psychologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and other branches of the social sciences.

An Agenda for Peace represented one more fundamental change that called for a revision of Traditional Security Studies. The years following An Agenda for Peace would see attempts at intervening in a conflict during the full cycle from the start of the dispute to the cessation of hostilities and beyond (Lund, 1996) and what would become known as Second Generation Multinational Operations (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1992 & 1993).

7. Twenty Years After the End of the Cold War and the Writing of Agenda For Peace

In the 20 years since the End of the Cold War there has not been a war between any of the major powers. During this period the world witnessed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, including the massacre at Srebrenica, the implosion of Somalia (United Nations 1995a), the Rwandan (United Nations 1995b), Genocide, civil wars in Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Liberia (United Nations 1995c), the endless war in the Eastern DRC that has led to 4 million deaths – mostly in the civilian population and caused by the secondary causes of war, ongoing tensions in Nigeria that stop short of civil war, and of course September 11th, the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, the Civil War in Syria, and of course the Arab Spring which is far from over. There are currently 300,000 military personnel, police, and civilians deployed worldwide on peace support operations. A little over a third of these are deployed on 15 UN peacekeeping missions, but there are also multi-national missions run by the EU, AU, NATO, OSCE, and others on a total of 74 peace missions.

The close of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the blurring of sovereignty, an increase of the number of ethno-political conflicts, and the willingness of the international community to intervene in areas of trouble have created opportunities for interventions by psychologists but have also raised some unforeseen questions. Where does national sovereignty begin and where does responsibility for the welfare of civilians in another nation end? At what point is the International Community nurturing peace and stability and at what point are we imposing western-style solutions and institutions such as elections, human rights, police, and democratic governments?

Peacekeeping is no longer simply a military intervention to halt fighting between armies. The past 20 years have brought an era when the international community has been open to addressing the root causes of conflict as never before and there are now opportunities for anthropologists, psychologists and other social scientists to both develop new theories to explain and predict conflicts, and constructive interventions to avoid or limit violent conflict.

One anthropologist who has taken a clear position in the application of anthropology to understanding the cultural aspects of violent conflict, and developing theory-based interventions, is Montgomery McFate. She developed the Human Terrain Systems, to assist US and coalition military personnel in better understanding local culture, and finding ways to influence the local population through culturally appropriate persuasive measures instead of through the use of force (McFate, 2005). There were many within the anthropological community who disapproved of this, arguing that such applications were unethical. I will leave it to you to, the reader, to consider if this application of anthropological theory represents an example of what we are trying to explore here today.

8. Conclusion

It is our goal to explore new theories as part of Critical Security Studies. It has been my goal here to argue that with the changes in international relations that came following WWII and also following the Cold War, the

time is ripe for the development of new theories to replace traditional Security Studies.

I know that some current publications in this field address issues of democratization, the differences between the haves and have-nots, and the need for fundamental changes in the global financial architecture. Yes, Critical Security Studies must encompass more than just military questions, but also global issues of food supply, access to drinking water, communicable disease, and economic stability. Of the 7 billion people on earth 1 billion do not have access to clean drinking water and another 1 billion do not have access to rudimentary sanitation – two things we take completely for granted. With the world still spending 1.6 trillion USD annually on defense – 2.6% of global GDP – the burden of the cost of arms still has a negative effect on economic prosperity. This was perhaps stated best by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower on April 16, 1953, shortly after the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, when he compared arms spending to stealing from the people:

“Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron”.

So it is our job now as social scientists to seek new theories of Critical Security Studies to replace Traditional Security Studies. The environment that led to the development of TSS has now changed and it is time to reevaluate these theories in light of today’s realities.

I will leave you with one final quote from social psychologist Kurt Lewin, that “There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (Lewin 1951, p. 169).

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4

“The Revolution Continues Worldwide!” Emancipatory Politics in an Age of Global Insecurity

Danielle Moretti-Langholtz

On September 17, 2011 the movement, known as Occupy Wall Street made its dramatic entrance into the public’s consciousness in New York City. This event was not *sui generis*. Rather, it was a confluence of actions, ideas, emotions and planning. While choosing to maintain anonymity and to claim the protests were and are leaderless, the relatively small band of protestors who initially planned the occupation of Lower Manhattan’s Zuccotti Park were inspired by other direct action protests such as: the 1999 blockade against the WTO meetings in Seattle, the G8 Summit protests in Genoa (Juris 2012:267), the 2011 protests in the state of Wisconsin’s legislature, as well as the global democracy movement in Tahrir Square, and Spain’s May 15th “acampadas” movement.

The political ideology for September 17th was inspired by *Adbusters*, an anti-consumerist & pro-environmentalist, activist-group founded by Canadian’s Kalle Lasn and Bill Schmalz and the writings of David Graeber, Michael Hardt and Christopher Hedges, to name just a few. However, the emotional component, which was generated by the so-called 99%, was and remains a diverse grass-roots coalition of demonstrators, who represent the unemployed and employed, professionally educated and unskilled, young and old, male and female; yet are united in their wish to challenge perceived threats to their economic and political security wrought by

unrestrained transnational corporate greed and globalization. The protests fundamental structure is rooted in the tenets of emancipatory politics and participatory democracy—a perspective wholly misunderstood by critics and the mainstream media; and whose version of civil society is viewed as threatening to hierarchical transnational corporations.

During the course of my own fieldwork in 2011 & 12, I visited OWS campsites in NY's Zuccotti Park (October and December 2011), Montreal (November 2011), Dewey Square in Boston (March 2012), and in London-Finsbury Square (March 2012). Initially, I monitored news reports and websites about the protest in NY, as well as received first-hand reports from my daughters, who visited Zuccotti Park several times in September of 2011. During my first visit to Zuccotti Park I was immediately struck by the contrast between mainstream media discussions of OWS, which were invariably presentations of a chaotic, hippie-led, freak show and what was being written on the social media's live feeds and websites, which presented the ideological, political and economic arguments fueling the protests. The dizzying array of online and mass media reporting was nearly impossible to monitor. As a cultural anthropologist I realized that I needed to observe this protest from inside Zuccotti Park; employing the traditional ethnographic tool kit; and later to visit its sister protest sites as well.

What follows is a brief summary based on my observations and fieldwork at Occupy Wall Street encampments in New York City (October & December of 2011), Montreal (November 2011) and London (March 2012).

In every instance each Occupy Wall Street camp I visited was highly organized within a tightly bounded stone or concrete space and far too complex and dynamic to employ the “standard” anthropological observational methodology.

Visiting the protest site for the Occupy Wall Street/ New York at Zuccotti Square it was evident that the physical space was divided into clearly demarcated areas for activities such as food preparation and accepting food donations. Tables were set up and labeled for inquiries relating to security issues and legal advice—in case of arrest by the police, emergency medical care, taking donations of clothing and bedding, and donations of cash. An OWS library, compiled from donations of visitors and protestors contained a wide array of reading topics from materials on

“The Revolution Continues Worldwide!” Emancipatory Politics...

anarchy to classic literature. A camera was set up which enabled protestors to record individual political statements on any topic of their choosing.



(Think Tank on Education Zuccotti Park, New York October 2011. Photo by author.)



172

In New York City, a ring of food vendors, as well as a ring of uniformed policemen encircled Zuccotti Square. Relations between the police and protestors seemed cordial; and at the very least I observed that protestors often exhibited great care to not have an antagonistic relationship with the police. This was true at least in the early days and weeks of the protest. The use of a people's mic during the nightly general assembly meetings and scheduled workshops gave the protest a festive and upbeat atmosphere. It may be argued that the one exception to this spirit of cordiality centered on the drumming and “noise” from the corner of Zuccotti Square drummer where musicians pounded out a steady beat of drumming. Over time, some of the protestors from the workshops expressed an interest in having the musicians have a less prominent place in the demonstration. Interestingly, the drummers, along with drop-in big name musicians, such as Sean Lennon, were often featured in the mainstream media television broadcasts. Prior to the crackdown on the encampment, buses loaded with tourists visited the site as if it were a “pop culture event”. However, I would argue, that the Occupy Wall Street Movements were being discussed in the media as a “leaderless, chaotic movement, without any clear message”. Importantly, the movement's horizontal structure, its implementation of participatory democracy, and its commitment to emancipatory democracy was misunderstood and ignored in all main-stream reporting, either on television, radio, and in the print media.



(Camp “library” at bottom right, discussion tables center and food vendors in background-top left. Zuccotti Square, New York. October 2011. Photo by author.)

Formal academic work on the Occupy movements is provisional and just starting to appear in print. Two recent journal articles in the May 2012 issue of *American Ethnologist*, one by Jeffery Juris, and another by coauthors Maple Razsa and Andrej Kurnik, along with Chris Farone’s 99 *Nights with the 99%*, and Noam Chomsky’s *Occupy* (2012), are among the most informative about the structural and functional aspects of the OWS movement. These works present not only the ideology behind the movement but in the case of Juris’ article, locate the reader directly into the campsite at Dewey Square in Boston.

Borrowing Foucault’s (1967) concept of a Heterotopia, I would like to suggest that the Occupy sites functioned as a non-hegemonic space of otherness. Perhaps this quality made Occupy campsites seem so foreign and threatening to mainstream media. Moreover, the campsites themselves served a critical function for the protests. There was a noticeable feeling of empowerment that was generated by the occupation of particular spaces. In particular, the camp’s location at Zuccotti Park, with its proximity to the

New York Stock Exchange, a short distance from Wall Street itself, was more than a “tactic” but the “physical embodiment” of the movement (Juris 2012:269). The “politics of the space” were observable when I visited the campsite on a weekday, when the stock exchange was open; the symbolism of the protest was apparent with stockbrokers in business suits and protestors visible to one another yet separated from one another by a ring of uniformed New York City police. Later, visiting on a Sunday, after the November 15th raid and eviction of protestors from the camp the space had an entirely different feel. Zuccotti Park, occupied only during the daytime, without tents, the library, food preparation, etc., did not generate the same type of energy and enthusiasm that it did while fully occupied. Yet the ring of police was still in place. When I saw and heard the Rev. Jesse Jackson speak at Zuccotti Square in December of 2011, after the raid on the encampment and a heavy police presence remained in the square. Of course there were raids on other Occupy sites and London’s was moved from St. Paul’s Cathedral to a less visible location at Finsbury Square. The impact of these raids has not yet been fully studied.

Again, my experience at various campsites was in sharp contrast to news reports about the protests. Typically a TV reporter was shown standing in front of a small group of musicians beating on drums while the reporter mentioned something about a celebrity who had visited the campsite along with some brief commentary emphasizing that the protestors’ lists of complaints were varied and they were not united by a single platform or issue. Implied by such a reports is that the protestors can’t get their “act together” and no one is in charge so this protest will fade and accomplish nothing-but it will cost the tax payers of the city dearly for the police “protection” and the security necessary to keep order in the respective camps. The insecurity of police and local government officials about the composition of the camps were masked under the guise of costs of providing police protection and poor sanitation of the camps. The financial and political insecurity fueling the protests was masked by mainstream media reports, which emphasized camp disorganization. The horizontal and participatory structure of the camps was not seen as a conscious organizing strategy. Nevertheless, it was.

Negative media reports both created and disseminated an image of the protestors as a dissatisfied, disorganized, fringe population; again this was counter to my own experience at each site I visited. People I interviewed were articulate on a variety of issues. However, television reporting on the Occupy movement featured “financial experts” using neo-liberal rhetoric to explain business cycles and the banking industry, brought into sharp relief what appeared to be a difference in knowledge between “experts” and a lack of financial expertise on the part of the occupiers. Thus I would argue that the mainstream media established a dichotomy between the knowledge reproduced by protestors and knowledge expressed by financial “experts”. This dichotomy functioned to emphasize conditions of chaos at the campsites, while simultaneously ignoring the examples of participatory democracy taking place within Zuccotti Park.

Significantly, never was the validity of any of the “categories” used by financial “experts” challenged in any way by television newscasters. Ken Booth’s (2005: 268-9) argument for the “denaturalization” of “human made” “referents” as well as the questioning of “assumptions of fact makers” in contemporary society has particular relevance here. I would argue that challenges to, or any critical analysis or modification of, traditional economic theory will not be generated from within the field of finance, especially given that the reproduction of this form of expert knowledge is produced at prestigious post-graduate business schools that are often heavily funded by successful bankers and stock brokers, as is the case at my own university.

Indeed the production of anthropological fieldwork in the study of and reportage about the Occupy Wall Street Movement and relevance of ethnography in this work is also a critical question. As Marcus and Fischer noted (1986: 17, 19) the “predicament of anthropology” was generated by the discipline’s focus on creating a field which sought to be known as promoting the “science of man” and thus practitioners researched primitive societies as living cultural analogues of the past and “described diversity across the world” without reference to colonial domination or the steady encroachment of capitalism and modernity onto their anthropological subjects. Indeed the only voice heard in ethnography was that of the

anthropologist, “self-fashioned” and “authoritative” (1986: 92). Clearly, ethnography can no longer be undertaken in this manner.

In George Stocking’s 1992 work, *The Ethnographer’s Magic*, students as well as practitioners of anthropology, are offered a retrospective on the methodologies and “paradigmatic traditions” of the discipline. Reminding readers of Malinowski’s “mythic character” and his success in “validating” the primacy and authority of his ethnographic field methods (1992:57) we are able to reflect on the nascent approaches to the anthropological focus. Malinowski’s work (1922) re-directed early or proto-anthropologists’ questions about the origins, myths, and cultural differences, in the human condition to overarching questions about what was shared among human beings. Malinowski’s approach turned the anthropological gaze away from the formulaic questions typified in the *Notes and Queries* (1874, 1951) carried by European travelers and missionaries to exotic locales, whose responses were relayed to the Tylor-esque armchair scholars of the academy, from which pronouncements about culture were made. For Malinowski, anthropological work was undertaken to identify that which was common to all humans, our basic biological and psychological needs. Malinowski demonstrated that our differences were only in the varied ways we satisfied those basic human needs. Of lasting importance was the way in which Malinowski and his students went about exploring these needs in a variety of settings. Malinowski and his students took themselves directly in the field itself to “study” one bounded group at a time. Ever after anthropologists were to live among those being studied to observe and describe them.

In 1896, under the mentorship of Franz Boas, anthropology, as an academic discipline in the United States, at Columbia University in N.Y., took its form and shape. Boasian anthropology was characterized by an inductive, four-field approach to research, imbued with a passionate rejection of the ideology, along with the proponents, of the evolutionary perspective cum classificatory typology of mankind. For Boas and his students, the study of so-called “primitive” people was to be undertaken in the field (a nod perhaps to the influence of Malinowski) but shaped by the Boasian cannon of participant observation and cultural relativism, seeking

to debunk the comparative method in previous anthropological work (Bohannon and Glazer 1988).

With few exceptions, notably Margaret Mead in the South Pacific, the field sites of Boas' students were situated within the boundaries of the nation state; primarily on Indian reservations, thus enabling Boas' students to undertake the task of "salvage" anthropology in order to document the vanishing American Indian lifeways. The traditional practices, languages and cultures of Native Americans were thought to be in a state of collapse due to the relentless pressures of the assimilationist policies promulgated by the U.S. government, starting in the late nineteenth century. The methodological underpinnings of Boasian anthropology hinged upon the identification of primary or key informants, typically senior males in the indigenous community, who possessed what was deemed to be traditional cultural knowledge in categories such as native language, ritual, kinship practices and life skills. This direct historical approach was used to reconstruct the past. Be it the recent or ancient past, Boasian ethnography sought to get at the past.

With the rise of Functionalism and Structural Functionalism, primarily under the tutelage of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown respectively, while subtly different perspectives, each was implemented under the protection of the mantle of colonial administrators—while hardly giving a mention of this overarching governmental cloak. Ethnographies remained essentially descriptive in presentation single-sited. However, determined to promote a "natural science of society" Radcliffe-Brown's (1952) argued for the study of social relations as a component of an integrated larger all-encompassing structure, as well as the way in which social life was analogous to a biological organism. This perspective allowed for both structural and comparative research. Moreover, once society was viewed as an organic institution its parts could be viewed as they expanded or contracted and along with the ways that these structures functioned and atrophied.

Decades of classical anthropological work, produced on both sides of the Atlantic, characterized by extraordinary dedication to fieldwork, the compiling of catalogues of material culture and the building of academic programs, are the intellectual inheritance of every anthropologists. Regardless of whether or not the "subjects" of the respective ethnographies

were presented as living in a state of change or insecurity, the anthropologist was neither. This was the era of the primacy of the anthropologist. The voices of those being studied were audible only through the anthropologist. Missing as well was any mention of the context and larger systems in which these societies were imbedded. The heyday of Functionalism and Structural Functionalism is long past and criticized as anti-historical in its approach and as a handmaiden to colonialist goals of the nation state. Boasian ethnography, once synonymous with “culture” (Stocking 1992:134), a term for which there still is little consensus, has receded into a kind of anthropological amnesia, no longer seen by some as relevant to fieldwork at present.

Anthropologists had become captives in an ethnographic present of their own making, an a-historical dream from which the field awakened with the post WWII new world order, and an emergent global interconnectedness that would have been unimaginable to social scientists in 1945. The single-sited, descriptive, ethnographies that had begun in earnest three decades earlier ended with the advent of the modern era and a re-examination of theoretical paradigms and methodologies. Simultaneously, applied anthropology’s attempt to solve problems and shape government policy may be seen in the testimony of Julian Steward at the Indian Claims Commission hearings to award financial compensation to tribes for treaty violations by the United States. The genesis of applied anthropology, a new subfield in the discipline, seen in the work of Frank Speck and his students in the 1940s, who worked among and with indigenous communities in the Eastern states to combat racism and bolster Native American identity, became a legitimate outcome for fieldwork.

Critical contributions by Fernand Braudel (1973), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), Eric Wolf (1988), helped to orient the discipline toward World Systems Theory and political economy, thus fostering a reengagement with history, leading to studies in ethnicity and identity, development and underdevelopment, dependency and post-colonial studies, post-structuralism and deconstructionism, bringing us to the current reassessment of anthropological research within the fast-paced and dynamic landscape of participatory democracy.

Through political economy and world systems theory researchers sought answers to explain the “origins” of the “modern world” not the origins of primitive peoples and civilizations of the past. Rather than ignore the influence of colonialism and its relationship to the rise of capitalism, political economists, influenced by the Annales School, sought to untangle the event level, conjuncture and *longue duree*, of Europe’s colonist policies, particularly in the Americas and Africa. One outcome of this scholarship was the concern with the positionality of anthropologists in their ethnographic work, writing of alternative histories, the amplification of subaltern voices in works characterized by collaboration and civic engagement, with a goal to affect social change both within the discipline in the form of applied work and outside the discipline—in the form of activist anthropology. A paradigm shift occurred within the world at large and bringing the field to the anthropologist in a dynamic and novel manner.

Graeber (2011: 247, 354), in his work entitled *Direct Action Ethnography*, questions the “relevance of ethnographic writing which aims to describe the social and conceptual universe“ without advocating for consensus decision-making or participatory democracy in the wider society.

In my view, the decentralized nature of the OWS camps, horizontal leaderless structure, internal reliance on social media, as well as their emphasis on participatory democracy, was best exemplified by the daily General Assemblies and topic-specific “think tanks”. However, these dynamic and fast-changing examples of participatory democracy challenge the efficacy of the traditional ethnographer’s toolkit.

Two works prefigured the limitations of the traditional ethnographic toolkit for studying the Occupy movement. June Nash’s 2007 book *Practicing Ethnography in a Globalizing World* and Douglas Holmes and George Marcus’ 2008 article entitled “Fast-Capitalism: Para-Ethnography and the Rise of the Symbolic Analyst”. Each of these works offers a critique of traditional ethnography, as well as suggests new models for working in the interconnected and multi-sited landscapes of contemporary anthropology.

Nash’s (2007: 137) clear and sweeping discussions of the processes of globalization and its impact on the movement of people, money, and

resources, in response to the expansion and integration of capital investment, with its impact on civil society and the simultaneous response of the counter veining forces of fundamentalism, privatization, grass-roots movements, NGO's, rise of inequality, and environmental degradation, call for the anthropologist to resituate her work within micro and macro historical processes, to assist collective action (see Wolf 1986: 327) and achieve social change (194).

Holmes and Marcus' (2008: 46) article on role of technocratic knowledge and the inner workings of the Federal Reserve Bank, what might be called “studying up”, and the institutional management of global affairs is a particularly obtuse but vitally important subject. The authors define, “fast-capitalism” as the “circumstances under which knowledge is created and effaced as the communicative space of the nation-state is eclipsed and our” ethnographic “subjects and we anthropologists too must think and act within a communicative space mediated by supranational markets”. The author's work on the “conceptualization of the para-ethnography” as well as the “re-functioning of ethnography,” is ongoing.

Holmes and Marcus argue for the construction of a multi-sited research design and a critical anthropology that is focused on revealing the history and processes by which distinct peoples have been impacted by and reacted to the encroachments of world historical systems, colonialism, capitalism, and globalization. Key to this approach is the acknowledgement that anthropologists are studying subjects fully “located within the shared, but differently situated predicaments of contemporary life” with careful attention to what they term as the “cultures of expertise” employed by anthropological methodologies themselves. (2008: 48) Holmes, Marcus, and Nash argue for an ethnographic practice that acknowledges that supranational markets impact politics and define our era and that the workings of these markets are “virtually invisible and inaccessible from the standpoint of conventional political ideology and practice” (2008: 73 & 83).

In conclusion, refashioning an ethnography which is co-created, with our subjects, which is civically engaged and itself generates “expert” knowledge, will be the most effective toolkit for exploring the predicaments of modernity and insecurity. Thus anthropologists, along with their subjects

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can “Occupy Everywhere and Everything” while promoting participatory democracy worldwide in this age of global insecurity.

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5

Anthropological methods in counter-trafficking activities: analysis of criminal networks and victim-oriented approach

Desirée Pangerc

1. A short introduction

In his article “Toward a Critical Anthropology of Security”, Daniel M. Goldstein (2010) attempts to explore the fundamental relationships between security discourse and practice, affirming the role anthropology can play in security debates, in order to analyze every crisis and every criminal phenomenon in a comprehensive approach. Moreover, he points out how collective security cannot be achieved without national security, by meaning that this topic has a transnational dimension (Goldstein, 2010). So, it is clear that migration flows are a security issue, considering their transnational spread and the necessity to manage them through both international and national measures. For these reasons, this reflection is more valid for illegal migrations, which are subdivided into *smuggling of migrants* and *human trafficking*. And, as Elke Krahman (2005) points out, the new presence of non-State actors bring insecurity not only to States, but especially to societies and individuals: this is the case of global human trade.

2. The operational approach: description of the “Italian model”

In 2006, I started to regularly meet then-Anti-Mafia Prosecutor in Trieste¹³⁸, Nicola Maria Pace. He introduced me to the thematic, starting with explaining very clearly the difference between *smuggling* and *trafficking*. The second is defined by Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (U.N. 2000) as:

“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”;

while *migrants smuggling* is considered by the Article 3 of the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol as:

“procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”¹³⁹,

¹³⁸ My hometown, an Italian city at the border with Slovenia.

¹³⁹ The Smuggling of Migrants Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. (<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html?ref=menu>).

that is only the illegal transports of immigrants, especially from their Country of origin, through some Countries of transit, to a Country of destination¹⁴⁰.

After this first theoretical phase, the Prosecutor elucidated me the characteristics of the model adopted by his team and by a lot of judicial coordinating institution, i.e. EuroJust¹⁴¹. The “Italian model”, created, verified and employed by him and his team, presents some particular features, such as:

1. the differentiation of every flux of immigrants from the others. The differentiation on ethnical bases showed that every criminal group works in a different way, from the recruitment of the victims to the modalities through which they segregate them, once enslaved (Spiezia, Frezza, Pace, 2002);
2. the analysis of criminal organizations in their transnational dimension, comparing their structure to the one of transnational holdings. As Jean Ziegler (2000) clearly demonstrates in his researches, the new mafias are characterized by: first, a financial and economical capitalistic structure¹⁴²; second, a military hierarchy, having every criminal organization its roots in the extreme violence, being subject to capital accumulation, territorial domination and conquest of the markets, establishing command-obedience relationships with authoritarian methods; third, they present an ethnical structure (Ziegler, 2000) or they can create “coalitions” *ad hoc*, which are

¹⁴⁰ The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/ 25 of 15 November 2000, is the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organized crime. It opened for signature by Member States at a high-level Political Conference convened for that purpose in Palermo, Italy, on 12-15 December 2000 and entered into force on 29 September 2003. The Convention is supplemented by three Protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.

¹⁴¹ European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit, founded in 2002.

¹⁴² And the parameters are the maximization of the profit, a strong vertical control and the goal of highest productivity.


temporary alliance to reach a specific/ some specific goal/ s (Boissevain, 1974, p. 171). These three characteristics exclude one another in everyday life, but by interconnecting them, the criminal organizations obtain the maximum level of effectiveness;

3. to diversify the general phenomenon called “trafficking in human beings” in sub-phenomena, such as: trafficking in women and minors for sexual exploitation; trafficking in men, women and minors for labor exploitation; the issue regarding the *argati* or minors “in leasing” – this is a very peculiar crime, present mainly in some Roma ethnic groups, where the family sells his sons to a *gazda*, an owner, as slaves for a certain period (Pangerc, 2012 b); human organs trade; illegal adoptions; money laundering, obviously connected to all the previous illicit activities.

After being prepared on the legal and operative framework by the Prosecutor, I spent two years – between 2006 and 2008 – completing my training by working at the Coordination Center for Immigrants’ Communities and Associations in Trieste as Project Manager and Researcher, in a Anti-Violence center as a social operator and researcher too, and by following some judicial cooperation initiatives – most of them carried on by UNICRI¹⁴³ – in Slovenia and Croatia. After that period of researches and collections of smuggled and trafficked people’s interviews, I thought I was ready to start my fieldwork in the Balkans, by following that route which arrives in Italy, passing through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and other Countries¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴³ UNICRI is a United Nations entity mandated to assist intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental organizations in formulating and implementing improved policies in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice (link [http:// www.unicri.it/](http://www.unicri.it/)).

¹⁴⁴ This part of my essay was presented at the *Conference Anthropology in the World*, organized by the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in June 2012.



Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. The routes of illegal migrations.

When my fieldwork in Bosnia and Herzegovina started, I decided to stop there because *human trafficking* was managed by the criminal organization, but also by other actors, in a different way (Pangerc, 2012 b).

3. Obstacles and problems on the field

In September 2008, I arrived in Sarajevo and I was officially employed as a Programme Officer for the Local Technical Unit of the Italian Embassy there. My work consisted in preparing feasibility studies, evaluating Italian cooperation initiatives and monitoring them. Moreover, I followed as a consultant our project concerning the justice system and the protection of the vulnerable social groups, in this case women and minors.

I have to provide you some information about Bosnia and Herzegovina, before entering the topic. The political situation of the Country is deeply complex: after the conflict of 1992-1995, the Dayton General Framework

Agreement for Peace (Belloni, 2001), which main purpose was to end the war, established an administrative and political division into two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina – formed by 51% of the territory, largely constituted by Bosniaks¹⁴⁵ and Croats – and Republika Srpska – 49% of the territory, primarily Serb¹⁴⁶. This arbitrary division had a very negative aspect, that is the crystallization of ethnic¹⁴⁷ (?) identities, and the impossibility of integration between the three groups (Bilefski, 2008): the lack of consensus from a bottom-up approach created the premises for a “failed State” (Thuerer, 1999), *de facto* a non-autonomous State, with a corrupted government and dependent on the presence of International Community, but, what is worst, of the hidden lobbies and organized crime.

¹⁴⁵ Bosniaks are Sunni Muslim, although historically Sufism has also played a significant role among them.

¹⁴⁶ Plus the District of Brčko, a sort of condominium between the FBiH and the RS, and under the control of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council till the 31st of August 2012. (www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-s-peace-overseer-suspends-brcko-supervision).

¹⁴⁷ I am quite cautious when I say that Bosnia and Herzegovina has three ethnic groups; In anthropologically terms, this is not correct. In the Country we have two nationalities (Serbs and Croats) and the Bosnian muslims (connoted by religion).



Source: Vidiani.com. Administrative map of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

So, once there, my fieldwork began, but when I met one of the most experts in human trafficking, operating there for one Cooperation Agency, he quickly stopped my introduction, in order to reply: “But there is no *human trafficking* here. Have you read the TIP ¹⁴⁸ report? Bosnia and

¹⁴⁸ The Trafficking in Persons Report is the U.S. Government’s principal diplomatic tool to engage foreign governments on human trafficking. (www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/).

Herzegovina was promoted, the Country is in the II Tier: its government made great efforts in fighting *human trafficking* and was successful”.

In the past BiH has generally assessed as a Country of transit and destination for victims –especially women – from Eastern Europe (OSCE Report, 2009). With a lot of operative measures to control the borders and with the key-role performed by the International Police Task Force till 2003, the procedures to smuggle the victims in and out of the borders were too risky for the criminal organizations, so the external trafficking came to an end (Pangerc, 2012) and this is demonstrated by statistics. But Alain Bauer, the French criminologist, reminded me Benjamin Disraeli’s words:

“There are three kinds of lies: the big lies, the small lies...and the statistics”.

And I agreed with him, because Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a Country where this human right violation is present, even though statistics are not useful to identify the social evil.

Another meeting, another anthropological dilemma – just at the beginning of my fieldwork: when I met the assistant of the State Coordinator for Counter-Trafficking in BiH¹⁴⁹, she told me: “You ask me how organized crime operates here, but I have to tell you that only two local *mafiosi* trafficked in human beings, Milaković – who operated in Prijedor – in the past and now Kučević – who operated in Tuzla”. Kučević was convicted in 2009, while I was in Sarajevo. But the local newspapers continuously reported cases of trafficked people and the State Coordinator’s staff explained me that the situation got worse, because people were trafficked by non-local criminal organizations but – and this shocked me – also by Bosnian families. “They are poor, they lost their jobs: they collect some money and they buy one or two girls to force them into prostitution in their flats or houses”, the Samir Rizvo’s assistant continued, “the NGOs continues to ask the Donors Community for money to finance shelters,

¹⁴⁹ This figure was included in the Stability Pact and the Office was created in 2003. The National Officer or State Coordinator is always the Assistant of the Minister of Security. At that time, Samir Rizvo was in charge of the Office.

rehabilitation activities and so on and we have to manage all these problems”¹⁵⁰.

To sum up, during the first months of my researches in Bosnia and Herzegovina I found that: local mafia was no more involved in *human trafficking* business; there were no more *data* on external *human trafficking*, so the institutions supposed it was successfully stopped; the Country, divided into two Entities and a District, had three anti-trafficking legislations plus one common Strategy, which was not applied because of the political unwillingness to cooperate; the perception of the phenomenon from the civil society was that it was “just a simple business” and not a crime. The “Italian model” was not useful to investigate human trafficking in that context and in those years, so I had to change my strategy.

4. A different way to proceed: social networks creation and actor-oriented approach

First of all, to continue my work I decided to collect facts and not data. Anthropology deals with social facts and human trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina is definitely a social fact. Secondly, I adopted an actor-oriented approach (Long, 2001), by dividing the network of my informants into three levels; an informal one, formed by common people; an operative one, formed by experts from Mission EUFOR ALTHEA¹⁵¹ and EUPM¹⁵², local police, social operators from NGOs; finally, an institutional one, formed by the representatives of the Embassies, the International Organizations and the Development Agencies.

What I discovered was that in the last couple of years, the Country has been increasingly starting to face a new form of human trafficking, whereby Bosnian women and minors (minors especially from Roma communities)

¹⁵⁰ Interview “Who trafficks whom”: “Just people, not mafia...Only because it’s a fast and easy way to make money. There are only two trials regarding *mafiosi* involved in this type of trafficking: Milaković in the past and now Kučević who operated in Tuzla. But you cannot imagine: we discovered a trafficking of young women managed by a mother and her son”. (OSCE informant)

¹⁵¹ The EU military operation in BiH, launched in December 2002.

¹⁵² The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

are being recruited and exploited within its borders. This internal trafficking “is harder as we can only find out about by special intelligence and surprise raids, both requiring a lot of resources and impossible to keep up as a standard approach”, an investigator noted (Savona and Stefanizzi, 2007, p. 18). And they were enslaved more and more often by common people and not criminal groups.

As to the statistics – mostly provided by the NGOs –, the number of identified victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation stagnated since 2003. However, in 2007, although the number of identified victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation was the lowest since this phenomenon has been monitored systematically, the number of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who have been identified as victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation within its borders, for the first time exceeded the number of identified foreign victims of trafficking in human beings. The 44% of the total identified victims are minors, all from BiH (OSCE Report, 2009): the number of children that are working on the streets is constantly rising, due to a lack of efficient mechanism of protection by relevant institutions, particularly among minority groups, such as Roma as I said before¹⁵³.

According to my informants and my researches, in Bosnia and Herzegovina human trafficking is perceived “like a simple business” for normal people, both for the victims and for the criminals; there is a huge internal dimension of human trafficking; the victims are no more smuggled, so they are recruited among the Bosnian citizens; finally, there is still a scarce involvement of the civil society and no information on what the Institutions do to coun

¹⁵³ As I have already underlined, some parts of my essay were presented at the Conference *Anthropology in the World*, organized by the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland in June 2012.

5. Some conclusive considerations

As I tried to prove in my article, the common perception in BiH as well in the majority of the Eastern Europe Countries is that *human trafficking* is just a “business” and not a crime against humanity. So the main challenge is to change this wrong perception and to work on raising awareness among civil society. Moreover, it is very important to focus on the victim status, because victims are fundamental as witnesses during the trials against the criminals and they need protection (IOM, 2007).

As Jo Goodey says (2004), the treatment of trafficked women as victims of crime and their treatment as criminal justice informants are different between EU Member States and not EU Member States and this clearly constitutes a very big problem.

“It is very hard to identify a victim who does not co-operate or, as often happens, denies his/ her status, does not accept our view of him/ her as a potential or real victim [...]. It is also clear that if the victim role is not beneficial to the presumed victim, he/ she will have no reason to come to us [...]”¹⁵⁴.

The weak legal status of the victims in the legislations of most nation states contributes to their reluctance to report the crimes and to co-operate with authorities during the investigation and court proceedings (Savona and Stefanizzi, 2007, p. 20).

So, by working on crime perception and through an actor-oriented approach, my conclusions are as follows: first, the International Community and the local government should continue to work on raising awareness among civil society and on prevention campaigns in cooperation with the local NGOs; second, the funded project should provide a specific vocational training both for the local police and the social operators, in order to ensure the success of the operations and, after that, the collaboration of the victims; finally, a more systematic coordination between institutional, judicial and social actors would allow to cut expenses for small projects and to channel

¹⁵⁴ Report from Finnish Police, 2006.

resources for an effective long-term strategy in counter-trafficking (Pangerc, 2012).

As we are analyzing a crime but also a social phenomenon – from an emic perspective, we will see changes only in a medium long-term period, but I hope that this contribution showed you some concrete premises to deepen the analysis and to try to find other solutions, also with the help of the social sciences, especially anthropology.

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6

Anthropology and conflicts. Today's wars and peace-keeping operations: why an anthropological perspective is needed

Marco Ramazzotti

1. Summary

The nature and the context in which military operations by Western armies are conducted today have changed radically. Western-led armies are engaged mostly in environments that are non-Western in culture – and these different cultures need to be understood. We live in a period of asymmetrical warfare that pitches conventional armies against armies that use guerilla warfare - 'poor' warfare. The instruments we use to analyze asymmetrical wars must be different from those we used for the symmetrical wars of the past. Social attitudes to war have also changed. In the Western world, in principle, civilians can either accept or refuse wars. Parliamentary democracy allows them to influence the decision whether to start, continue or stop wars. They need the information and knowledge that enables them to form a judgment as to whether wars are 'just' or 'unjust'. Soldiers can also accept or refuse wars.

Recent history (the French in Algeria, the French and the US in South-east Asia, the Soviets in Afghanistan) shows that conventional armies are unsuited to fighting a guerrilla-type war. So long as Western conventional armies fought against other Western conventional armies, they behaved in similar ways because Western armies shared similar cultures and values. This no longer holds today. The experience of the Soviet army in Angola

provides a telling example of lack of preparedness for a different cultural environment, and how interpreters helped to bridge the gap.

Despite some resistance to change on the part of the conventional military establishment, “winning hearts and minds” is by now a common mantra of Western-led military and peacekeeping operations. War it is not a technical undertaking but a "social" and political undertaking - and understanding enemy and the enemy's society is the first step to be taken. Since World War II, the US Army has a history of using social scientists and anthropologists in preparation for and in the context of their operations. Operations on the ground by NATO's CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) and its role-playing exercises - which involve military and civil-society actors - can be considered as experiences in “practical anthropology”.

The use of anthropology in analyzing wars and ‘peacekeeping’ operations, and in preparing the military for them, is not only legitimate but necessary. Anthropology can help to respond to some of the key issues that UN or European soldiers will be confronted with while on mission in a non-Western environment. It is required to understand the socio-cultural context, the needs of the people involved, to grasp different perspectives. But one should avoid the confusion between the so-called behavioral or "simplified" anthropology: ("be respectful of customs and behaviors of the host country", which is what most of the armies care about) and anthropology as such – involving a real understanding the culture(s) of a country and people.

Researchers can analyze and understand a conflict by from both sides, that is , also from the side of the offended party. The Author believes that scientists and anthropologists have a moral and scientific duty to analyze, understand and make public the reasons for a conflict, who is right and who is wrong, and to favor a solution to the conflict. Soldiers are citizens and they accept or sanction their Government's policy at election time, by writing, voting and by creating a public opinion against a “unjust” war .

2. The Changing Nature of War and Attitudes Towards War

Wars have changed....

Wars, and in general military operations by Western armies, have changed. Since the end of World War II, Western armies have been engaged – with the exception of Slav Europe – in areas and environments that are non-Western in terms of culture. In recent years, this engagement has been largely in the context of so-called peacekeeping operations. NATO (where we still belong, whether we consider its interventions to be just or not) does not fight invaders in our homelands, but is operational in non-Western areas and environments.

The reality is that the conventional armies of rich countries are engaged today in poor countries, against an enemy which uses guerrilla strategies, which is difficult to identify because it has no uniforms, uses "poor", "improper", "improvised", unsophisticated armament. The enemy knows the geography of the country very well; uses citizens - that is, the entire society - to provide for logistics, and may use a neighbor country (with which it has a frontier) to obtain what its own people cannot provide. The national guerrilla fighter is a fish swimming in the pond of his (or her) own society

...and so have social attitudes towards war.

Social attitudes to war have also changed. The distinction between 'just' and 'unjust' wars has always been present in Western cultures but was limited to the nation state's assessment of the rationale for a specific war. Nowadays, peoples' reactions to wars are not limited to moral judgments but also involve their acceptance of and participation in wars. In the Western world, in principle, civilians can either accept or refuse wars. Parliamentary democracy allows them to influence the decision whether to start, continue or stop wars. Their social (cultural, economic, political) situation allows them to accept or to refuse wars.

Most importantly, soldiers themselves can accept or refuse wars. One can recall the European fighters who joined their countries' Resistance armies against the Fascist and Nazi oppression; American servicemen who refused to serve in the Vietnam war; the *refuseniks* in Israel. Soldiers can refuse to obey illegal orders: international law creates the obligation to follow correct, legal orders.¹⁵⁵ By now, most national legislations recognize the principle of "conscientious objection".

Colonial and anti-colonial wars, 'poor' wars and guerilla

Historically, guerrilla is the military strategy of poor peoples. Colonised peoples (the Poor) started fighting the colonial and the neo-colonial world (the Rich) with the instruments of a poor people's war. Being poor did not mean that they had no technicity, culture or ideology.

Colonized peoples theorized and fought their own types of anti-colonial wars. Great theorists were Mao in China, Giap in Vietnam, the FLN in Algeria. They fought peasants' wars, primarily in rural areas. Colonial and neo-colonial wars were often "total wars", against everybody and everything, with enormous disparity of armament, with outcomes which could often be called genocide (the Germans against the Herero in Namibia, the Italian general Graziani in Ethiopia and Lybia). Wars provoked in Africa by western colonial powers were waged first for slaves, skins and ivory, then for agricultural land, then for copper, cotton, gold, diamonds, oil and coltan (columbite-tantalite)¹⁵⁶.

¹⁵⁵From the *Frankfurter Rundschau*: the Basel Appeal, 1994, by the European Citizens' Forum, with the patronage of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, asks European countries to allow their diplomatic representations to facilitate foreign deserters by providing them with entry permits for humanitarian or political reasons if a town agrees to receive and support them. The financial means for such a support should come from the town's budget. In Germany, Muenster, Jena, Erfurt, Gottingen, Munich, Bremen support such an initiative.

¹⁵⁶ With the slave trade, that is African wars and the hunt for human beings, wars in Africa become more similar to European wars: Africans got training from the new white lords and obtained fire arms. There was nothing traditional about capturing slaves, and there was no one to mediate.

African wars against colonizers were fought for freedom and equal rights. Angolans, for example, fought for their national liberation, against a 500-year long colonization and they consider it to have been a "just" war. Their Portuguese colonizers and the apartheid South Africans spoke of war fought in the name of civilization, for the defense of Christian values against savage negroes that were prey to the Communists. The Portuguese and the South Africans ultimately came to realize that their wars in Angola were unjust.

Differences in perspectives in colonial and anti-colonial wars

The African, Asian, Latin-American people who were confronted by conventional armies, had (as they largely have today) social and cultural characteristics which are different from those of the Western world. The perception of conflict and war also differed. The wars against Spanish colonization in Latin America bred heroes who were national but also continental heroes: Simon Bolivar, José de San Martín - people who fought for their own countries and, at the same time, for their entire continent. This is a phenomenon Europe did not experience, with the exception of Garibaldi in Latin America, La Fayette in the American liberation war against Great Britain, Pilsudsky and other Polish fighters in the Italian "Risorgimento" (the struggle for the unification of Italy in the XIXth sec.).

How did Gandhi and a large part of the Indian world envisage conflicts and wars? Regardless of what we may think of Gandhi's theories and ideas, he was provoking conflicts with the British Empire to arrive at decolonization, but not a war, because he knew he would never have been capable of fighting against the British army. But in the end he won. Was Gandhi just an accident on the road of the conventional officers who intend to continue to wage conventional warfare, or did he represent a new way of conceptualizing conflicts, wars and world reality? We may agree or not with Gandhi's ideas, but we must take his theories into account (despite the fact that India today has the atomic bomb....).

In the Western world, conflict is positive struggle; it means emerging over others, competing and winning. In many Asian cultures, conflicts and (to an even greater extent) wars are considered unacceptable, uncivilized, savage behaviors, even by people who have suffered years and years of persecution, aggression and destruction.

Colonised people wanted independence (on the bases of Western Constitutions' principles of: "*liberté, égalité, fraternité*"). In the Western world, apartheid and colonization are by now negative terms – but how much did the Western countries do in the past to defend those ideas of colonization and apartheid!

Conventional versus unconventional armies today

Poor people often live in (or primarily within) subsistence economies without salaries and without markets or with markets that do not determine their economic strategies. They may be illiterate or have low levels of education. They are people characterized by ethnic structures, and by cultures structured around traditional religions with connections to magic. They fight poor wars, with rudimentary, but often effective means.

Traditional/ internal wars were - and are generally today – small, with a limited number of fighters. They are managed in traditional forms, according to local rules of war; are often fought on ethnic grounds, between non- professional and un-paid fighters. Similar armament is used on both sides (no technologies were employed), for traditional outcomes (often negotiated together by traditional chiefs of the opposing sides). Traditional wars developed into guerrilla wars¹⁵⁷.

¹⁵⁷ Many Westerners ask with (false or real) dismay: why do people, who are so poor, kill each other? Do we, Westerners, have a critical perception or understanding of our conflicts, of our wars, of our genocides? I learned from school memoirs that history is made of wars: the Thirty Years war, the 100 Years war, religious wars and genocides: genocide of the Scottish highlanders, genocide of Protestants by Catholics, of Catholics by Protestants, genocide of the Albigenses, genocide of the "night of S.Bartolomew", genocide of heretics, colonial genocides, pogroms, Shoa or Holocaust, the Savoia fight against Brigands (poor starving peasants!), 600.000 Italian soldiers killed and wounded in 1st WW, 20 million

It is a generalized experience that African and Asian conflicts, fought with guerrilla warfare, are managed differently from conventional wars. They are characterized by low level technology, elementary logistics, participation by the population. They are prevalently ground conflicts, in which the air force and the navy have very limited involvement. Internal conflicts are more frequent than interstate conflicts.

Western peoples with conventional armies are the "rich" people (compared to the other areas of our world), with market (capitalist) economies based on salaries, on industrialization, connected to concepts and structures of the Western world such as a State without ethnic groups or clans or tribes, without important religious linkages, with soldiers who are not only literate but even well educated in scientific fields.

Considering modern wars, it is evident that conventional armies are (very) unsuited to fighting a guerrilla-type of war, as shown by the French defeat in Vietnam, Laos, Cambogia, Algeria, the USA defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the US invented the contras wars and counterinsurgency... Despite this, both they - and their allies - obtained only "minor" strategic results or were defeated (as in Iraq and Afghanistan today).

As long as Western conventional armies fought against other Western conventional armies, they behaved in similar ways because Western armies shared similar cultures and values. International law on war became a common, shared law because there was a Western war culture which made Western countries behave in the same way. Today armies operate in areas which not share similar cultures and behaviors.

3. New Issues Facing the Military Today

In the face of these changes, modern armies are confronted with a set of problems. One (which I do not deal with) is how to equip a conventional

Russians killed during 2nd WW..... And yet, the Indipendence wars were glorious! (glorious or unevoidable?). And what about the decolonization wars? Were they not glorious too? Do we not perceive them as such because we do not know them?

army to fight both a conventional and a guerrilla war. The second relates to how to culturally form and technically train the new cadres of this army so that they are able to analyse and conduct operations in situations which are very different from those that prevailed up to the Cold War; and – in peacekeeping operations - to enable to “conquer hearts and minds”.

In operating in non-Western environments where guerilla tactics are used, even the most traditional "technical" officer, the one refusing to be "political", refusing to have anything to do with what he generically calls "politics", always responding to a hierarchical structure without any complaint, is confronted with issues that differ substantially from those confronting him or her in a conventional war.

- To an increasing extent an officer will be called upon to take increasingly autonomous decisions (the logic of total blind obedience no longer holds);
- It will also be necessary to confront an enemy who does not openly declare himself or herself as such; that officer has to understand who his enemy is according to the deep logic of the conflict (the logic of the uniform and of the flag is also subverted);
- The enemy combatant may not always be male; the combatant can be guerrilla woman (as in Cambodia and Vietnam), no less dangerous than man (the logic of the war as a typical male business is also gone);
- Modern wars exact a terrible toll on the civilian population as victims and as combatants (the logic that soldiers fight only soldiers recognizable as such is gone, soldiers are often fight civilians).

In guerrilla warfare the solution is not a military victory, the destruction of the enemy, but "winning hearts and minds" of combatants and of those providing them support, while leading the enemy with military means to a political negotiation. There may be more or less chances of influencing the end result. The distinction between “technical” versus “political” action, as also the stereotype "politics to diplomats, war to soldiers" are overturned). Just like politicians and diplomats, soldiers work for a political end to the conflict. Technical – military solutions to guerrilla

problems need to be found but these are only partial solutions. They must be complemented by political, military-cum-diplomatic solutions achievable through the understanding of the enemy and of the conflict. This understanding is needed at all levels of our military structure, from the soldier (whose behavior will be respectful of local culture) to the officer whose goal is to conquer hearts and mind

The military also need to be aware of the changing role of civil society. Once, it was left to diplomats, politicians, professional soldiers to judge whether a war was to be undertaken or not. Nowadays, to an increasing extent civil society questions whether a war is 'just' or 'unjust', whether a war is advisable on political, economic, and military grounds. This is a society which votes for or against the war in Parliament – whatever the arguments advanced by politicians and the military to justify it.

In brief, even the most "technically-minded" officer should understand that, in today's age, war it is not a technical undertaking but a "social", and political undertaking, and that understanding the enemy and the enemy's society is the first step to be taken.

A soldier needs to study and learn

There have been moments in our history, in the XIX sec., when our officers were not supposed to study! Our soldiers did not know how to read and write. Historically, there has been a transition from Armed Forces whose officers were supposed to simply fight with their sabers and swords, and were sanctioned for studying, to Armed Forces whose officers must study if they want to be able to recognize their enemies and where soldiers manage very technical, very expensive, very complicated equipment. Rambo says: "You treat me like a dog, I do not get the most elementary job and, during the war I was supposed to use the most sophisticated and costly equipment". Poor Rambo, the saddest soldier in the history of cinema. Nowadays, no soldier can afford to be unaware of the social context in which he or she operates.

Failing to understand the context - the case of the Soviet Army in Angola

In his book “We did not see it even in Afghanistan – memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war” (1986-1988)” from which the following text is drawn, Igor Zhdarkin who was a military interpreter provides a telling account of how the military were ill-prepared for the context in which they were supposed to operate, and how military interpreters contributed to bridge that gap. He recalls that the military to be trained for service in Angola came, apparently, from all parts of the former Soviet Union. The «selection» was very careful and «painstaking».

To give our General Staff its due, they did make serious attempts to prepare people in some fashion or other for service in tropical countries. Naturally, they tried to select people who were in satisfactory physical condition: they had to confront disease such as malaria, yellow fever, hepatitis and amoebic dysentery (.....) And what had to be taken most into consideration was the hot and humid climate (.....). People going to Angola would be trained in geography, history, demographics, the official language of the country(....). Despite all these studies, despite all these endeavors, and despite the fact that serious efforts were made to prepare people, nonetheless, the military who went to Angola were not well prepared. They were not trained in the traditions and the customs of the people and how they generally view themselves, how they conceptualize reality (anthropology!) - which differs substantially from what we are used to. And mistakes are indeed committed when we attempt to cast reality according to our own image and reality - and the Soviets did that in Angola.

The attempt was to recreate in Angola exactly the same conditions as at home, expecting them to work equally well there. The attitude was: “Just as you have become a state of socialist orientation, become whatever else we advise you to be”. (In a simpler language: “since you have become a state of socialist orientation, you should follow our advice”).

Just imagine a simple officer who has just been transferred to Angola. What does he know about these people? He knows practically nothing about them. He arrives in Angola and he begins to think of these Angolans as if they were ordinary Soviet soldiers who share the same ideology and lifestyle with him. That is to say, for him Soviet soldiers are normal, everything works out because this type of soldier both speaks Russian and understands everything. And he shares the same ideology and lifestyle with him, and so on. But, in fact, in Angola, everything is completely different.

However, the Angolans related very well to our interpreters who knew the language, the customs and the traditions of the country they worked in. And it was very easy for interpreters to talk about things that were of interest to the Angolans, and simply about their lives.

Likewise, Angolans greatly respected our advisors and specialists who were not only experts – “good workmen” – but could also speak Portuguese. Knowledge of local traditions and establishment of personal relations were made possible by familiarity with the local language.

The most important thing was the contact between the interpreter, local population and the Angolan military. It was essential for the interpreter to obtain their respect. If, indeed, he gained their respect, then he could iron out any tight situations or unpleasant moments, etc., etc. After all, such moments sprang up all the time.

Many advisors and specialists did everything correctly, helped Angolans in their work and struggle, and honestly fulfilled their duties, but generally they were not familiar with the specifics of the Angolan mentality, they found it often very difficult to obtain results.

We, as interpreters, we understood not only Portuguese or Persian-Farsi or some other language, but also had specialized training dealings with regional military studies. This was a significant subject, including in fact military geography and analysis of international affairs, the study of traditions, customs, history of

the state, what the state represents, and how to conduct oneself in such a state. We were taught by teachers who had already been several times in the particular country of interest. In other words, the best form of instruction is the experience of a witness to this or that event, experience he transmits to his students.

As for the others, on the other hand, especially the technical specialists, they reached out very much to other people because Angolans wished to learn about this and the other.....

Most of all, besides an excellent knowledge of their own special fields, they tried to learn how to say it in Portuguese – that is, if they were not next to a translator. But they could explain to Angolans how to do things.

I think the Angolans are grateful to them up until today for what they learned from them.¹⁵⁸

Col. Sagachko, quoted by Vladimir Shubin in “The hot – cold war, the USSR in Southern Africa”, describes the type of training received as follows:

- One week of training, 8 hours of lectures and “self – preparation” in the evenings, history and geography of the country, natural peculiarities, operational situation, information on combat action, structure and arms of the FAPLA and those of the enemy...
- The lecturers were officers from Desyatka itself (General Staff, Office for Relations with Liberation Movements) as well as from medical, logistical, intelligence and other structures and officers who had earlier served in Angola¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁸ Adapted from Igor Zhdarkin: “We did not see it even in Afghanistan – memoirs of a participant of the Angolan war (1986-1988)”, Institute for African Studies, Moscow, Russia, October & November, 2000 and October 2001.

¹⁵⁹ Adapted from Col. Sagachko, In Angola 1988 – 91, quoted by Vladimir Shubin: “The hot – cold war, the USSR in Southern Africa”, p.89.

4. How War Strategy Has Changed and Adapted

From failures in fighting non-conventional wars to the strategy of 'winning hearts and minds'

From the experience coming mainly from World War II, from the European Resistance and the French wars in Indochina and Algeria, Western armies were forced to take into account and deal with revolutionary armies and guerrilla strategies. In each of these wars, officers of the conventional army produced an anti-guerrilla strategy which ... they immediately forgot about at the end of the war. French officers, after Vietnam and Algeria, went back to being fully conventional officers, showing much more interest in nuclear war than in guerrilla warfare. The same applied to the Americans and to NATO: guerrilla warfare was just an unfortunate (shameful) accident on the route. And when the next guerrilla war explodes, they all have to quickly re-invent a new strategy for it. At least, until the new USA Counterinsurgency Manual - published under the influence and with the support of General Petraeus.

"Winning hearts and minds" is by now a common mantra of Western-led military and peacekeeping operations. Officers are supposed to create friends and avoid creating new enemies. They are encouraged to create cooperation with civilians, influencing military operations through civilian issues. Officers are obliged to look at war - at one and the same time - from both a military and a civilian perspective. At the beginning it was not easy. Nowadays, military customs, cultures and mentalities are gradually changing. And yet many officers refuse any such developments, and prefer to stick to the comfortable culture of "their own" conventional warfare

Resistance to change within the military establishment

The effort of the USA Government and of the Army/ Marines for a drastic change in approach to these wars seem to clash against the obstinacy of a good part of the conventional army which intends to remain

conventional. In an article in The New York Times (04 June, 2012)¹⁶⁰, col. Gentile of West Point stated that counterinsurgency could ultimately work in Afghanistan if the USA were willing to stay there for “70, 80, 90 years”. (As if the USA had not tried conventional warfare in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan for years on end!) Against the more "conventional" view of col. Gentile, col. Meese, again from West Point, says: "Warfare cannot be divorced from its political, economic and psychological dimensions.....Warfare in a dangerous environment is ultimately a human endeavor and engaging with the population is something that has to be done" to try and influence them. It is declared that the new USA Counterinsurgency Manual - published under the influence and with the support of gen. Petraeus – “promotes the protection of civilian population, reconstruction and development”. But this sounds more like propaganda.

Bridging military and civil perspectives – the examples of NATO's CIMIC

Today's military exercises by NATO and European Armed Forces are set in an environment of developing countries and peacekeeping (whatever peacekeeping might mean). As part of the process of “winning hearts and minds” of the population, using the carrot instead of the stick, officers are supposed to create friends and avoid creating new enemies. The capacity to create and maintain such relations are also tested in NATO military exercises through the use of CIMIC – Civilian-Military Cooperation.

CIMIC is an old instrument: it consisted of the rules of military management of occupied (war) areas. Initially, CIMIC referred to the rules applicable in all military occupations in which the occupying Army had to deal with civilian government. Today it is conceived as an instrument to conquer hearts and minds and, at the same time, it is intended to help people to survive in conflict situations. It may consist of a cubic meter of paper money coming down from an helicopter in Iraq to pay here and there. It can be used as an instrument to overcome emergency and start

¹⁶⁰ West Point is divided on a War Doctrine's Fate, New York Times 28/ 5/ 2012 [https:// www.nytimes.com/ 2012/ 05/ 28/ world\(/ at-wespoint-asking-if-a-war-doctrine-was worth-it.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/world/at-wespoint-asking-if-a-war-doctrine-was-worth-it.html)

reconstruction. It may help to build up "friendships". NATO European exercises deal with (a) military problems, in the strict sense of the term; and b) the relations between Armed Forces and the civilian population.

These exercises have both a military and a civil society perspective: the new actors in NATO military operations are the country government, ordinary people, companies, parties, labour unions, the UN agencies, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, unconventional enemies.

During the exercise, CIMIC officers work with civilians who are role players within the so-called EXCON Grey and White Cells. Role-playing means that civilians personify UN Secretariat and UN Agencies' officials, ONG personnel, politicians, civil officials, military personnel, and various characters from the country where NATO intervenes.

The role-plays include: public declarations and appearances in TV, correspondence, public and private meetings ... all possible activities which could occur between the occupying Armed Forces and the people from the occupied country. The aim is exercises to test the capacity of a military to temporarily step out of his or her own culture and to easily connect and deal with the (civilian) culture of the occupied country. It is a test of cultural awareness of military personnel, their willingness to accept "the different" and "the dangerous", their capacity to "play politics" (an expression which the Military normally dislikes), their capacity to choose between the inevitable, correct demands of the population from demands profiting the military occupation. The issue is about knowing the civilian population, trying to understand how people think and behave, being able to recognise signals of incoherent or unusual behaviours which could be relevant for security relevance – but without running the risk of CIMIC becoming military intelligence. We could call it an exercise in "practical anthropology".

5. What We Need to Know, and the Role of Anthropology

Why new professions are needed in the armed forces

For a long time, the profound changes in the general characteristics of wars and military operations have been calling for new professions in the armed forces – and these include social scientists and anthropologists. The evolution in thinking has been similar to that which has taken place over the years in relation to development aid.

Forty, fifty years ago, the debate on the use of social sciences started among those interested in development projects and the developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America. People had to record the failure of the large majority of these projects. What was the uncontested domain of engineers, economists, "technicians" was being opened to sociologists and anthropologists because development strategies were failing and people needed to understand why we, Westerners, did not understand the people to whom we brought aid. Today, in warfare, we face the same phenomenon: we are not collecting victories, to say the least (and accusing the "politicians" is a rather poor excuse!). The concept of soldiers as pure "technicians" of strategy, tactics, military techniques and engineering evolves to encompass soldiers as sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists. War is a social phenomenon. From the use of new academic disciplines, we proceed increasingly towards interdisciplinary approaches.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ In reality, as far as I know, the Italian military information service always functioned as our armed Forces' informal "anthropologist". Today, the need for anthropological knowledge and "finesse" is extending to larger numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers. Once, when I was working in an African country, I was talking to the person responsible for AISE, the Italian military information service, accredited at the Italian Embassy. I told him that I knew an Italian anthropologist. This person knew a certain ethnic group particularly well and he had written a good book on them. The AISE man asked me to introduce him to the anthropologist. Why? He needed to know how this ethnic group lived, how they thought, how they behaved, their relations with the rest of the world. The colonel spent hours talking and asking questions to the anthropologist. The colonel had turned into an "anthropologist".

To 'win heart and minds', officers and non-commissioned officers should seek to identify the "world vision" of their enemies, their deep reasons for fighting, and be able to see the conflict situation with the enemy's eyes. Their objective should be to understand deeper processes which may be hard to grasp, such as clanic - tribal - ethnic relations and conflicts; to make friends (lasting friends) with local leaders; to be able to identify enemies. Studying and defining genealogies is an essential exercise, very useful to define local friendships and enmities.

In countries with a different culture - namely, a non-Western culture - concepts such as peace, war, justice, community, collectivity, State, enemy, social organization, etc are different from ours and are applied differently. If the concept of community in Africa is different from our own concept and we do not recognize such a difference, we will not understand who is in front of us, we will not recognize our friends and our enemies. Anthropology helps to look at what the adversary thinks, how he or she thinks and what channels should be used in order to reach his or her heart and mind.

Anthropology can help to respond to some of the key issues that a UN or European soldiers will be confronted with while on mission in a non-Western environment, say Africa:

- What should soldiers understand of a local conflict? How can soldiers understand it?
- What relationships will people have and build with foreigners when they come as civilians? and when they come as soldiers?
- What are the practical implications of concepts of conflict and war that are different from ours?
- What kind of relations will it be possible to build with national leaders, local administrators, traditional chiefs and important persons?
- When, how should soldiers negotiate with locals?
- What relations should soldiers have with the local population?
- When is "diversity" to be respected and protected, when refused or fought against?

- How to distinguish friend from foe?
- Which are the arguments and the tools we propose to use when trying to win hearts and minds of the local population?
- Who can be, act as intermediary between soldiers and locals?

To answer such questions requires an understanding of differences in culture and beliefs; in traditional versus modern way of exercising power and leadership; in state structures; relations between national and local leaders, between chiefs and people; between the Army and the State; between traditional and modern legislation and justice; between secular and religious power. It also requires an understanding of the relation between conflict and local economies, and issues of competitions between clans, tribes, rich and poor, town and country in specific contexts.

Ferguson and the anthropology of war

A fundamental contribution which illustrates the importance of anthropology in addressing these issues is by Brian Ferguson. In his '*Ten Points on War*', he states:

We must explain war, we cannot accept it for what it is. (...) Wars can be caricatured as explosions of ancient local hatreds, but they are not. Other reasons are hidden behind so called ancient local hatreds.

(....) War is a relation between groups. It is in the nature of war that its politics are internal as well as external. It is unusual, if not rare, for war to involve two pre-existing groups and only them. In actual practice, it is the conflict that firms up the opposed groups. War groupings vary in duration. Segmentary systems, where we may find that enmities stretch over years or even generations, provide structured fault lines guiding groups in alliance and opposition.

(....) Oppositions in war are very contemporary constructions however much ancient history (to build a public opinion in favor of war) is invoked by its leaders (or interested outsiders). These

struggles (author's note: the reference is specifically to identity-linked wars) are often called "ethnic", even though most are not about cultural differences at all. (...) Understanding their violence is impeded without first understanding the specific social character, the social basis of contending groups, worse, by misleadingly tagging them as "ethnic" or "religious" even though most are not about cultural differences at all understanding why wars happen requires bringing into theory the internal politics of each side in a conflict.

The real politics of war is an ongoing dialectic of the internal and the external. (...) Leaders favor war because war favors leaders. In States, war decisions are made at the top, with those below being compelled to follow. In comparatively egalitarian societies, that command power is generally absent, but there are leaders who have their own interests and exert substantial influence over decisions.

War often forces a coalescence of groups in a way that makes the management of people more possible. It leads to the acceptance of certain situations, otherwise unacceptable.

Leaders' pursuit of self-interest in war may be accompanied by a deep sense of moral correctness. To understand wars it is essential to understand the structure of decision making and to identify the total interests - internal and external - of those involved into it.(....)To build a following, they construct narratives and histories to define "us" and demonize "them". They speak to local cultural understandings and fears, invoke potent symbols and offer plausible - even if false - explanations of recent miseries. In modern societies, decisions for war involve a complex array of class, corporate, institutional, media and political positions.

As war needs to be re-conceptualized, so does peace. People often think of peace as the absence of war. Factors leading to peaceful conflict resolution are quite distinct from those that lead to war. Peace has its own dynamic, including behavior patterns, social and political institutions and value systems that foster equitable treatment and the rejection of violence as acceptable means to an

end.Without addressing the more difficult issue of underlying culture of violence, war awaits its comeback.

How anthropologists have been used by the US military.

To illustrate how social scientists and anthropologists have been used since WW II in support of military operations, we can cite an overview of experiences by the US Armed Forces in using anthropology in military operations¹⁶².

During WW2, Ruth Benedict and other anthropologists of the Office of War Information were requested to analyse how the Japanese Emperor was perceived by Japanese society. Their research convinced President Roosevelt not to include the Emperor's unconditioned surrender in the surrender clauses, as was the case with Mussolini and Hitler.

From 1947 to 1952, working for the Office of Naval Research, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and others set up a research program at the Columbia University with the aim of creating ways of communicating with specific cultures. Some of these research results were not only correct and accurate, also proved to be useful in a military context.

Many counterinsurgency operations by Lansdale in the Philippines could be described as applied military anthropology. In the years '50, in the context of the Huk rebellion, he commissioned research on local superstitions, which he then used in his psychological warfare. "People were scared of vampires.... When a Huk patrol was expected to arrive, they would set up an ambush, quietly catching the last one in line.... They would produce two small holes on the neck, as a vampire's bite, and they would abandon the body after having it suspended to bleed it. When the Huks would go back looking for the one who had disappeared and

¹⁶² Montgomery McFate - Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: the Strange Story of their Curious Relationship, Military Review, April 2005.

would find the body without blood, the entire patrol would believe that he had been the victim of a vampire and that one of them would be the next one". Lansdale noted that such tactics were surprisingly effective.

The anthropologist Gerald Hickey sought to analyse the traditional Vietnamese concept of adaptation. In 1967, at the end of the presentation by Hickey of his research to a Pentagon audience, the politician and diplomat Richard Holbrooke commented: "What you are saying, Gerry, is that we shall not get a military victory in Vietnam". Unfortunately, Hickey was right but he did not get much personal success out of it. An interesting little story focusing on the importance of anthropology in preventing and shortening conflicts.

The Australian anthropologist and retired infantry colonel David Kilcullen was called in to manage the "anti-terrorism" office of the Department of State. He contributed to the new "counterinsurgency" manual of the US Army and Marine Corps. Kilcullen describes his work on "counterinsurgency" as a guide to "armed social work" for soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. In certain aspects, it is reminiscent of an anthropology field-work manual: "Get to know the people, topography, economy, history, religion, and culture (local culture). Get to know every village, road, fields, population group, tribal chief and ancient torts suffered. Your task is to become the world expert on your district".

The CIA financed the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program to train more than 150 analysts in anthropology.

For many years, the US Ministry of Defence financed the publication of Area Handbooks or Country Studies (which are now published by a University), a book for each country, with in-depth information on politics, anthropology, culture, sociology, economics, security and military issues.

The "Small Wars Journal" is a review which deals with issues related to small wars, counterinsurgency, sociology and anthropology applied to conflicts, institutional building, nation building rather than simple enemy destruction. It shows the US

effort to evolve and adapt.

The US Armed Forces started the Cultural Operations Research Human Terrain Program in which they use anthropologists and experts in (far away) foreign cultures, who are posted in fighting brigades in Iraq (experts in Arabic language and cultures) and in Afghanistan. Their function was to provide data for counterinsurgency and confront the inadequate awareness of cultural differences at the tactical and strategic levels. It was to provide the brigade commanders with an organic capacity to understand and manage the human environment – the social, ethnographic, cultural, economic and political characteristics and aspects of the people among whom a military force operates, thus improving the decision-making processes of the military commands. In other words, it enabled them to see social life with the eyes of those they were working or fighting with, and provided commanders with cultural experts and linguists who could support them by making them understand what happened under the surface, and influence local leaders. *Language skills (speaking foreign languages) are a critical element of counterinsurgency.*

The Naval Postgraduate School has a study program in cultures and conflicts, which is working on the development of a database on human groups for the Human Terrain Program. Considering the enormous importance of the family, of family linkages and relationships in the countries of interest, important data to be introduced into these databases includes the genealogic data of major families which will facilitate the understanding of their connections, and complex questions regarding tribal relations.

5. Conclusions

We live in a period of asymmetrical warfare (and the term ‘warfare’ is used here to include modern armies’ engagement in what "peacekeeping operations"). Conventional armies are engaged almost exclusively in areas on non-Western culture. The instruments we use to analyse asymmetrical wars and military operations must clearly be different from those we used

Anthropology and conflicts. Today's wars and peace-keeping operations...

for symmetrical wars of the past. The difference in culture between conventional armies and unconventional ones require the understanding of different cultures and different war cultures: for this, we need social science, and specifically anthropology.

Again, in *Ten Points on War*, Ferguson notes (page 46):

Anthropological knowledge is clearly being sought by the military, but for the purpose of waging war. (...) But what if, under a different regime in Washington, we were asked to use our knowledge to help reduce the incidence of wars and reinforce peaceful cooperation?

Anthropologists can help to promote peace by calling attention to the interests of the powerful, dissecting militaristic propaganda and dispelling the pervasive myth that war is to be assumed because humans are inherently warlike and thus war will always be with us.

(...) Part of the cultural phenomenon of war is that both war and its definition are taken as "given", "inherently defined" in human society. Many aspects of this implicit definition are not only wrong but positively misleading. They prevent us from grappling with the reality of war. Anthropology can offer a different vision.

There are political scientists and anthropologists who have tried to understand the nature and reasons for wars; anthropologists who have sought to analyze specific wars and conflicts, some primarily as scientists, some as combatants¹⁶³. The latter use of anthropology has been criticized in academic terms¹⁶⁴, but by people who rejected all wars, on moral and political grounds. I would argue that if the academic researcher agreed on the need to fight a specific war on the basis of the (very traditional Western, Christian) evaluation paradigm "just war – unjust war", then the anthropology of conflict and war by soldiers would become academically

¹⁶³ In the bibliography see Christian Geffray, David H. Price, Paul Richards, Bettina Schmidt & Ingo W. Schroder, Alisse Waterston.

¹⁶⁴ See bibliography, under the heading "Authors against the use of anthropology in conflicts".

acceptable. Anthropologists who refuse all wars do not recognize the difference between "just" and "unjust" wars, between a war waged, for example, by Nazi Germany against European Nations and the USA (war to be refused) and a war waged by European Resistance fighters against Nazi Germany (wars we must fight); between a war for colonization and a war against colonization (France against Algeria, Angola against apartheid South Africa).

The use of anthropology in analyzing wars and 'peacekeeping' operations, and in preparing the military who are involved (as in NATO's CIMIC exercises) is not only legitimate, but necessary. It is required to understand the socio-cultural context, the needs of the people involved, to grasp different perspectives. One should, however, avoid the confusion between the so-called behavioral or "simplified" anthropology: ("be respectful of customs and behaviors of the host country", which is what most of the armies care about) and anthropology as such – a real understanding the culture(s) of the country and people.

To analyze and try to understand a war does not mean instigating a war or taking part in it, being "embedded" in an invading or imperial Army. Researchers can analyze and understand a conflict by from both sides, that is, also from the side of the offended party. I believe scientists and anthropologists have a moral and scientific duty to analyze, understand and make public the reasons for fighting, who is right and who is wrong, and to favor a solution to the conflict. If the scientist is a soldier, he or she will be more aware of the reasons for conflict and consequently he or she will have to decide if he takes part in it, and which is the best policy to seek. Soldiers are citizens and they accept or sanction their Government's policy at election time, by writing, voting and by creating a public opinion.

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The Author's analyses of the Angolan and Sri Lankan conflicts cannot be published because their copy-rights belong to UN agencies and to the EC. The Author's notes on CIMIC (Motta di Livenza CIMIC Command) and those on anthropology and war belong to CASD, Italian Armed Forces Defence Research Centre.

Conclusions. A new grammar for international relations in a new world order

Maurizio Boni

“«World order» is not value-neutral; any actual world order will reflect the values of its architects and members”

(Anne Marie Slaughter)

1. Introduction

I would like to thank Giovanni Ercolani for giving me the opportunity to be part of this interesting initiative, contributing to the ongoing debate on the role of critical security studies in world politics. Consigning to a professional soldier the final considerations on how Anthropology could complement these studies certainly represents a bold move, but I think it appreciates the interdisciplinary nature of modern international relations, as well as the intellectual effort to move beyond traditional thinking and commonplaces to assess security needs which are intrinsically multidimensional and interdependent.

As a matter of fact, the presence of anthropologists along with other social scientists in the majority of the data bases of experts of the western defence general staffs, is a consolidated occurrence that has significantly increased the understanding of the modern operational environments, along with the capacity to elaborate appropriate responses to current crisis response operations. As Harvey Langholtz and Marco Ramazzotti have both highlighted in their works, nowadays there are new opportunities for addressing the root causes of conflicts and for constructive intervention. A challenge that the more conscious actors tackling security issues (including both social scientists and the military) have taken seriously, in the context of

the growing awareness on the inevitability of a interagency approach to emergencies.

As a representative of the military world and advocate of the implementation of a holistic approach to international affairs as well, I feel comfortable in this environment and happy to offer my perspective to the authors whose papers I had the pleasure to read and study. In this circumstance, I don't fear the possibility for a part of the anthropological community to disapprove the application of anthropological theory to the analysis of the military dimension of security, as Harvey Langholtz has mentioned. Acting pragmatically in the framework of an interdependent world, I'm rather inclined to consider the opportunities offered by each element of complementary systems to better understand reciprocal tools and capabilities, for developing integrated strategies to address global challenges. On the other hand, the multidisciplinary footprint of this panel reflects this view, I think, pretty much.

Undoubtedly, this latter aspect has made, to some extent, my task of drawing the concluding remarks more difficult, but it has offered the opportunity to split conceptually my contribution. After ruling out the option of addressing each paper separately, I preferred instead to comment some common and recurrent themes presented by a few authors, and referred to my specific knowledge on security and military matters, and then to expand the focus of the study to a more comprehensive framework, that offers to all of us a common reference for applying the paradigm of the critical security studies.

The first part of my contribution is therefore focused on the debate on security. My intent here, is to assess to which extent the international community has developed the idea to widen the security agendas to implement the concept of human security, "reformulating an understanding of global social and political relations away from the tradition of state centred security studies" (Chris Farrands), and "encompassing more than military questions" (Harvey Langholtz). Thereafter, I briefly explain how the western countries understand military operations today, to complement Giovanni Ercolani, Marco Ramazzotti and Harvey Langholtz's analysis, and to reinforce the idea of the coexistence and the interdependence of different dimensions to take care of, when dealing with crisis management .

In the second part of my discussion I describe two scenarios that may blend into the category of “anthropological and existential places” introduced by Giovanni Ercolani. They are portrayed by Khaled Fouad Allam and Anne Marie Slaughter. The former, Algerian by birth and Italian citizen since 1990, is one of Italy’s most prominent scholars and commentators on Islamic issues¹⁶⁵. The latter is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. From 2009–2011 she served as Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State, the first woman to hold that position¹⁶⁶. They are miles apart in personality, education, professional background and intellectual outputs, but their works (in this particular occasion a speech given to the participants to the 62th session of the Italian Institute for High Defence Studies, and a book

¹⁶⁵ Khaled Fouad Allam, is professor of Sociology of the Muslim World at the Universities of Trieste, Urbino and the Standford University of Florence. His research interests include contemporary Muslim world and the analysis of Islam phenomena of acculturation. He has been member of the Italian Parliament from 2006 to 2008, and he has been appointed Expert about Immigration and New Citizenships matters for the European Union and the European Council. Columnist of “La Repubblica”, “La Stampa”, “Il Sole 24 Ore” and “Avvenire” (the newspaper of the Italian Bishops’ Conference), he has published several essays and books, among which “Global Islam” (Rizzoli, 2002), “Letter to a kamikaze” (Rizzoli, 2004), “The Loneliness of the West” (Rizzoli, 2006), and “Islam” (Laterza, 2007).

¹⁶⁶ Prior to her government service, Anne-Marie Slaughter was the Dean of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs from 2002–2009. She is a frequent contributor to both mainstream and new media, publishing op-eds in major newspapers, magazines and blogs around the world and curating foreign policy news for over 20,000 followers on Twitter. She appears regularly on CNN, the BBC, NPR, and PBS, lectures widely, and has served on boards of organizations ranging from the Council of Foreign Relations and the New America Foundation to the McDonald's Corporation and the Citigroup Economic and Political Strategies Advisory Group. Foreign Policy magazine named her to their annual list of the Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009, 2010, and 2011. She has written or edited six books, including “A New World Order” (2004) and “The Idea that is America: keeping faith with our values in a dangerous world” (2007), and over 100 articles. She was also the convener and academic co-chair, with Professor John Ikenberry, of the Princeton Project on National Security, a multi-year research project aimed at developing a new, bipartisan national security strategy for the United States.

published in the United States in 2004¹⁶⁷ respectively) are somehow convergent in the way they describe social trends that can be caught, understood and processed only if you are inspired by an unconventional way of thinking.

Fouad Allam offers an analysis of the impact of the “Arab Spring” on the relations between the North and the South banks of the Mediterranean, while Slaughter asks us to rethink our views of the political order, looking at multilateralism in terms of interaction among government networks. The title I gave to this concluding paper, merges the two authors’ main themes: the Allam’s concern for governing the interactions between populations belonging to emerging new common social spaces (the quest for a new grammar for international relations), and Slaughter’s study on emerging forms of global governance characterizing a “new world order”. Despite their broad difference both in scope and academic origin, the two approaches highlight the kind of intellectual challenges and trends we should capture and understand in a globalized world. They both provide food for thoughts for any social scientist and decision maker (including the respective advisors) acting in a social world, trying to assess to which extent he/she is capable of grabbing the key developing factors of evolving societies, and applying the available existing analytical tools accordingly. They both represent an ideal background in which Danielle Moretti-Langholtz and Desirée Pangerc’s fieldwork methodologies, Chris Farrands’ visual ethnography, and Harvey Langholtz’s psychological perspectives, in particular, could well fit in.

2. The debate on security

I appreciate what Barry Buzan and others have argued on security being constructed “in specific contexts and within the boundaries of certain kinds of knowledge” (Chris Farrands). I understand this statement in the sense that the debate on security should be tailored to specific geopolitical and social contexts. Indeed, the notion of “security” is employed in an impressive range of contexts and for multiple purposes. It’s a multifaceted

¹⁶⁷ Anne-Marie Slaughter: “A New World Order”. Princeton University Press, 2004.

concept loaded with assumptions, structures, solutions and functional ideas which varies according to different realities.

Since a decade at least, in the Old Continent this discussion has gone well beyond the framework of the military dimension, opening a space for a more articulated approach. Since its inception in 1999, the year when the European Union (EU) has begun to take on foreign, security and defence policies responsibilities, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) takes into consideration a world of complex, dynamic and interrelated threats along with the uniqueness of each crisis/ region. The “European Security Strategy” (ESS), adopted by the European Council in 2003, encompasses poverty and diseases, the competition for natural resources (water in particular), global warming and energy dependence among the characterizing factors of global challenges¹⁶⁸, and most of the security challenges are assessed to be of a comprehensive nature: political instability, violent conflicts, extremism and terrorism, organized crime and humanitarian crises. Due to its comprehensiveness, the EU is well suited to address these issues, and the EU’s approach to prevent/ cease conflicts and (re)build peaceful and stable societies, is based on a combined and tailored response made of diplomacy, trade, development and humanitarian aid delivered through police, judicial, civil protection and military tools. The EU members decided to share this vision of such an articulated way to do business on matter of security, and to tune up their respective policies and actions accordingly.

In 2004, a “Security Research Programme” (SRP) has been launched by the European Commission aimed at developing a fully fledged European civil security framework. The European Research Innovation Forum (ESRIF), established in 2007, takes care of this task. ESRIF’s main message is that

“European security is inseparable from social, cultural and political values of European life. Such values need to be present at every level of security research and development. A threat to Europe is a threat to Europe social integrity. Security research

¹⁶⁸ “A secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy”, Brussels 12 December 2003.

must necessarily in the future focus on understanding and developing Europe's societal resilience and the ability of Europe to absorb the shocks associated with potential security challenges"¹⁶⁹.

In all, the scope of the security research is widening to take into account societal fabric and vulnerabilities of societies within the EU, and appreciating the increasing inter-linkage between the internal and external dimension of security. Certainly, the implementation of the ESS can't be classified under the heading of the fully successful stories, because the EU and the Member States have not translated it into clear priorities. Nor has it had a real impact on the development of means and capabilities, on which the ESS remains vague as well. At the same time, the SRP has highlighted the existence of many ways to interpret the EU's role in security along with some gaps/ duplication between national and European level efforts. But this is not the point.

What is relevant, here is that despite the inevitable implementation shortfalls, there is a European increasing emphasis on societal and human security. The acknowledgment that societal security is about safeguarding both the state and the population. The focus on the "society" as a whole and on everything that could disrupt or damage it. The idea that security research, encompassing the broader concept of the word and the more traditional "hard" military research, are moving closer together.

Moreover, during the last two years and a half the security agenda has further expanded to include the financial speculation, a cross borders unconventional type of offence capable of disrupting entire societies as much as conflicts and wars. It's interesting to see how the European Central Bank (ECB) has recently taken its most ambitious step yet toward easing the euro zone crisis, spreading responsibility for repaying national debts to the euro zone countries as a group. Thanks to this move Mario Draghi, the Italian president of the ECB, has been recently assessed to be "the most

¹⁶⁹ ESRIF Draft Final Report (2009), pg.11.

powerful central banker in the world”¹⁷⁰, and his financial strategy a critical element (if not the most important today) for restoring confidence and prosperity in the Old Continent. Indeed, the ECB’s way ahead represents a major evolution from its original narrow mandate to restrain inflation, paving the way for a more federal Europe, but in its essence characterizes a “defence” from an irregular form of attack that affects human beings who are sharing a political territory much wider than any single state. Human security today, at least at these latitudes in the world, is very much dependent on the way the European political leaders coordinate and stabilize their interdependent economies and, more generally, the respective banking systems. In practical terms, the situation highlighted by Danielle Moretti-Langholtz citing Holms, Marcus and Nash, stressing the impact of supranational markets that are “virtually invisible and inaccessible from the standpoint of conventional political ideology and practice”, in defining our era.

As we turn our sight elsewhere, the above described highly sophisticated approach fades away to give space to less comprehensive environments. In the majority of the African Continent, where the number of civil wars is decreasing, but the number of inter-state wars and low intensity conflicts is increasing, security often means freedom from violence and from fear, and human security encompasses infant deaths, malnutrition, insufficient medical treatment, low life expectancy, political instability, and the like. The African Union, the new comer organization founded in 2000 mirroring the EU structure, has put security and defence at the hearth of its policies, improving cooperation and integration among its members. Many states have joint a new formulated Common African Defence and Security Policy, and undertake joint peace operations, in an intellectual framework in which the physical security of human beings still represents the main concern. In this context, two layers of security communities¹⁷¹ are developing in parallel: continental (e.g. the African

¹⁷⁰ International Herald Tribune: “ECB takes new powers”, Friday, September 7, 2012, pg 2.

¹⁷¹ “A security community can be defined as a group of states joined by collective identity and shared values, not just by common threats”. See Benedikt Franke in

Union) and regional (e.g. the African Regional Economic Communities) with many states being members of both types. This means that the African continental security system is currently decentralized, incorporating regional security initiatives into continental policy. Decentralization means regions feel direct ownership of the continental security system and have central role in decision-making. This reduces competition between the layers and reassures states previously opposed to centralising security¹⁷², but although security cooperation has improved, in some areas of Africa there is no guarantee that this articulated approach will continue, due to the existing endemic economic, social and political shortfalls. Notwithstanding the setting up of structures and institutions to implement new courses, widening the scope of the security agenda remains challenging.

In China, where the human rights issue remains unsolved, there is simply no chance to abandon the state-centric hard military dimension of security, since Beijing's main focus is the sustainment of its aggressive economic global expansion and the preservation of its unparalleled military superiority in East Asia.

In the nearby centralist state of the Russian Federation, an asymmetrical development in human security has taken place during the first two decades of transition from the communist period. The oil-led economic boom did improve the human security of citizens in some specific dimensions directly linked to the exploitation of such a business, but not in others where the state-centric approach to modernization has often resulted in a loss of individual security and liberties. On the other hand, the political mentality of Russian society is divided. Priorities and interests which members of society, including elites, recognize and pursue are different. Against a general request for increasing democracy and respect for human rights, the debate on security is still dominated by the "national interests" affected, at their turn, by at least two elements of continuity of Russian and Soviet history. First, the concept of Russia's missionary idea: the political

"Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities". *Cooperation and Conflict*, September 2008, vol.43 no.3

¹⁷² Ibid.

and military elites are united in their strong belief that Russia foreign and security policy must aim at regaining and consolidating its status of great power. Second, the country's specific geopolitical situation: the permanent encirclement syndrome that pervades the Russian leadership since centuries, the consequent struggle for maintaining sovereignty and influence over the remaining territories of the former Soviet Union, and the effort to contain the effects of a perceived growing western pressure. Therefore, the traditional Russian political culture of the idea of the state representing an end in itself rather than serving the interests of the society, coupled to an intrinsic vocation to power projection, hampers the possibility to apply the paradigms of the critical security studies.

In the Korean Peninsula, the two Koreas have been suffering through a long period of military confrontation since the years of the Korean War in the fifties, and there is little hope that the situation will improve in the near future. Over the last few years both Korea have strengthened their armed forces, and after the 2010 North Korean attack in the West Sea, the military build up is likely to continue in the years ahead. Military confrontation is an extension of political confrontation funded on the incompatibility of the political, economic, and social systems of the two states. While the northern society is locked in a dictatorship, the economic dynamism of the Southern state compensates the leading conventional military dimension of security.

A kind of situation that the about 16 million inhabitants populating the disputed territory of Kashmir, between India and Pakistan, are used to since the UN-brokered ceasefire on 1 January 1949, with the aggravating circumstance of the presence of nuclear weapons. A recent Chatham House's study illustrates that for a large majority of the population (81%) unemployment is thought to be the most significant problem faced by Kashmiris. Government corruption, poor economic development, human rights abuses and the Kashmir conflict itself are all given as the main problems facing people¹⁷³.

In Cyprus, the event of a massive flow of incoming European citizens living in the nearby territories of the Middle East using the island as a safe

¹⁷³ Robert W. Bradnock: "Kashmir: Paths to Peace", King's College & Associate Fellow, Asia Programme, Chatam House, May 2010.

area in case of turmoil represents for the populations of the Greek portion of the island, a major source of concern. As the Cypriots already experienced such an occurrence in 2006 in the occasion of the Lebanon crisis, they consider this possible incident a form of “asymmetric warfare”¹⁷⁴. On the other hand, since the partition of the island in 1974, the Greek Cypriots are the protagonists of a weird living condition as each citizen is keeping a rifle along with some 500 rounds of ammunition beneath the bed, fearing a military invasion coming from the Turkish-controlled portion of the island. A security paradox of the 21th Century in which, respectively, an EU and a NATO members, confront on the basis of purely political-military considerations.

If we look at the Middle East, still the higher militarized region in the world and probably the most complex from a geopolitical standpoint, national security is normally seen in terms of military strength and internal security operations against extremists and insurgents. The upheavals of the Arab Spring have highlighted how national security is measured in terms of the politics, economics, and social tensions that shape national stability as well. The wrong kind of internal security efforts, and national security spending that has limited the ability to meet popular needs and expectations can do as much to undermine national security over time as external and extremist threats. Ongoing domestic changes throughout the region are becoming increasingly important and issues such as political and economical reforms, civil military relations, leadership change, and the information revolution are all affecting regional security dynamics, but it is far from certain that the regime changes will evolve into functional democracies and governance. The religious rivalry, alone, is a dominant element of the equation and the future of the entire area depends on the outcome of the ongoing dispute between Shiites and Sunnis. In the framework of the complex Syrian crisis, for example, militant Sunnis from Iraq have been heading to Syria to fight against President Bashar al-Assad for months since the beginning of the civil war. While I’m writing, Iraqi

¹⁷⁴ Concept expressed to the author by the Director of Larnaca Civil Defense in the occasion of the Exercise “ARGONAUT 2012” held in that city in October 2012, simulating a Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Cyprus.

Shiites are joining the battle in increasing numbers, but on the government's side, "driving Syria ever closer to becoming a regional sectarian battlefield"¹⁷⁵.

In Central America, citizen insecurity is driven by criminal threats, fragile political and judicial systems and social hardships such as poverty and unemployment, which leave large portions of the population susceptible to crime. Drug trafficking organizations, along with transnational gangs and other organized criminal groups, put at risk the existence of Central American governments, and their respective societies, along with their inhabitants. Considered the state of affairs of these countries, the response to such a circumstance has been (and it's still) rather conventional: more aggressive measures, including deploying military forces to help police with public security functions and promulgating anti-gang laws. Other softer preventive initiatives have been put in place, such as intervention programs that focus on strengthening families of at-risk youth, along with regional cooperation strategies that take into account the increasing transnational nature of the threats, but nothing more elaborated.

This is not an exhaustive case studies list, but a more accurate analysis of the rest of the existing political and social realities in the world wouldn't add anything more significant in substance. There are locations where history hasn't substantially moved from the inter-state confrontation of the 20th Century, and the idea of security is simply overlapping with the conventional traditional scheme of the balance of power. Other places, where human security focuses just on freedom from violence and where state security is really an apparatus for the imposition of the power of the state as such, using a Chris Farrands's term.

The spectrum of possibilities varies according to geographic location, cultural, historical and social factors which are instrumental to limiting/ expanding the kind of possible response. On the other hand, since broader concepts of human security include everything from poverty to genocide, it has often proved too all-embracing to be helpful in policy development, posing an additional layer to complexity. The challenge

¹⁷⁵ Yasir Ghazi and Tim Arango: "Iraqi sects join Syrian battle on both sides", The International Herald Tribune, Monday, October 29, 2012, pg5.


therefore isn't that much in recognizing the role of social sciences in international relations but, rather, to assess in which context wider analytical tools can complement the more traditional security studies, and to select the most appropriate methodologies to inspire the decision making process, should any targeted political leaderships be eager to do so.

The western communities have developed the more comprehensive intellectual requirements to implement such an approach, the worldwide exportation of which remains challenging, at least for the legitimacy aspect raised by Harvey Langholtz of the imposition of western-style solutions and institutions to other forms of political-social organizations. But despite the relevance of this latter element in the debate, in recognition of the "universality" of the tenets of the critical security studies, we should also pragmatically select the geopolitical contexts in which such an approach could be gradually implemented.

3. The growing complexity of (Western) military thinking

Today, in Western countries the military portion of security is dealt with a growing interagency focus and holistic posture. Since more than a decade by now, the totality of the Western armed forces (not necessarily NATO members) are planning and executing their operations taking into account the political, economical, social, infrastructure and information factors characterizing the operational environments, along with military considerations.

The challenge: understanding the systems in a PMESII environment



The intellectual tools to understand the complexity of the current crisis scenarios have been developed by educating the military leadership along with their subordinates at all levels, from the very beginning of their respective professional careers. This mind set is well shared with an increasing and differentiated number of civilian interlocutors, with whom the military world is used to interact, attending the same universities, post graduate courses as well as specific education and training events. Giovanni Ercolani has already stressed NATO's consciousness of the fact that "military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security" and that is necessary to work "with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments"¹⁷⁶.

¹⁷⁶ NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration, Para. 8, which also states that the effective implementation of the comprehensive approach "requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy".

The international community recognizes the “Comprehensive Approach” (CA) as the effort to pursue greater synergy, harmonization and complementarity in the international peace-building system, and a lot of actors are now committed in implementing this principle. In the United Nations context, there have been generated the “Integrated Approach” and a specific structural arrangement in the context of UN peacekeeping operations: the “Integrated Mission”, with the focus on a wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions¹⁷⁷. Other similar definitions include the “Whole-of-Government” approach, endorsed by United Kingdom and Canada, the “3D” (Diplomacy, Development and Defence) approach adopted by the Netherlands and the United States¹⁷⁸, while the “Multinational Experiment 5” process describes the overarching framework in which various nationally sponsored concepts (or focus areas) are evaluated for their individual practicality and for their critical integration linkages, with other focus areas to support effective and efficient coalition operations¹⁷⁹. The “Human Terrain Systems”, mentioned by Harvey Langholtz refers to this background, but with a more limited scope compared to the CA.

¹⁷⁷ Integrated missions refer to a type of UN mission in which there are processes, mechanisms and structures in place that generate and sustain a common strategic objective and a comprehensive operational approach among the political, security, development, human rights, and where appropriate humanitarian UN actors at country level. See “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations-Principles and Guidelines”, 2008, Chapter 5, Para 1”Planning a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation”.

¹⁷⁸ The United States established the “Center for Complex Operations” (CCO), a congressionally mandated center within the Institute for National Strategic Studies, located at the National Defense University on Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington DC. The CCO is tasked to conduct research, identify lessons learned, enhance training and education, and improve the planning and execution of interagency operations. www.ccoportal.org/

¹⁷⁹ The Multinational Experiment 5 community includes 18 nations, NATO and the European Union. Specifically Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and NATO’s Allied Command Transformation comprised the partner and participating nations. Additionally, Australia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Singapore, South Korea and the European Union are involved as observers.

The common idea is that the scope of modern crisis is often of such a scale that no single agency, government or regional/ international organization can manage it on its own. The recognition of that represents the good news. The bad news is that efficient complementarily and coordination is very difficult to achieve in such a multi-dimensional arena. Despite the agreement in principle on the necessity to coordinate, each agency, organization, government its incline to serve its own strategic goals and interests. The definition, at the strategic level, of the type of integrated operation to launch and the interests it may serve, constitutes the main challenge: the scene where “political realism may meet theory” (Harvey Langholtz). In the above mentioned framework, as Rupert Smith affirms,

“military force is considered a solution, or part of a solution, in a wide range of problems for which it was not originally intended or configured [...] We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability and if possible democracy”¹⁸⁰.

In other words, “establishing a condition” is the hallmark of the new paradigm of modern military operations. “A condition in which humanitarian activity could take place, and negotiation or an internal administration could lead to the desired political outcome”¹⁸¹. This idea reflects what Marco Ramazzotti has mentioned about soldiers achieving political end states along with politicians and diplomats, even though he refers his analysis to a specific operational background (the asymmetric warfare) which represents just a portion of a possible operational spectrum.

¹⁸⁰ General Sir Rupert Smith is a retired general. In his forty-year career in the British Army he commanded the UK Armored Division in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, commanded the UN forces in Bosnia in 1995, was General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland in 1996-99, and then served as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) in NATO. He is the author of the best seller titled “The Utility of Force – The art of War in the Modern World”, published by Penguin books in 2005.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

In order to establish a condition, it's necessary to understand the "road to crisis" including its root causes both at strategic level, the stage where the operation is being shaped, and at operational/ tactical level, the arena where the operation is being planned and executed. This is the context in which the contribution of social scientists is becoming the more and more relevant, and where soldiers are requested to understand, on their part, sociology, psychology, anthropology and economy because social factors permeate their operational environment. This is the context in which, for example, the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept (Giovanni Ercolani's main theme), has been thought, developed and fully implemented.

Desirée Pangerc offers the opportunity to apply her field work methodology to another human trafficking scenario in the Horn of Africa, where thousands of refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia make their way to the smuggling hubs in Puntland, Somaliland (two semiautonomous regions of Somalia) and Djibouti, for a risky journey across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, and other locations in Middle East. Smugglers and pirates work hand in hand with the formers loaning their boats to the latters. In return, the pirates pay the smugglers a percentage of the ransom they receive from a pirated vessel. Very often, pirates and smugglers overlap as pirates skiffs are used in a dual role. On their way to Yemen filled with migrants, and then equipped to attack commercial vessels before sailing back to the northern coast of Somalia. The majority of the military navies running counter piracy operations in the region¹⁸² can do almost nothing to contrast human trafficking at sea, because this occurrence legally exceeds their mandate. On land, instead, there is more room for action as the international community is committed in establishing the condition of a stable and functional governance in Puntland and Somaliland through, among other initiatives, the eradication of piracy and the other illegal activities, including human smuggling, that hamper social and economic development along the coast. In the comprehensive framework of the "Capacity Building", some European nations and the United States' armed forces, are implementing projects to strengthen Puntland and Somaliland's

¹⁸² Mostly acting under NATO/ EU flags, or running national counter piracy missions as "Independent Deployers" like Russia, India, China, and even Iran.

security forces, in order to enable local authorities to prevent and disrupt such illegal activities. Coupled with the broader international civilian-led efforts to improve the effectiveness of local institutions or to re-build them in the same region, these programs constitute a framework in which social scientists contribute to the development of recovery processes with benefits for the whole range of civilian and military initiatives. You can imagine how relevant is the mapping and the study of the clanic Somalian society, for example, just to mention one of the common basic requirements to start working in the area, and how therefore relevant is the specific contribute of anthropologists in finding origins, causes and features of human behaviours and in suggesting working solutions.

In any case, creating/ establishing conditions represents just one element of a multifaceted operational environment, in which military forces can be asked to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping/ stabilization, reconstruction and combat operations simultaneously. This is the nature of the “Hybrid Conflicts”, already mentioned by Giovanni Ercolani, or the so called “three/ four blocks war”¹⁸³ in which the type, the scale, the priority and the relationship of the blocks vary in a rapidly changing operational environment. For any military organization, embracing such an all-round approach means to educate, train, and equip its own forces to face complexity and multiple tasks, preparing to be committed for very long periods of time.

Still, the above described talented intellectual framework, concerns just a minority of armed forces in the world, incidentally coincident with NATO/ EU members and Canada, and with those countries whose political military systems refer, for their domestic developments, to the above mentioned community. While the “western block” is struggling debating the utility of the use of force in modern operations, and contributing to the

¹⁸³ The term “Three Block war” was coined by General Charles C. Krulak when he served as Commandant of the United States Marine Corps (1995-1999). Based upon the challenges the Marines faced in “failed states” such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, he offered the concept as a metaphor to describe the demands of the modern battlefield. This is imagined to be urban and asymmetrical, an environment with few distinctions between combatant and noncombatant. The fourth block has been added later on, to reflect the “reconstruction” portion of a possible mission.

implementation of the CA, a relevant cluster of other states anchor the employment of the military to more conventional roles, especially in those areas of the globe where the interstate confrontation paradigm of the past centuries remains still extant. Rupert Smith reinforces this idea:

“The higher educational levels of the west European armies, the expectations of their societies as to how soldiers should be treated and employed, all dictate the nature and operating method of those forces. At the risk of a gross generalization, they are technologically dependent, require considerable resources to keep them in the field comfortably, and their political masters tend to not be prepared to risk them”¹⁸⁴.

Going back to the geopolitical overlook presented in the paragraph on the debate on security, we can appreciate the foundation of such an assertion. Western military thinking reflects the sophisticated approach to security that typifies western societies where, unlike other realities worldwide, the issue of striking a balance between “hard power” and “soft power” strategies remains relevant.

4. A new grammar for international relations

One good example of considering the human being as the focal point for developing innovative social and political settings is represented by Khaled Fouad Allam’s analysis of the ongoing deterioration of North Africa and Middle East geopolitical situation. He affirms that during the last 30 years, Europe has been failing in defining a timely political architecture capable of inserting the south bank of the Mediterranean into the dynamics of globalization. The adoption of such a narrow minded approach focusing just on “regimes elites” instead of “people and societies”, and characterized by a structural lack of communication and real understanding, prevented analysts and decision makers sitting either in Brussels or in any other western capital, to predict the events which are currently grouped under the

¹⁸⁴ Rupert Smith, “The Utility of Force – The art of War in the Modern World”, pg. 22.

very well known term of “Arab Spring”. Notably, according to Allam, one of the most relevant causes of this failure has been the implementation of the western community’s “good neighbourhood”/ “partnership” strategies, developed during the 1960s and 1970s, and now totally obsolete.

Migrations, turmoils and civil wars are long lasting processes, which are effecting both north-south and Europe-Arab’s perceptions of the relationship between the notions of territory, personal identity and governance. In particular, as they permanently set up in the European territory, the thousands of immigrants coming from the scourged Maghreb are undermining the conventional way of thinking on this issue. Looking with a medium/ long term perspective, it’s becoming the more and more difficult to apply a rational definition of geographic boundaries to not homogeneous populations who recognize themselves as a part of a (new) common “political space”. In other terms, “heterogeneity”, to be assumed, as Allam points out, as the main functioning principle of current society, brings along a more fluid notion of territoriality which effects, in turn, the political governance. The future “European identity” will therefore depend on how this political space will be perceived by its assorted inhabitants, and on how far it will be physically extended.

Faced with the need to develop a new interface mechanism with the effected populations/ societies, and to build up innovative forms of governance, the western community seems incapable of appreciating the ongoing social/ anthropological changes, lacking a visionary approach and the definition of clear objectives to achieve as well. We are therefore managing the globalization processes in presence of a critical asymmetry. On one side, the real effects of such revolution in terms of migrations, financial speculations, oscillating courses of economy markets, and new demands for political leaderships. On the other side, the reality of the outdated 20th Century’s instruments and modalities inspiring the current ineffective political options. What is therefore missing, as Allam articulates, is a “new grammar for international relations” understood as the “substance of relations between systems merging in different contexts”.

This new “grammar” should consider the Mediterranean area, in its entirety, as an intermediate political space in the world system in which “circularity” and “connecting rings” prevail on the existing conventional

dividing lines. In which, the national state enters the globalization challenge with the perspective of adapting its structure to a constant growing of diasporas and “contamination”, that contemplates the territory as nothing more than a “supporting carrying vector”. Transition measures to accompany this developments and to integrate minorities are essential, bearing in mind that integration means to feel the affiliation to a community sharing a common destiny, as individuals as well as collectively. Facing an emergency after another without projects, in a political vacuum and without a clear understanding of the new needs, leads the way to conflict. In the Mediterranean area, there is the risk to convert its south bank into a sort of south European “security line”, separating populations sharing already the same political and social environment.

Stretching the concept, Allam predicts the political geography for the next 30-40 years to come characterized, as he firmly believes, by “interface relationships” between three geo-political systems/ connecting rings, in which the world circulation will take place, such as Europe/ Africa/ Mediterranean – Asia/ Pacific – Australia/ Oceania.

This fascinating analysis carries the high “destabilizing” potential to put under question the conventional notion of nation state itself, along with the elaborated institutional architecture developed in Europe through decades. As Europeans, considering the characteristics that differentiate North African political and social conditions from those of the remaining of the Mediterranean area, we should focus on the first “ring” in particular, setting the interface mechanisms between Maghreb and the Old Continent. In fact Maghreb, where societies are relatively unconnected from their neighbours, differs from Middle East where the politics of Syria and Lebanon, for example, cannot be divorced from stability issues in Jordan and Iraq, or from the fearful reactions of Turkey and Israel, with a bigger difficulty to apply Allam’s circularity paradigm as such. Is the already mentioned European comprehensiveness, capable of adapting its heavy bureaucratic mechanisms when confronted with the perspective of a territory understood as just a “carrying vector”? What is security (and human security) in the framework of such an “intermediate/ new common” and “contaminated” political space? How should we harmonize

“circularity” with governance? How should we eventually fill up the political vacuum applying the principles of the critical security studies?

Allam’s description of current events offers the opportunity to set up that “multi-sited research design” augured by Danielle Moretti-Langholtz for exploring the predicaments of modernity and insecurity, in which Chris Farrands’ reading strategies suggested by his visual ethnography could complement Desirèe Pangerc’s efforts to examine the nature of migration flows and their possible influence on the development of circularity. In which a new psychology of international relations could develop, being captured and interpreted by Harvey Langholtz’s analytical tools.

On the other hand, the necessity of writing a new grammar of international relations must be endorsed by the totality of the possible stakeholders. Tariq Ramadan rightly sustains that Muslim societies need not only political uprising but also an intellectual revolution that will open the door to economic change and personal freedom. In affirming that “the timeworn dichotomy of Islam versus the West” is giving way to an era of multi-polar relations”, he calls for “courageous scholars and intellectuals who are willing to discuss [...] the need to take responsibility for their actions¹⁸⁵”. A backing of Allam’s circularity coming from a different milieu, coupled with the quest for an intellectual personal commitment that perfectly fits into our discussion.

5. A new world order

Examining globalization challenges from a very different standpoint, Anne Marie Slaughter’s looks at multilateralism not in terms of relations among liberal democracies, but between government networks. For her “world” is one where governance takes place not through communication with nation states’ presidents, prime ministers, or international organizations, but through a complex criss-crossed system of government

¹⁸⁵ Tariq Ramadan is professor of contemporary Islamic studies at Oxford University and he is the author, most recently, of “Islam and the Arab Awakening”. His views, cited in this paper, are expressed in the article titled “Waiting for an Arab Spring of Ideas”, *International Herald Tribune*, Monday, October, 1, 2012, pg 8.

networks composed of courts, regulatory agencies and executives, all of whom are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense level of relations. Understood as critical dimension of any world order, these networks can become the solution to the “globalization paradox”, which is explained as follows:

“Peoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means. [...] Yet, world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the people to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of global demos. No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles. This is the globalization paradox. We need more government on a global scale and a regional scale, but we don’t want the centralization of decision-making power and coercive authority so far from the people actually to be governed”¹⁸⁶.

If national governments officials can work with international institutions, she argues, it’s possible to achieve the required global capacity (also in security matters) avoiding a centralized global institution, coordinating the response to various crises and (possibly) adopting common policies¹⁸⁷. In other words, her vision of a world order is

¹⁸⁶ Anne-Marie Slaughter: “A New World Order”. Princeton University Press, 2004 pg.8.

¹⁸⁷ “A global policy network includes anyone who is interested. It includes nongovernmental organizations, independent experts, activists, scientists and international officials; it can also include the private sector. The idea is that to implement global policy, we need to harness everyone”. A new World Order. Anne Marie Slaughter, Joanne Myers. Public Affairs, April 15, 2004. Available on

“[...] a sphere that would have international institutions do important things that only international institutions could do, but that would be embedded in an increasingly dense web of networks that would span the globe”¹⁸⁸.

Every European could argue that what Dr. Slaughter is presenting is to some extent already in place since decades in the old continent, where the European Union has been experimenting a kind of regional-collective governance based on the same principles. Here, in fact, national officials of all kinds act trans-nationally and trans-governmentally in the context of a complicated multi-faced regulating system, discussing and implementing dedicated regulations focused on virtually all the area of interest for mankind, with the relevant exception of defence matters. On the same venue, we may note that interactions among national officials have been regularly taking place even during and after the cold war, in the framework of the various regional/ international organizations and international bodies which arose in numbers (believe it or not, in the military environment as well).

Trans-governmentalism, therefore, is not really new but Slaughter's analysis is not aimed at “discovering” government networks. She intends, rather:

- “to point out their proliferation in every place we have eyes to see”¹⁸⁹ for many of the same reasons;
- to call the attention to the fact that government officials, who once defined their jobs as domestic, increasingly see their work as having an

Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
www.carnegiecouncil.org/studies/transcripts/4467.html

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. More precisely, World Order “describes a system of global governance that institutionalizes cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all nations and their peoples may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve their stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human dignity”. Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg 15.

¹⁸⁹ Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg 11.

international component, with an expansion of the scope, substance, intensity and range of their business;

- to affirm that “these networks are critical dimension of any world order we hope to establish in this century to address the problems we face now and at least in coming decades”¹⁹⁰.

In this context, I captured at least six main features characterizing this setting:

- the informal structure of government networks: separate government institutions have no formal standing in the international system or modern international law; thereby the coexistence or conflict between the formal unitary state relations and the parts of states acting in the formal sector is a challenging relationship¹⁹¹;
- the shift from hierarchy to network: “from a situation of command and control – i.e. being able to direct people to do things in each corporation – to the challenges posed by a more horizontal structure, requiring one to manage a regional or global network”¹⁹²;
- the increasing level of the “complex interdependence”, understood as “an overall description of relations among nations driven by the increasingly transnational nature of services and by the extraterritorial dimension of domestic regulation”¹⁹³;
- the shift from “government” to “governance”: involving the delegation of transfer of public functions to particular bodies, operating on the basis of professional or scientific techniques¹⁹⁴;
- the “disaggregation” of states: they remain crucial actors, but they are “disaggregated” in the sense that they relate to each other not only through their respective ministries for foreign affairs, but also through a variety of other channels¹⁹⁵;

¹⁹⁰ Anne Marie Slaughter, Joanne Myers. Public Affairs.

¹⁹¹ Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg 152.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg 39.

¹⁹⁴ Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg 43.

¹⁹⁵ “Seeing the world through the lenses of disaggregated rather than unitary states allows leaders, policymakers, analysts, or simply concerned citizens to see features

- the “disaggregation” of sovereignty: traditional conceptions of sovereignty are inadequate to capture the complexity of contemporary international relations. The “new sovereignty” is specified as “the capacity to participate in international institutions of all types, in collective efforts to steer the international system and address global and regional problems together with their national and supranational counterparts”¹⁹⁶.

Each of these trends presents an excellent opportunity for social investigation as it represents an element of a more fluid idea of states organization and relations. More relevant, the fact that Slaughter’s analysis recalls the same Allam’s issues concerning new forms of governance and sovereignty, despite her totally different research premises and requirements. Two academics, with the same end state. Two processes with different speed and dynamics, as elements of the same gear mechanism. A longer cycle encompassing a smaller cycle, in which the synchronization machinery is part of that new grammar for international relations under scrutiny.

As a matter of fact, the above described situation is just reinforcing Zygmunt Bauman’s paradigm of “liquid modernity” presented in his homologous book published twelve years ago¹⁹⁷. Giovanni Ercolani has already referred to this fascinating predicament that offers a capable tool for interpreting social changes. Raymond Lee, one of Bauman’s theories interpreters, provides the following summary:

“ The concept of liquid modernity proposed by Zygmunt Bauman suggests a rapidly changing order that undermines all notions of durability. It implies a sense of rootlessness to all forms of social construction. In the field of development, such a

of the global political system that were previously hidden. Anne-Marie Slaughter, pg.5.

¹⁹⁶ As defined by Abram and Antonia Chayes in “The new Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements”. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995.

¹⁹⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, “Liquid Modernity”, Cambridge, Polity, 2000.

concept challenges the meaning of modernization as an effort to establish long lasting structures. By applying this concept to development, it is possible to address the nuances of social change in terms of the interplay between the solid and liquid aspects of modernization.¹⁹⁸

In this context, the solid part of modernization is represented by the centralization of institutional power, while the liquid portion by its “dissolution”. Another way of presenting the challenging relationship between the formal unitary state relations and the “disaggregated” state portrayed by Anne Marie Slaughter.

Another author, such as Griselda Pollock highlights the following other key aspects of Bauman’s analysis:

“Change is not the passage to the newly ordered; it is the condition of permanently orderless. [...] Instead of settlement, location, national economies and political entities, which made the city its symbol against all forms of transitoriness, offering the order and discipline necessary for production and consumption, the liquid phase of modernity aims to erode frontiers and boundaries. [...] Bauman invites us to consider the relations between the shift from solid, defined, localized, territorialized, nation-bound modernity to that which he has defined as *liquid* rather than *post* modernity. In this qualifier, *liquid*, Bauman catches up the effects of globalization, migration, nomadism, tourism, the effects of worldwide webs and internets, socket-free phones and texters.¹⁹⁹”

¹⁹⁸ Raymond L.M. Lee, “Bauman, Liquid Modernity and Dilemmas of Development”, Thesis Eleven, Number 83, November 2005, SAGE Publications, London.

¹⁹⁹ Griselda Pollock, “Liquid Modernity and Cultural Analysis – An Introduction to a Transdisciplinary Encounter”, Theory, Culture & Society 2007, SGAE Publications, London.

A line of reasoning which perfectly matches Allam's circularity and territorial relativity.

6. Concluding remarks

Drawing the “conclusions to the conclusions” is certainly weird, but since I developed my contribution in the form of a paper, I don't see other logical ways to conclude our brainstorming. The “golden nugget” I would take away, is the portray of a spectrum of analysis in which conventional/ traditional forms of societal organizations, and fluid/ circular/ disaggregated trends stand at the two opposite extremes of the band. They are not isolated though, as different modalities of interaction take place along the spectrum as life goes on.

Accordingly, “orthodox” approaches to security are challenged by more comprehensive and “fluid” ideas of security. In this context, the military dimension of this debate, that has represented a main source of concern for a part of the contributors to this book, offers its potential which is predominant albeit limited, according to the position that geopolitical and social circumstances guarantee to this dimension along the spectrum. As we tread this scale, it gradually blurs to give space to more elaborated concerns, interests and requirements, exactly as military forces are considered just a part of the solution as we get farther away from conventional/ traditional doctrine to deploy and use them.

In some parts of the spectrum, even the tenets of the critical security studies could be at stake, as the “rarefied atmosphere” of the liquid modernity and circularity impose even more demanding constraints in terms of interpreting and follow up actions. In practical terms, assessing in which part of the band a given social action is supposed to take place, understanding which degree of freedom of action is being granted, and then selecting the most appropriate tool/ methodology to influence the social environment, should be the recommended sequence to apply by any actor dealing with security issues. Accordingly, broadening the security agenda shouldn't be considered as an isolated aim *per se*, since this end state must be confronted with each given situation.

To implement such a *modus operandi*, a holistic and visionary mindset is needed, in order to grasp the essence of the evolutionary trends in each “anthropological space”, to overcome commonplaces and to challenge conventional interpretations of reality. The same flexible and adaptable mindset, though, capable of telling the difference between circumstances in which interpreting evolutionary trends and evolving cycles is a must, from those in which providing a solid and functional government in all its aspects is the only workable solution. This is not a utopian proposal, but rather a call for a more, I think, worthy policy. If I was right in capturing the spirit of each paper I have read, all the contributors to this book could be important actors in developing such an articulated procedure as true architects of a possible new world. It’s just a matter of selecting a context and to start working.

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