by Natalia Cervantes (24 June 2014)

Rising levels of violence and crime can erase the benefits of economic growth and dramatically decrease well-being. But if we see high levels of violence as a specifically urban problem, with therefore specifically urban solutions, new ways of approaching the problem can be established. Our Researching Security Fellow Natalia Cervantes explains how her research in Mexico is developing this idea.

Violence has been analysed and written about incessantly. Let’s start by saying that almost any person living in a city of the Global South has had one form of victimization experience or an other – whether directly or indirectly. It may have even been in a ‘simple’ or everyday manifestation of violence: robberies, muggings or property damages. Violence crimes, and the fear of it, have indeed become the reality for millions living in developing countries, thus constraining their personal and family development. Violence is virtually everywhere. Violence has arguably become one of the most pressing issues affecting development. Violence and crime represent incalculable costs, both in economic and social terms. Specifically, violence discourages investment, diverts resources toward law enforcement, and away from health and social services. It also affects social cohesion and social capital; limits social mobility, and erodes good governance by wearing down citizens’ trust in the ability of the state to deal with its causes and consequences.  What is more, since the majority of the world’s population is now living in a highly urbanized world, violence has become more noticeable in urban areas. Urban violence is increasingly recognized not simply as a security issue but also as a phenomenon that has deep social and economic roots.

Latin America has witnessed a persistence rise in violence since the 1980s. This has had devastating consequences for both citizens and governments. It has been suggested by some analysts that there is a relationship between violence and the challenges that growth and urbanization of Latin America have posed over democratic governance; yet, this relationship is certainly neither direct nor automatic. It has been acknowledged that many cities – especially those that grow at a rapid pace – experience the convergence of risk factors – namely poverty, unequal distribution of resources, social exclusion, social and political conflict– that increase the probabilities of violence and crime to appear. The fact is that there is a pressing need to further understand the factors that shape urban violence and its repercussions for cities and overall development.

But how about coming up with an urban solution to an urban issue? There are a number of compelling reasons to focus on the ways in which the processes and relations of development planning underpin urban violence. For example, urban policies often follow an inertia that maintains and strengthens social exclusion and inequality. These policies, then, reinforce – rather than reverse – existing conditions of inequalities, poverty and social exclusion, which consequently may contribute to increasing levels of urban violence. Hence, it can be ventured that some urban development planning processes lead violence to persist given the politics and social implications they represent.

Generally, policy responses to urban violence aim at addressing the so called “multi-causality‟ that drives violence and crime. In doing so, going beyond repression and punishment becomes vital. Since urban violence has social, economic, spatial and institutional roots, a successful approach to reduce urban violence should include those four dimensions.  In a spatial approach to violence, the role of urban planning at local and community levels can become crucial in diminishing opportunities for crime and violence, given that, depending on the typology of violence, most crimes have environmental design and management components. The approach known as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) emphasises the spatial setting of crime and links crime prevention and reduction to municipal level interventions to improve community’s physical infrastructure. It focuses on a number of issues such as street layouts, building and site design, zoning and land-use, transportation system planning and infrastructure improvements, as well as lightning of streets and public spaces. Of course, this is aimed at reducing the opportunity of crime, and, hopefully, to improve cities’ built environment.

This may seem as well-intended, yet awfully innocent and small scale initiative, given the situations of extreme violence some countries experience (read Mexico), but what else can be done when everything that has been tried before seems to be failing? Now, we analyse the context of Mexico.

Why Mexico and why now?

Mexico is a good example of what an extreme case of urban violence implies. Violence has been a central trait of the social and political consolidation of the country. Yet, the levels of violence experienced from 2006 until today have posed new overwhelming challenges to both governments and citizens. The appearance of increasing levels of violence in the country corresponds to a conjunction of historical and current events. Historically, violence is a consequence of deeply rooted social, economic and political problems that have been present in the country for decades. Based on current events, violence is also a cause of new social, economic and political strategies. Apart from drug and organized crime-related violence, several forms and sources of violence have been present in Mexico.

Violence has come to largely redefine Mexico, including the country’s government, society and institutions. The situation appeared to have reached a peak in 2006, and a frontal fight against drug trafficking and organized crime was subsequently launched by the Mexican government. Yet, despite this effort, the government’s strategy did little to decrease the marketing of illegal drugs (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2012). Violence has caused leakage of investment, loss of jobs, and the gestation of a phenomenon that poses a growing threat to national security.

Violence has also redefined the Mexican economy in many ways. It has been estimated for instance, that about 37.4 per cent of the companies in the country were victims of crime and violence in 2012. The rise of violence has been accompanied by the closure of many small businesses and increased unemployment. Violence has redefined how citizens relate to each other. Citizens change their activities and limit their interaction with the rest of society. Violence has also transformed the relation between citizens and institutions of the state; it has eroded citizens’ trust toward the government and its institutions. Violence has also increased corruption and institutional weakness and has hampered the rule of law.

Mexico is coming toward a turning point. The mounting significance of violence and insecurity has provoked the surge of a pressing need to scrutinize the causes, consequences, costs and over all, new strategies to reverse this situation. The traditional approach to urban violence has proven to be insufficient.  The frontal war against organised crime has only provoked violence to spread. Criminal justice and law enforcement have only worsened the problem and triggered a blood-spattered reaction from drug organisations. There has to be an incentive to stop joining drug traffickers, a feasible alternative for citizens to achieve decent living standards: something to look up to instead of violent ways. What if instead of continuing fighting violence with violence, we try to focus on developing better cities and eventually, better citizens?

References

Note that all other references can be accessed by clicking on the hyperlinks.

Guerrero-Gutierrez, E., 2012. Políticas de seguridad en México: analisis de cuatro sexenios, in: Atlas de La Seguridad Y Defensa de Mexico. Colectivo de Análisis de la Seguridad con Democracia A.C. (CASEDE), Mexico.

Sunday’s calls for celebration in “esta gran fiesta democratica”[1] transformed, by evening, into tense stand-offs and a statement that “La Fuerza Armada esta lista para hacer democracia”. What had been projected to be a docile, comfortable second-round presidential election with the governing FMLN party easily obtaining the presidency by a 10-18% margin melted into a tense political dispute with opposing candidates separated by less than a percentage point. As of Tuesday, 11 March 2014, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) continued to aske the candidates to refrain from declaring victory and stated that results would be delayed until Thursday so that an analysis of the results from each polling station could be conducted.* Likely factors for this upset abound. What is certain is that the deep political polarisation of El Salvador has, since the end of its civil war in 1992, rarely been more evident or potentially more explosive.

According to the latest counts, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) presidential candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén achieved 50.12% of the vote in contrast to Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) presidential candidate Norman Quijano with 49.88%. Eager to position themselves in what is at best a murky contest, both candidates have declared victory during celebrations held in San Salvador during the evening of 9 March 2014. Quijano went further by declaring that his party would not allow fraud “al estilo chavista o maduro, como en Venezuela”,[2] challenged the reliability of the TSE, and put the armed forces on notice of a fight for democracy. There exists a rising risk of civil unrest in result as FMLN and ARENA supporters challenge election results and attempt to influence the TSE outcome.

Further complicating the situation is the level to which security plays a role in El Salvador’s political process. Quijano may have been the first to call on the military to defend the election victory of his party but both sides are guilty of politicising security operations during the last months of the election campaign; out-going FMLN president Mauricio Funes deployed soldiers to the streets as recently as this last week in an attempt to bolster security or win security votes as alleged by political opponents.[3] The temptation to turn to military solutions during political problems is an ever-present issue in El Salvador. For decades the country has seen the military at the centre of its political system – either as direct or indirect government actors. A key component of the 1992 peace accords was the de-politicisation of the military and the removal of its overt influence from government institutions and public security structures like the police. To place the military alongside police in establishing greater security in El Salvador has caused consternation over the last decade; to make a call such as Quijano did on Sunday, for the military to stand by for intervention, should ring alarm bells.

The implication of a call to arms is immediate and significant but also worrisome over the medium- and long-term is the lasting impact of security allegations which have been flung by both parties throughout the campaign. First, the subject of a national gang truce has been contentious, as well as misrepresented, throughout the course of the campaign. Although the initiative has been responsible for reducing reported homicide rates by almost 50% since March 2012,[4] opponents claimed with reason that the FMLN was responsible for negotiating with terrorists/criminals.[5] The public has remained distrustful of the gang truce and opinion polls reveal that few see the truce as reliably improving security.[6] The FMLN was further accused of using this initiative to their advantage by employing these same gang members to pressure the electorate into voting for them[7] although there has been little evidence of gang members exerting pressure for votes.[8] The truce continued to influence election discussions both inside and internationally despite both leading parties attempting to avoid the elephant as it related to their own policies as much as possible. Cerén promoted moderate positions generally but avoided direct endorsement or other confirmation of government support for the initiative. Quijano condemned the truce, promising a return to mano dura-style enforcement, but appeared to soften on the issue as the election progressed, discussing re-integration options for youth at risk.

Also of worry has been the role that the gangs themselves may play in the political process. Since the implementation of the truce, epidemic violence responsibilities have been illuminated. Many analysts were surprised by just how heavily gangs dominated homicide rates. It was also unanticipated that concessions granted to such a small number of gang leaders (approximately 30) could extract such drastic results, illustrating a much greater hierarchical structure than previously estimated.[9] The truce has thus also altered the political influence that gangs appear to wield. On several occasions in 2013, homicide rates rose drastically over short periods, most notably in June and July 2013 after the Security Minister and Chief of the National Civil Police (PNC) were changed and new Security Minister Ricardo Perdomo began to publically criticise the truce.[10] As such, contentions that gangs have become political actors or grown to exert political power in the country are not without some truth. Nevertheless, Douglas Farah’s concerns that government concessions to gangs strengthened their political power and increased their extortive influence on the political decision-making process are, at least for the moment, overblown.[11] What should be of concern is that the negative political spectacle to which the truce has been treated over the course of the campaign can only have contributed to what PNC director Pleites declared as the truce’s “technical end”.[12]

Second, the American media and outspoken members of the US political community also challenged the legitimacy of the past five years of FMLN government operations throughout the electoral campaign through highly publicised articles on their alleged links to transnational organised crime. Constant reporting of Salvador Sánchez Cerén’s guerrilla-commanding days during El Salvador’s 1979-1992 civil war coloured publicity in the United States and, as in the 2009 presidential elections, problematized the ability of the US to work with an FMLN-government. A former George W. Bush administration deputy security advisor, Elliott Abrams, was among the primary commentators who highlighted Cerén’s ideological origins as key to today’s international crime and trafficking problems in the country.[13] The US political community on the right has been using allegations of corruption and connections to organised crime in an attempt to influence Salvadorans living in the United States – almost 2 million of them – who sent home about $3 billion in remittances in 2013 and were granted the right to vote in national elections for the first time during this presidential election. As in the 2009 Presidential elections, there were questions raised by this group as to whether US-El Salvador relations would be able to continue if an FMLN government was elected.[14] The interest of the political right in the United States is guided primarily by historic links to the civil war but also see an FMLN government as a means through which organised crime will gain a greater foothold not only in that country but also increase associated gang violence in the United States.[15]

Setting aside the partisan nature with which transnational criminal organisations, including trafficking activities, have been treated in the United States, these organisations pose a serious threat to the country’s national security, its citizens and its government institutions. Abrams is certainly correct in identifying that illegal trafficking money is corrupting officials and institutions in the country and that this is a threat to both El Salvador and the region. El Salvador’s institutions have long been weakened by encroaching corruption via transnational criminal organisations as well as national groups who purchase power within the PNC and other security structures. Jose Luis Merino’s connections to the FMLN, Venezuela, and FARC, tarnish the shine of the “new approach to democracy” image that the party has attempted to construct.[16] However, these assertions are also hardly original in content, having been in circulation since the mid-2000s, and the US has yet to present support to back up these reports.

Third, whilst Merino has been a flashpoint character for the political right in El Salvador and in the United States, serious but less publicised allegations from Insight Crime and online newspaper El Faro revealed individuals close to out-going president Funes maintain ties to the Texis Cartel. Herbert Saca is known to have garnered links to organised crime for over a decade and been close to both ARENA and FMLN presidents, funnelling crime money to at least three different administrations.[17] Not to be outdone for current scandals, however, ARENA has also been struggled to emerge from corruption allegations which dogged it throughout the campaign. ARENA members, 7 former government officials including former Salvadoran President Francisco Flores Perez, were recommended to the Attorney General by the Legislative Assembly for prosecution on charges of grave corruption and the illegal appropriation of $70 million. Although some cited these activities as “trumped-up legal threats against ARENA officials” and evidence of untoward manipulation of government institutions[18] despite ample evidence to the contrary – many asked why it had taken so long for the legal processes to be initiated! What is in evidence is that corruption, like purported criminal links amongst government employees, only serves to heighten fears and broaden gaps in an already polarised electorate.

Security being an explosive subject at the best of times, El Salvador is likely to be visited by further allegations, threats and promises as each party seeks to gain the upper hand in this elections dispute. Prior to the voting period, and despite the politicalisation of security issues and the importance given the issue by campaigning parties, voters reported that they did not use crime as a deciding issue when casting their vote, believing that no party had “good ideas for how to address crime”.[19] What each party needs to keep in mind is that their use of the security issue during the election only likely to exacerbate the issues they are likely to have to address themselves in the months to come. As El Faro opines, unlike the all or nothing calls of the conflicting parties, “en el momento en el que más necesita El Salvador una visión de futuro, de estrategia a largo plazo” and that includes treating security issues with less politicisation and greater contemplation of all the citizens for which they hope to govern.